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Abstract	
Credit derivatives played a large role in intensifying losses during the subprime lending 
crisis, which began in 2007 in the US and spiralled into a financial crisis in 2008. One of the 
major reasons for this descent into financial crisis was the uncertainty about the exposure of 
some systemically important financial institutions through their derivative positions, 
specifically credit derivative instruments such as credit default swaps (CDSs). 
 
Using data obtained from the SARB, the study found that prior to the crisis, the size of the 
South African OTC credit derivatives market was increasing steadily. However, the 2008 
financial crisis temporarily stunted this growth, and the size of the market declined. Since 
2010, the growth of the market has once again been on an upward trajectory. The study 
examines recent international and local regulations relating to OTC derivatives and makes 
policy recommendations for South Africa. 
  
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
3 | P a g e  
 
Abbreviations	
AIG American International Group 
ABCP Asset-backed commercial paper 
ABS Asset-backed securities 
AIGFP American International Group Financial Products 
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
BoE Bank of England 
CB Capital conservation buffer 
CCB Countercyclical buffer 
CCP Central counterparty 
CDO Collateralised debt obligation  
CDO² Collateralised debt obligation squared 
CDS Credit default swap 
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission (US regulatory supervisor) 
CLN Credit-linked note 
CLO Collateralised loan obligation 
CMBS Commercial mortgage-backed securities 
CPI Consumer price index 
CPSS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
CVA Credit valuation risk 
DCO Derivatives clearing organisation (Dodd-Frank terminology for a central 
counterparty) 
DIS Deposit insurance scheme  
D-SIB Domestic systemically important banks 
DTCC The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (US Depository) 
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank 
EMIR European Market Infrastructure Regulation  
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority (EU regulatory supervisor) 
EU European Union 
FAIS South African Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 
Fed Federal Reserve Bank 
FMA The South African Financial Markets Act 
FMI Financial market infrastructures 
FOMC Federal Open-Market Committee 
FSA Financial Services Authority (UK regulatory regulator) 
FSB Financial Services Board 
FSCF Financial Sector Contingency Forum  
G20 The Group of Twenty 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
4 | P a g e  
 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GNFV Gross negative fair value 
GPFV Gross positive fair value 
GSE Government-sponsored enterprise 
G-SIFI Globally systemically important institutions 
ICR Individual capital requirement  
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMM Inside market midpoint 
IOSCO International Organisation of Securities Commission  
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
LCR Liquidity coverage ratio 
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate 
MAGD Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives  
MBA Mortgage Bankers Association 
MBS Mortgage-backed securities 
MoU Memorandum of understanding 
MSP Major market participants (definition from Dodd-Frank) 
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ODP OTC derivatives provider (definition from FMA) 
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QE Quantitative easing 
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SA South Africa 
Safcom South African Clearing Company (CCP for exchange-traded derivatives) 
Safex South African Futures Exchange  
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SIV Structured investment vehicle 
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ZAR South African rand 
 
   
The international organisation Financial Stability Board has not been abbreviated to FSB to 
avoid confusion with the South African Financial Services Board which has been abbreviated 
to FSB. Thus everywhere in this document FSB refers to the Financial Services Board and 
the Financial Stability Board is not abbreviated. 
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Chapter	1:	Overview	
1.1 Introduction 
As of February 2013, the Financial Stability Board found that the “currently available 
information on the size and structure of the South African OTC derivatives market is limited” 
(Financial Stability Board, 2013). While there has been much examination of the credit 
derivatives markets in the US and Europe, a preliminary literature review was unable to find 
a detailed study of the South African commercial banking over-the-counter (OTC) credit 
derivatives market before, during and after the subprime financial crisis. 
 
There are two distinct ways in which derivative markets are organised, the exchange-traded 
market and the OTC market. In South Africa, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
operates the licensed exchange-traded derivatives market. The JSE trades a large number of 
derivatives, but does not offer credit derivative products. Even the JSE’s Can Do Exotic 
Options (in which the contracts details are agreed upon by two counterparties, making it an 
extremely customisable product) are currently only written with equity as the underlying 
product (Johannesburg Stock Exchange Ltd, 2014). At June 2010, the SARB’s data shows 
unexpired contracts at month-end of R25 trillion South African rand of OTC derivatives and 
R0.8 trillion for exchange-traded derivatives. That is a ratio of roughly 31:1. This indicates 
that the OTC market is much larger than the exchange-traded market for derivatives in South 
Africa, which is consistent with international developments in the markets for these 
instruments.  
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Participants in the OTC derivatives market in South Africa mainly consist of commercial 
banks and institutional investors such as asset managers and hedge funds. Prior to the crisis, 
OTC markets were subject to almost no direct regulation, starkly contrasted against the 
highly regulated exchange-traded markets. This indicates why OTC markets are often 
associated with higher risk and less transparent instruments than those traded through a 
licenced exchange. During the period under study, commercial banks were the only market 
participants who were required to report the notional volumes of outstanding derivatives. 
This is in terms of the functional regulation on banks supervised by the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) and thus banks also report their exchange-traded derivatives holdings. 
Prior to 1 January 2008, the banks were required to submit the DI430 form monthly to the 
SARB. With the implementation of Basel II, the banks have been required to submit the 
BA350 form monthly from 1 January 2008 to present.  The DI430 form has largely the same 
layout as the BA350 thus making it possible to compare the data from these forms. 
 
The vast majority of derivatives contracts initiated in the South African OTC market are 
interest rate derivatives, followed by foreign exchange derivatives, then credit derivatives, 
and finally, equity and commodity derivatives. The most common credit derivatives are credit 
default swaps (CDSs) and total return swaps (TRSs). Synthetic collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) and credit-linked notes (CLNs) are also examples of credit derivatives, and these 
instruments are discussed in sections 2.2.5 and 2.2.6. TRSs transfer the cash flows from the 
underlying reference entity (such as a loan or a bond) in return for interest payments, thereby 
hedging interest rate receipts for one party while the other accepts the risk of variable returns. 
CDSs transfer the risk of a credit event involving the underlying reference entity, such as 
bankruptcy, default or a ratings downgrade from the protection buyer to the protection seller, 
thus providing a method for hedging credit risk. However, CDS protection buyers do not 
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necessarily have to have an interest in the underlying reference entity, and CDSs can 
therefore be used for purely speculative purposes.  
 
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Fed from 1987 to 2006, believed that CDSs would 
strengthen the stability of the financial industry, and in a 2004 speech, he stated the following 
Greenspan (2004): 
The new instruments of risk dispersion have enabled the largest and most 
sophisticated banks in their credit-granting role to divest themselves of much credit 
risk by passing it to institutions with far less leverage… These increasingly complex 
financial instruments have contributed, especially over the recent stressful period 
[Stock market bubble], to the development of a far more flexible, efficient, and hence 
resilient financial system than existed just a quarter-century ago.  
Using CDSs for hedging purposes affords banks the ability to offload risk on to those parties 
who want to hold it, thereby reducing the concentration of risk in the financial system. 
However, CDSs are not the first financial instrument to give banks this opportunity. In the 
1980s, the development of loan sales allowed banks to originate loans and then sell them so 
that they could deleverage when necessary or free up capital to originate more loans, which 
had the effect of giving individual banks the flexibility in managing their credit risk 
exposures that had not been previously available. One disadvantage is that selling a loan of a 
valued customer could lead to reputational damage for the bank and often the administration 
surrounding loan sales is complicated. In the 1990s, securitisation provided another credit-
risk management strategy for banks (Hirtle, 2009: 125-150). Securitisation and its role in the 
financial crisis will be discussed in section 2.2.2.  
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A survey prepared by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) showed 
that the market size for CDSs globally more than doubled in size each year from a notional 
value of US $3.7 trillion in 2003 to $62.2 trillion at the end of 2007. However, by the end of 
2008, the notional amount outstanding had fallen to $38.6 trillion (International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, 2010). The credit derivatives market worldwide is relatively small 
compared to the market for other OTC derivatives, but according to Karras (2009), there was 
rapid growth in global credit derivative transactions before 2009, and this would only 
increase in the future owing to defaults and debt restructuring, which create a real need for 
these hedging products (Karras, 2009: 193-213). CDSs will be discussed in chapter 2, and in 
detail in section 2.2.6. 
 
1.2  Rationale for the research 
Credit derivatives were intricately involved in the financial crisis, through two main channels. 
Firstly, defaults on poor quality loans triggered embedded CDSs, and secondly, there were 
mark-to-market losses. “Mark-to-market” is an accounting practice whereby assets are valued 
at their current market value on the balance sheet. This is in contrast to historical cost 
accounting where an assets original purchase price is recorded in the financial statements. 
Mark-to-market accounting is a concept of fair-value accounting, which seeks to prevent 
businesses from overvaluing their assets in an attempt to protect investors. Thus a drop in the 
market value of an asset would result in a mark-to-market loss through leverage even if the 
loss is not realised by selling the asset. Mark-to-market losses on OTC derivatives were 
triggered when concerns about counterparty credit risk exposure grew after some financial 
institutions suffered large losses on mortgaged-backed securities (MBSs) and CDOs. These 
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losses reduced asset value resulting in higher leverage for financial institutions, and it was 
this increased leverage that created further concerns over counterparty risk and almost led to 
the meltdown of the financial system through systemic risk. In fact, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) noted that approximately two thirds of counterparty credit risk 
losses were due to mark-to-market losses and only one third due to actual defaults (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2013).  
 
CDSs resulted in direct losses through defaults, indirect losses through mark-to-market losses 
and a decline in aggregate demand through the wealth channel effect. In addition to the 
financial losses, these complicated financial instruments also played a role in increasing 
systemic risk in the financial system. Alan Greenspan’s prediction that CDSs would decrease 
systemic risk in the financial system was based on the premise that credit risk would be 
transferred away from institutions that did not have the risk appetite to institutions that were 
prepared to hold the risk. However, Nijskens & Wagner found that credit risk transfer 
activities such as CDSs and securitisation led to many individual banks seeming less risky 
due to lower volatility however, these activities resulted in  higher levels of systemic risk in 
the financial system contrary to Alan Greenspan’s prediction (Nijskens & Wagner, 2011: 
1391 – 1398). Possible reasons for this finding include banks’ use of CDSs to sell protection 
(i.e. buy risk), discussed in section 2.2.6; CDS holdings resulting in a higher level of 
counterparty risk even in the case of a balanced book, discussed in section 2.2.10; the 
originate-to-distribute model discussed in section 2.2.2; as well as the use of CDSs to create 
synthetic portfolios discussed 2.2.6.5. 
 
The role of CDSs in the crisis led the G20 to issue the following directive at the 2009 
Pittsburgh Summit to improve the safety of the OTC derivatives market: 
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All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central 
counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported 
to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher 
capital requirements. We ask the FSB and its members to assess regularly 
implementation and whether it is sufficient to improve transparency in the derivatives 
markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse (G20, 2009). 
Since the G20’s directive, there have been large developments in the regulation and 
supervision of OTC markets in its largest centres, the EU (including the largest centre for 
OTC derivatives, the UK) and USA. South Africa has followed suit and developed 
regulations specifically designed to fall in line with existing regulations to avoid regulatory 
arbitrage. Since banks make up some of the largest OTC credit derivatives market 
participants throughout the world, Basel III has many indirect influences on this market. 
 
The South African derivatives market has increased in size significantly since January 2005, 
with month-end unexpired contracts of R144 billion for exchange-traded contracts and R7 
200 billion for OTC contracts excluding credit derivatives. These figures increased to R624 
billion for exchange-traded contracts and R35 800 billion for OTC contracts excluding credit 
derivatives at the end of January 2015. 
 
Looking at credit derivatives, in January 2005, the amount of outstanding credit derivatives 
with the banks as protection buyers was R17.8 billion and R14.7 billion with the banks as 
protection sellers. By January 2015, the amount of outstanding credit derivatives with the 
banks as protection buyers had risen to R87 billion and R97 billion with the banks as 
protection sellers (note that the figures quoted are in nominal values; in chapter 4 the data has 
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been adjusted for inflation). The market has thus grown considerably over the stated period. 
This study further conducts an examination of the variances in the size of the credit 
derivatives market as an absolute value and relative to the total of all other OTC derivatives 
over the period January 2005 to January 2015.  
 
A preliminary investigation indicates that South Africa has suffered minor derivative 
disasters in the past and that the use of credit derivatives such as CDSs has risen significantly 
since the 2008 financial crisis, justifying further examination of this market. From an 
academic perspective it is also evident that there is limited research available, especially as 
far as South African journals are concerned, indicating a further need for this type of study.    
 
1.3 Research question 
The credit derivatives market worldwide has grown significantly over the period of analysis, 
making it an increasingly important role player in South Africa’s financial markets. Research 
on its exact size and composition is thus vital, especially following the 2008 financial crisis 
and the lessons learnt about the potential dangers of these instruments.  
 
1.3.1 Problem statement: 
The intention of this research is to analyse and evaluate the size and composition of the South 
African OTC credit derivatives market from January 2005 to January 2015 and to review the 
progress of implementation of proposed new regulations locally and abroad and make policy 
implementation recommendations for the local market.  
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1.3.1.1 Sub-problem 1: 
Analyse and evaluate the size and composition of the South African OTC credit derivatives 
market from January 2005 to January 2015. 
 
1.3.1.2  Sub-problem 2: 
Review the progress of implementation of proposed new regulations in the US, UK, EU and 
South Africa. 
 
1.3.1.3  Sub-problem 3: 
Make policy implementation recommendations for the local market.  
 
1.4 Chapter layout 
The layout of the chapters is as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a review of literature and key word analysis. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed during the empirical analysis. 
Chapter 4 discusses the results obtained from the study. 
Chapter 5 presents the concluding remarks and policy recommendations. 
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Chapter	2:	Literature	review	
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the available literature on the financial crisis of 2007–2008, giving 
an outline of the events which led to the crisis and the role that credit derivatives played in 
exacerbating the crisis. Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, is quoted in 
a document filed with the US Court of Federal Claims on 22 August 2014 as saying: 
“September and October of 2008 was the worst financial crisis in global history, including 
the Great Depression”. The subprime crisis which began in the US in 2007 escalated and 
spread through the global economy, leading to a global financial crisis followed by a global 
economic recession which some, including the former IMF MD Dominique Strauss-Kahn, 
have dubbed the “Great Recession”. The crisis hit after a period known as the Great 
Moderation which was a golden age of financial stability and reduced severity in business 
cycles. The Great Moderation was thought to be caused by structural changes and improved 
macroeconomic policies in advanced economies, and many thought it would be permanent. 
According to Paul Krugman, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton 
University, the crisis has taught us that the international financial system is fragile and can 
have devastating consequences for the world’s real economy (Krugman, 2015). The severity 
of the 2007–2008 crisis was largely due to the complicated nature of newly structured 
financial instruments combined with the interconnectedness of global financial systems.  
 
The direct losses on subprime loans were estimated to be at around US $250 billion by 
October 2007. This is a large number, but the contagion effect meant that this initial loss 
snowballed, leading to much higher losses in the stock market and worldwide GDP. From 
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July 2007 to November 2008, the estimated worldwide decline in GDP was $4 700 billion 
and the decline in world stock market capitalisation was about $26 400 billion dollars, which 
is around 100 times the initial loss on subprime loans (Blanchard, 2009). These losses were 
so high because the subprime loan asset-price bubble led to a financial crisis. 
 
Olivier Blanchard, chief economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Professor 
of Economics at MIT,  admits that many, including himself, believed that the US economy 
would fare better than most economies if housing prices fell as a result of the diversification 
of risk that both securitisation and derivatives provide. He has since acknowledged that the 
opacity of these innovative instruments (both securitised and credit derivatives) combined 
with the fact that they were widely held by a large number of financial institutions were two 
factors that he did not consider before the crisis (Blanchard, 2009). According to Stulz 
(2009), one of the major reasons for this snowball effect was the uncertainty about the 
exposure of some systemically important financial institutions through their derivative 
positions, primarily through their credit-default swap (CDS) holdings (Stulz, 2009: 58-70). 
Innovative new financial products such as CDSs, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and collateralised debt obligations squared (CDO²) 
were at the heart of the crisis. They can be broadly classified as credit derivatives, such as 
CDSs and synthetic CDOs), and securitised products, such as MBSs and balance sheet CDOs. 
In theory, both classes of financial products should strengthen the stability of the financial 
industry through diversification of credit risk, whereby the risk is spread among many 
investors not just the loan originator. 
 
Losses in the financial sector led to much larger losses in the real economy. Average 
worldwide growth between 2000 and 2007 was 4.2%, which had, however, dropped to 2.7% 
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in 2008 and -0.4% in 2009. Although the direct impact of the financial crisis was primarily on 
the US, UK and EU, emerging economies soon began to suffer indirectly from it through two 
main mechanisms: firstly, through a decline in portfolio investment; and secondly, through a 
decline in exports. For South Africa, the average growth rate between 2000 and 2007 was 
4.3%, but this declined to 3.8% in 2008 and down to -1.5% in 2009 (Blanchard, Johnson, 
Akoto, Alsemgeest, Bhoola, Biyase, Dikgang, et al, 2014). The South African stock market 
fell by 36.0% between May and December 2008, leading to the loss of almost one million 
jobs (Financial Stability Board, 2013). Although South Africa did not experience a local 
financial crisis stemming from the global financial crisis, according to the Financial Stability 
Board, it was one of the worst affected emerging economies. 
 
Throughout this chapter, the role of these complicated financial instruments in the global 
financial crisis will be examined with specific focus on credit default swaps (CDSs). A CDS 
is a type of credit derivative that is used to transfer risk from a party who does not wish to 
hold the risk to a party who is willing to accept it. This credit derivative caused great 
uncertainty during the crisis as a small default could trigger large payments by issuers of 
CDSs, and these issuers included large systemically important banks like Lehman Brothers 
and large systemically important insurance firms like American International Group (AIG). 
According to Sipko (2011: 33–38), the gross notional outstanding volume of CDSs reached 
$62 173 trillion by the end of 2007, which is equivalent to global GDP. 
 
The rest of chapter 2 is set out as follows: Section 2.2 summarises the events that led to the 
crisis, as well as the role played by credit derivatives, specifically CDSs, in exacerbating the 
global financial crisis.  Section 2.3 looks at the available literature of the OTC credit 
derivative market in South Africa. Section 2.4 examines the financial market regulation 
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relating to OTC derivatives prior to the crisis and in response to the crisis in South Africa, the 
US and Europe. 
 
2.2 Global financial crisis 
2.2.1 Background 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) feared that the 
already fragile, post-dotcom stock market bubble economy would be plunged into a 
recession, so under the leadership of Chairman Alan Greenspan, the Fed kept interest rates 
low. On 17 September 2001, the Fed lowered interest rates from the already low 3.5% to 
3.0%, down from 6.5% at the beginning of January 2001 (The Economist, 2007). The Federal 
Open-Market Committee (FOMC) continued to cut the target federal funds rate at each 
meeting through to the end of the 2001 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
27 February 2002). By 2003, the federal funds rate reached a low of 1%, which was the 
lowest rate since 1958 and it remained at that level for a year. Thereafter, the Fed gradually 
increased the federal funds rate until it reached 5.25% by June 2006. The period of extremely 
low interest rates encouraged households to take up large amounts of mortgage debt, both 
through home buying and refinancing existing mortgages. In October 2001, the Mortgage 
Bankers Association’s (MBA’s) refinancing index reached the highest level since its 
inception in January 1980 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 27 February 
2002). This increase in household borrowing had already outstripped the growth of 
disposable personal income in 2001, which meant that despite the lower interest rate, the 
household debt-service burden at the end of 2001 was already near the peak recorded at the 
end of 1986, according to the report submitted to the US congress by the Fed in February 
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2002. At this stage, however, Greenspan was not concerned about the housing market, stating 
in 2002 that the lower interest rate would sustain the demand for new construction as well as 
mortgage markets which have been a “powerful stabilising force over the past two years of 
economic distress by facilitating the extraction of some of the equity that homeowners have 
built over the years” (Saxton, Reed, & Greenspan, 13 November 2002). Greenspan later 
admitted that he had only become aware of the housing bubble during late 2005 and 2006 
(Felsenthal, 2007). 
 
According to John Taylor, Professor of Economics at Stanford University, the Fed kept rates 
too low for too long. The Taylor rule is a rules-based approach to monetary policy whereby 
“the nominal federal funds rate is adjusted in response to both the gap between real and trend 
gross domestic product and the gap between the inflation rate and policymakers’ target” 
(Kohn, 2012: 173-182). The Taylor rule therefore stipulates that interest rates should increase 
in times of high inflation or when employment is above full employment levels, and vice 
versa. Figure 1 was presented to the 2007 annual central bankers’ symposium in Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming by Taylor (The Economist, 2007). It shows the actual federal funds rate 
between 2000 and 2007 compared with a hypothetical interest rate following the Taylor rule. 
Taylor says that the Fed has deviated from the Taylor rule before, but this was the greatest 
deviation over the last few decades (The Economist, 2007). Taylor’s argument criticises the 
Fed for creating an artificially low interest rate environment in which the housing bubble was 
allowed to grow. However, according to Blanchard (2009), there was no pressure on inflation 
and the equilibrium world interest rates were low – hence there was no reason for Greenspan 
to increase the federal funds rate.  
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Figure 1: The Taylor rule 
Source: Chart published in The Economist, on October 18, 2007 using data from John Taylor’s paper “Housing and 
Monetary Policy” September 2007. See: http://www.economist.com/node/9972453 
 
Donald Kohn, former Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, identified various 
limitations to following a simple rules-based approach to monetary policy, such as the Taylor 
rule. Firstly, there are many measures of inflation (e.g. the GDP deflator, CPI, core CPI, etc.) 
and the Taylor rule requires a single measure. However, there can be significant short-run 
deviations between the various measures. Secondly, it is not easy to determine the level of 
potential output or the equilibrium real interest rate as both are inferred from other 
information and both could fluctuate with changes in other factors. Thirdly, the Taylor rule 
relies on lagged or current values of a small set of variables while “policy is best made 
looking forward … especially in periods of rapid or unusual change” (Kohn, 2012: 173-182). 
According to Kohn (2012), before meetings of the Federal Open-Market Committee 
(FOMC), policymakers receive several versions of the Taylor rule to consult, but that it is not 
viewed in isolation, and that “central banks monitor a wide range of indicators in conducting 
monetary policy”. 
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In an opinion piece for the New York Times in 2015, entitled “Bad Tayloring”, Paul 
Krugman states that Republicans in the US are pushing for government to force the Fed to 
follow the Taylor rule and that this would be a very bad idea. Krugman highlights the fact 
that the Taylor rule was devised during the period of “Great Moderation”, and that Taylor 
misjudged the risks and volatility in the economy of which the financial crisis is evidence 
(Krugman, 2015). The period of Great Moderation lasted from the mid-1980s until the 
beginning of the crisis. This period was characterised by a softening of the volatility of 
business cycle fluctuations and it was in these benign economic conditions that Taylor first 
proposed following a systematic monetary policy that is free from fiscal concerns – in other 
words, abandoning discretionary monetary policy in favour of the Taylor rule.  
 
Robert Schiller, professor of Economics at Yale University, along with Karl Case, created an 
index of housing prices dating back to 1890. The index is now known as the Standard & 
Poor's Case–Shiller home price index. This index showed a large spike in US housing prices 
beginning in the early 2000s. Schiller predicted a US housing price bubble as early as 2003, 
and in the second edition of his book entitled Irrational exuberance, published in 2005, he 
fortified his prediction of a housing bubble. Table 1 shows the index of home prices used in 
the second edition of Schiller’s book. The index is updated monthly and reflects prices from 
1890 to the present. In 2013, Schiller won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work 
predicting both the housing bubble and the stock market bubble. It is worth noting that US 
housing prices reached a low in 2012, but have recovered significantly since then and are 
again on another steep upward trajectory. 
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Figure 2: Case-Schiller Housing Index 
Sourced from http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm (accessed on 28 February 2015) 
 
However, according to Frederic Mishkin, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System from 2006 to 2008, the Fed would have had an almost impossible task of 
deflating the housing market asset-price bubble (The Economist, 2007). He argues that in 
order for a central bank to prevent an asset-price bubble from bursting, three conditions 
would need to be met. Firstly, the central bank would need to identify the bubble before it 
bursts; secondly, monetary policy would need to be incapable of dealing with the 
consequences of the burst bubble; and thirdly, the central bank would need to know what 
monetary policy would deflate the bubble. Mishkin maintains that all three conditions would 
in all probably not be met. Firstly, if the central bank were aware of a bubble, then so would 
the market be aware and it would burst before action could be taken. Secondly, Mishkin 
asserts that central banks are capable of dealing with the consequences of an asset-price 
bubble burst and that the Japanese experience after the asset-price bubble of the 1990s was 
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unique because the Japanese central bank made many mistakes before and after the bubble 
burst. Thirdly, it seems improbable that central banks would know exactly what monetary 
policy would be effective in deflating the bubble. Mishkin believes that it is better for a 
central bank to act swiftly after the bubble bursts (The Economist, 2007). 
 
Hyman Minsky, late Professor of Economics at Washington University, developed a model to 
interpret financial crises in the US, Great Britain and other market economies. The model 
identifies various steps leading to a crisis (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005: 21). Firstly there 
would be some kind of macroeconomic shock which might make some assets more desirable 
than others; secondly, this desirable asset would be in high demand; and thirdly, a credit 
supply expansion would allow people to increase the demand for this asset. As demand 
grows, the asset price continues to rise which in turn leads more people to take out loans to 
jump on the bandwagon. Lastly, there would be some kind of incident which would spark 
“revulsion” towards the asset, resulting in widespread panic selling which would drive the 
price of the asset down. Minsky highlighted the pro-cyclical nature of credit, namely that the 
extension of credit increases in boom times and decreases during economic slowdowns, 
exacerbating the cycle. Minsky’s model is consistent with the subprime crisis: housing prices 
were on the rise and low interest rates combined with lax underwriting policy made it easier 
for subprime lenders to obtain mortgage loans. Many mortgage loans were converted into 
MBSs which were easily tradable and held by many financial institutions. The revulsion 
event (catalyst) could be said to be when Lehman Brothers, a major bank that was heavily 
involved in the creation and selling of MBSs through its subprime lender BNC Mortgages, 
filed for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. Although the crisis followed the basics of 
Minsky’s model, the model does not explain why the crisis was so much more severe than 
any since the Great Depression and why it had such far-reaching effects. Section 2.2.4 looks 
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at the structure of complicated financial instruments involved in the crisis and the contagion 
effect they potentially had. First, sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 will examine securitisation and 
subprime lending, respectively. 
 
2.2.2 Securitisation 
Securitisation is the practice of pooling various types of contractual debt together and selling 
them in the form of bonds to investors. This is an off-balance-sheet activity, meaning it is not 
a conventional banking activity. In the years leading up to the crisis, the market for mortgage 
lenders was highly competitive and this was in part due to the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act which effectively repealed certain provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act. The Glass-
Steagall Act refers to four provisions in the US Banking Act of 1933 which separate 
commercial and investment banking. The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in the aftermath of 
the Great Depression as a way of preventing excessive risk taking and conflicts of interest in 
the financial industry. Commercial banks were prevented from dealing in non-governmental 
securities for customers; investing in non-investment grade securities for themselves, 
underwriting or dealing in most securities. Lastly, these banks were prevented from affiliating 
with any company primarily engaged in such activities. Conversely, investment banks or 
securities firms were prevented from taking deposits (Barth, Brumbaugh, & Wilcox, 2000: 
191-204). Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics Professor at Columbia University, and recipient of 
the Nobel Prize in Economics, warned of the dangers if these activities are not kept separate 
before the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. A commercial bank’s primary business is to 
manage other people’s money and to lend conservatively, whereas an investment bank’s 
primary business is to organise the sale of bonds and equity with the goal of achieving the 
highest profit possible for its clients. Stiglitz (2010: 321–339) believes that the bigger risk 
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culture of investment banking won out over the conservative culture of commercial banks 
when Glass-Steagall was repealed. In contrast, there are some, like former US President Bill 
Clinton, who argue that the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley helped mitigate losses in the 
financial crisis because commercial banks were allowed to acquire investment banks and that 
loopholes in Glass-Steagall had been taken advantage of since 1960 – hence it was largely 
irrelevant. In addition, regulators had allowed banks to enter into limited securities and 
insurance activities with few problems being attributed to these practices before the repeal. 
However Gramm-Leach-Bliley permitted financial institutions to form holding companies 
which could own banks and other financial subsidiaries. Subsidiaries were allowed to engage 
in activities that the banks themselves were prevented from directly entering into (Barth et 
al., 2000: 191-204). Thus banks were able to expand into non-conventional banking activities 
such as securitisation by acting through subsidiaries of bank-holding companies as well as 
separate entities such as special purpose vehicles (SPVs). SPVs gained infamy in 2001 when 
it was revealed that Enron created an SPV in order to move losses off its own balance sheet 
and on to that of the SPV to avoid accounting for those losses. The SPV’s investors received 
Enron shares as compensation for their losses but the scheme soon fell apart. Generally, this 
kind of accounting treatment was easier to achieve under the US GAAP (Generally accepted 
accounting principles) system compared to the IFRS (International financial reporting 
standards) system. However, 2010 updates to US accounting rules relating to SPVs would 
make this kind of accounting treatment harder to achieve for certain transactions (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2009). 
 
The role that SPVs, also known as special purpose entities (SPEs), played in the recent crisis 
was as vehicles for the disaggregation of the risks of an underlying pool of exposures (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2009). This, in and of itself, is not a bad thing, but subprime 
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lending, asymmetric information problems combined with opaque financial instruments 
contributed to the failure of many of these entities. Many banks created SPVs to buy 
mortgage loans originated by the sponsor bank and who would repackage this debt and sell it 
to investors through the process of securitisation. Securitised assets are also called structured 
finance products. This debt could take the form of asset-backed commercial papers (ABCPs), 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), structured investment vehicles (SIVs), collateralised 
loan obligations (CLOs), collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and collateralised debt 
obligations squared (CDO²s). For the purposes of this study, MBS, CDOs and CDO²s will be 
discussed in further detail in a later section (No distinction is made between commercial 
mortgage-backed securities [CMBSs] and residential mortgage-backed securities [RMBSs]). 
An SPV can take the form of any legal entity and is usually kept separate from its sponsor or 
parent company for regulatory, accounting and bankruptcy purposes. Through this process of 
securitisation, banks therefore no longer had to hold all the mortgage loans they had 
originated on their balance sheets for the full term of the loan, usually 20 years. This created 
an asymmetric information problem since the originators were no longer concerned about the 
risk of default since the loans would not be held on their balance sheets for long. Banks 
would conduct less credit due diligence on assets bound for SPVs than they would for assets 
destined to be held on the banks’ balance sheet. This is a kind of moral hazard since the 
originator of the loan knows that other investors will bear the risk of default. This situation 
encouraged loan originators to issue loans to people who did not meet traditional lending 
criteria, and these would become known as subprime loans. This business plan is known as 
the originate-to-distribute business model. Loan originators were also able to earn fees when 
selling loans to SPVs and additional fees could be earned by the originator for management 
and administration services for the SPV (Bank for International Settlements, 2009).  
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The use of off-balance-sheet entities like SPVs was inadvertently encouraged by Basel I 
because these detached entities required less capital than assets held on banks’ own books. 
The 1988 Basel I accord was a step forward in banking supervision since it provided a set of 
internationally recognised minimum capital holdings on banks’ balance sheets. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision provides a framework for prudential supervision of 
banks. The Committee also provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervision and 
members come from all over the world, including South Africa (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2014). However, the Basel Committee does not have the authority to impose 
acceptance of its framework on countries – instead, it is up to central banks and governments 
whether or not to implement the accord. This causes an inconsistency in the timeframe of 
application, and in some cases, in the manner of application. For instance, European banks 
generally had less ability to move assets off balance sheet into an SPV, but because European 
risk-based capital requirements are not as closely tied to accounting, there was less incentive 
to move assets off balance sheet. Conversely in the USA, US institutions can easily move 
assets off balance sheet to SPVs and they have the incentive to do so because Basel I required 
US banks to hold more capital for certain exposures than in Europe (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2009). These kinds of practices are known as regulatory arbitrage, and as early 
as 1999, the Basel committee began formulating what would become known as Basel II. 
Basel II includes more risk-sensitive approaches for measuring capital requirements for 
positions that an originator purchases from an SPV to which the originator transferred assets. 
However, because very few banks had adopted it prior to the crisis, its provisions were 
untested.  
 
According to a report issued by the Bank of International Settlements in 2009, the use of 
SPVs was not inherently problematic, but rather it was the poor risk management and a 
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misunderstanding of the associated risks and possible structural behaviours of SPVs that 
contributed to failure of their usage during the crisis. Ultimately, SPVs had been used 
successfully for years before the crisis so it is unclear whether the poor credit quality of the 
underlying assets sold to SPVs could be attributed to the SPVs’ structural behaviour (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2009). 
 
SPVs allowed banks to move assets and liabilities off their balance sheets; backed by less 
capital than if they were kept on the banks’ balance sheet. In essence, this created a “shadow 
banking system” with lower capital requirements than traditional banking institutions, which 
geared up the whole financial system (Blanchard et al., 2014). This increase in leverage due 
to reduced capital holdings would prove to accelerate the crisis. For example, in 2006, 
Citigroup had off-balance-sheet assets to the value of $2.1 trillion, but the value of assets on 
its own balance sheet was only $1.8 trillion (Blanchard, 2009). Prior to the crisis, many banks 
committed themselves to helping SPVs pay out investors if necessary, but the severity of the 
crisis was not foreseen and the severe devaluation of assets held by some SPVs led to their 
bankruptcy. By mid-2008, write-downs and returns of some of Citigroup’s off-balance-sheet 
assets had decreased the value down to less than one half of the value of assets held on its 
own balance sheet.  In many cases, these assets and liabilities were moved on to the balance 
sheet of the sponsor bank, which created a huge strain on the financial industry. 
 
According to Juraj Sipko, Associate Professor at Pan-European University, the abolishment 
of the Glass-Steagall Act contributed directly to the phenomenal growth in the derivatives 
market seen in the first decade of the 21st century. Using data from the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), Sipko (2011) estimated that at the end of 2000 the gross notional amount 
outstanding of OTC derivatives would be approximately $95 trillion, which would increase to 
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$675 trillion at the end of 2008, which was more than seven times the 2000 figure. Credit 
default swaps were in their infancy when Glass-Steagall was repealed, but reached a gross 
notional outstanding volume $62.173 trillion by the end of 2007, the same volume as the 
worlds’ combined GDP (Sipko, 2011: 33-38). 
 
2.2.3 Subprime lending 
The Fed refers to a subprime borrower as an individual who has a low credit score, a history 
of delinquency, foreclosure or bankruptcy and a debt service to income ratio of ≥ 50% among 
other characteristics (Sengupta & Emmons, 2007). These borrowers would not qualify for a 
standard mortgage because they do not meet one or many of the traditional lending criteria 
such as no collateral, no job or a poor credit history. Lending to borrowers who did not meet 
traditional lending criteria became known as subprime lending. Examples of subprime loans 
offered include the “NINJA” loan and “Liar” loan. NINJA loan is an acronym for a loan 
granted to a borrower with no income, no job and no assets. Liar loans did not require 
borrowers to provide proof of their stated income. In addition to lax lending criteria, some 
lenders would give borrowers a low teaser interest rate for the first few periods and thereafter 
the higher interest rate would apply (Connerty, 2010: 83). Subprime borrowers are thus 
distinguished from prime borrowers, and as a result usually have to pay a higher cost for 
credit, that is,  a higher interest rate.  
 
In the early 2000s, the lowest interest rates in decades contributed to the creation of an 
intensely competitive market for US mortgage lenders. Seeking higher revenue and market 
share, more mortgage lenders began relaxing underwriting standards and originating riskier 
mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers. Subprime lenders included investment banks and 
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government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as Freddie Mae. The Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA), commonly known as Fannie Mae, was founded in 1938 
during the Great Depression as part of the New Deal, and has been a publicly listed company 
since 1968. It does not lend directly to consumers but rather buys loans made by banks on the 
secondary market. Freddie Mac, another GSE, was created in 1970 and, like Fannie Mae, it 
buys mortgages on the secondary market and repackages them as mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs) which it sells to investors. According to an article in the New York Times published 
on 30 September 1999, Fannie Mae had been under increasing pressure from Bill Clinton’s 
administration to expand mortgage loans to low- and moderate-income people, and it was 
also under pressure from shareholders to increase profits. Fannie Mae started easing its credit 
requirements on loans that it purchased from banks and other lenders in order to create MBSs 
(Holmes, 1999). 
 
Minsky identified three types of finance, namely hedge, speculative and Ponzi. Hedge 
finance means that the borrower’s income is sufficient to pay both the interest rate payments 
and capital repayments on a loan. In speculative finance, the borrower can pay the interest 
rate payments, but not the capital repayment. Lastly, Ponzi finance means that the borrower’s 
income does not cover the interest payments or the capital repayments, and it is necessary to 
rely on selling assets or securing more loans to make these payments. According to Minsky, 
during an economic recession, some borrowers are pushed into a lower group, either into the 
speculative finance or even the Ponzi finance group (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005: 21).  
Many subprime borrowers were in the speculative finance group during the boom times, 
since they needed the value of their properties to continue to appreciate. The appreciation of 
their property value allowed them to repay their loans with newly found home equity. As the 
economy slowed, many borrowers were pushed into the Ponzi finance group and could not 
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make their repayments, forcing them to default on their loans. In addition, as housing prices 
fell, many mortgages exceeded the value of the house, in which case, the mortgage is said to 
be underwater, leading to default or foreclosure. 
 
At the time, many thought that subprime loans were giving people, who would not normally 
be able to own their own homes, a piece of the “American Dream”. However, it was unlikely 
for housing prices to rise indefinitely at the rates necessary to allow subprime borrowers to 
use equity to make the repayments. Lending money to people who have to rely on the value 
of the underlying asset to increase in order to make their repayments is tantamount to 
predatory lending. While US lenders were jumping over one another to lend money to 
subprime borrowers, in South Africa, the National Credit Act of 2005 protected consumers 
from this kind of predatory lending by financial institutions. The Fed was aware of this 
problem early on, and in the February 2002 report, it was noted that “the economic slowdown 
and the rise in unemployment significantly eroded the quality of loans to subprime borrowers, 
and delinquency rates for both mortgages and consumer credit in that segment of the market 
moved sharply higher” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2002).  
 
2.2.4 Complex financial instruments 
The first MBS was created by Bank of America in 1977. A financial institution administers 
an MBS by collecting the mortgage cash payments from multiple mortgage lenders and 
grouping them into pools from which specific securities draw payments from various 
tranches grouped according to risk and earnings potential.  These tranches are given different 
ratings by credit rating agencies according to their value, risk and liquidity. According to the 
credit rating system, AAA rated assets are the most valuable, least risky and easiest to sell 
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(most liquid) assets. As one goes down a step in the tranche, the assets are lower rated 
because they are more risky owing to the fact that they will only be paid out as long as the 
tranche above it has been fully paid (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2010: 161-207). One can think 
of this in terms of a sequence of water buckets, one held above the other. The highest rated 
tranche would be represented by the first bucket and the payment streams as the water. Only 
once the first bucket is completely full, will the water overflow into the second bucket, and so 
on, until the water finally reaches the last bucket. If there are no defaults, then the lowest 
rated tranche will receive its full payment, but defaults will dry up payments in the lowest 
tranche first. The lower rated bonds have a higher risk of default than the higher rated bonds, 
but they are compensated for this with a higher interest rate – hence they have the potential 
for higher earnings as long as defaults are at a minimum. The higher rated tranches are called 
senior tranches, while the lower rated ones are called junior tranches. 
 
Financial institutions did not stop at securitising subprime mortgages into MBSs. CDOs were 
first created in the 1990s, and consist of various types of debt pooled together. This debt may 
include credit card debt, vehicle loans and mortgage loans, which serve as collateral for the 
CDO. A special purpose vehicle (SPV) would pool MBSs together into tranches with varying 
risk and return potentials which it would sell to investors. Following the US housing market 
boom, frequently the lower rated tranches of MBSs were pooled together into a CDO. Senior 
tranches of CDOs would often receive high ratings despite being backed by the most risky 
MBSs. CDOs are re-securitised securities, because unlike MBSs, which are backed by actual 
mortgage loans, CDOs are backed by MBSs (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2010: 161-207). If the 
CDO is backed by other structured credit securities (e.g. MBSs), it is called a structured 
finance CDO, and if it is backed solely by other CDOs, it is called a collateralised debt 
obligation squared (CDO²). 
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Financial institutions used CDOs to obtain investor funds for subprime mortgages generating 
large fees for themselves. The system would continue to work as long as defaults were kept 
to a minimum. As long as property prices in the US were increasing, most subprime 
borrowers were able to make their repayments, but when the housing bubble burst in the 
second half of 2007, the default rate soared. The house is the collateral on a mortgage 
agreement – if the borrower defaults, then the house is sold to repay the lender. However, if 
the value of the mortgage is more than the resale value of the house (this situation is referred 
to as the mortgage being underwater), then the lender will lose money on the default. Owing 
to the reduced mortgage payments received, the lower tranches stopped receiving their 
incomes, which caused panic selling of these instruments. This led to the supply far 
exceeding the demand for these securities which further eroded their value, and created a 
vicious downward spiral. 
 
Credit rating agencies gave many MBS, CDO and CDO² tranches a high rating despite the 
fact that they comprised high risk assets. This could have been either an error on their part 
because of the opacity of these instruments or perhaps the result of the perverse incentive 
structure of the rating agencies. Agencies such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's are paid 
by the security issuers for whose securities they rate, resulting in a serious conflict of interest. 
A study conducted by staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2010 found that 
rating agencies provide useful information, but there was a progressive decline in standards 
leading up to the crisis, between the beginning of 2005 and mid-2007, when the MBS market 
was at its pre-crisis peak (Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, & Vickery, 2010). During 2007 and 
2008, rating agencies radically downgraded securitised asset tranches in successive rounds. 
Moody’s alone downgraded 36 346 tranches during this period, nearly one third of these were 
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previously rated AAA (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2010: 161-207). Another contributor to the 
inaccurate risk assessments could be the use of credit default swaps packaged with CDO 
tranches. The characteristics of CDSs that allow them to change risk assessments is discussed 
in section 2.2.6, while the role of rating agencies is discussed further under section 2.2.7.  
 
2.2.5 Credit derivatives 
In a paper presented to the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in May 2007, David Mengle, 
then head of research at the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, defined a 
derivative as a bilateral agreement whereby risk is shifted from one party to another and its 
value is derived from the value of an underlying instrument. A broad range of derivatives 
exist, and they can be classified as interest rate, exchange rate, commodity and credit 
derivatives. A credit derivative is an agreement to shift credit risk from one party to another; 
with its value derived from the credit performance of one or more reference entities. 
Reference entities could be corporations, sovereign entities (in other words, a country) or 
debt obligations. “[T]he vast majority of credit derivatives take the form of the credit default 
swaps , which is a contractual agreement to transfer the default risk of one or more reference 
entities from one party to another” (Mengle, 2007).  
 
CDSs gained infamy during the crisis for several reasons. The following is a brief summary 
of the key issues that will be discussed in detail in section 2.2.6. Firstly, CDSs can reference 
an entity that neither party to the CDS owns, therefore allowing speculators to make large 
bets on the performance of the reference entity, which in many cases exceeds the value of the 
market for the reference entity (see subsection 2.2.6.3). Secondly, SPVs can secure even 
higher credit ratings for their CDO tranches by packaging CDSs with some of the tranches 
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(see subsection 2.2.6.4). Thirdly, they can be used to create a “synthetic CDO” which is a 
credit derivative itself, not a structured finance product like a CDO (see subsection 2.2.6.5). 
Since CDSs were traded OTC, the amount of CDSs held and the counterparty risk of large 
financial institutions through their CDS holdings were uncertain, further fuelling mistrust 
between financial institutions (see subsection 2.2.6.6). Lastly, there is a brief discussion of 
other types of credit derivatives (see subsection 2.2.6.8). 
 
2.2.6 Credit default swaps 
The section on CDSs has been broken down into subsections. The first subsection deals with 
the definition of this instrument and the most common types used. The second provides a 
practical example of how a single-name CDS functions. The third subsection contrasts the 
two primary uses of CDSs, namely hedging and speculation. The fourth subsection examines 
how CDSs can be used to secure higher credit risk ratings for other financial products. The 
fifth looks at how the characteristics of CDSs allow them to create other credit derivatives. 
The sixth looks at how these instruments exacerbate counterparty risk in times of uncertainty. 
Lastly, the seventh subsection examines real-life examples of index CDSs created using 
MBSs. 
 
2.2.6.1 Definition and types of CDS 
According to the ISDA, a credit default swap is a contractual agreement whereby one party 
buys protection from the default risk of a reference entity and the other party sells the 
protection in exchange for a periodic fee received from the protection buyer for the term of 
the CDS.  If there is a credit event (i.e. the reference entity defaults or declares bankruptcy), 
the protection buyer is entitled to protection on a specified face value (which is referred to as 
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the notional amount) of reference entity debt (International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, 2014). 
 
There are numerous types of CDSs. The three main types are single-name CDSs, basket 
CDSs and index CDSs. A single-name CDS refers to a single reference entity, that is, a 
corporation, sovereign entity or debt. When there are two or more reference entities, it is 
called a basket CDS. Because a basket CDS does not only refer to a single reference entity, it 
needs to be stipulated after how many entities experience a credit event, the CDS will be 
triggered. There are first-to-default CDSs, where if any one of the entities has a credit event, 
it will trigger the CDS. The contract can stipulate any number of entities that must have a 
negative event, right up to an all-to-default CDS, where all of the entities must default before 
the CDS is triggered. And lastly, an index CDS references as many as 125 entities and each 
entity has an equal share of the notional amount (Mengle, 2007). It is important to distinguish 
between a single-name CDS and a basket or index CDS. 
 
2.2.6.2 Practical example of the pricing and life cycle of a single-name CDS 
The price of the CDS is known as the spread or premium and it represents the annual interest 
rate paid by the protection buyer to the protection seller. It is calculated as an annual 
percentage of the nominal amount represented as basis points and is usually paid quarterly. 
When pricing a CDS, the likelihood of default, the recovery rate in the event of default as 
well as market sentiment are taken into account. The higher the spread (interest rate), the 
more risky the reference entity is assumed to be. The parties to the contract do not need to 
own the reference entity or obtain the reference entity’s (or reference entity’s owner’s) 
permission to enter into a CDS because the reference entity is not a party to the contract 
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(Mengle, 2007). This means that parties to a CDS are able to speculate on the performance of 
the reference entity without being exposed to the reference entity. Therefore a CDS can be 
bought for the following two reasons: firstly, to hedge against possible losses, that is, the 
protection buyer owns the reference entity and wants to be protected from loss should the 
reference entity suffer a credit event; and secondly, a CDS can be bought to speculate on the 
creditworthiness of the reference entity. 
 
A credit event is well defined by a bilateral agreement of the parties prior to the inception of 
the CDS. In the case of a single-name CDS on a corporate bond, a credit event may refer to 
the default on coupon payments on a bond; a restructuring of the bond that is detrimental to 
creditors; bankruptcy of the bond issuer; repudiation of the contract; a moratorium on 
payments; or even a decline in the bond’s credit rating. A credit event triggers the CDS, 
which means the protection seller needs to pay the protection buyer the pre-agreed-upon cash 
payment known as the “default payment”. This is usually the principal amount plus expected 
interest/coupon payments known as the nominal value, while the protection buyer must 
deliver the actual bond to the protection seller or the current cash value of the referenced 
bond.  
 
To illustrate how a CDS functions, see the following example of a single-name CDS on a 
corporate bond: Say, for example, that Company Z issues a bond worth R100 000. If the 
premium on a CDS written using Company Z’s bond as the reference entity is 200 basis 
points (0.2%), then the protection buyer would need to pay the protection seller R2 000 per 
annum for the duration of the CDS’s lifespan. As long as there is no credit event before the 
CDS reaches maturity, then the protection seller will keep the premiums and not have to pay 
anything to the protection buyer. 
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Figure 3: Example of a single-name CDS on a corporate bond 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
What happens when a credit event takes place? If the protection buyer owns the underlying 
reference entity, then it is a simple procedure to settle with the protection seller. This 
procedure is known as “physical settlement”, whereby the protection buyer gives the 
protection seller the physical bond in exchange for payment, which equals the nominal value 
of the CDS. Alternatively, the protection buyer can keep the bond and the protection seller 
will pay out the nominal amount minus the par value of the bond.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: After a credit event: physical settlement of a single-name CDS 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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However, with the increased use of CDSs for speculative purposes, if there is a credit event, 
only a few of the CDS buyers would actually hold the underlying bonds. If the physical 
payment method was used in the case where many of the CDS buyers did not hold the 
underlying bond, the bonds would have to be recycled in order to settle all the CDSs. This 
would artificially raise the price of the bonds after the credit event, which would artificially 
push the expected recovery rate higher and increase the volatility of the defaulted bonds. 
These problems gave rise to the ISDA establishing a global protocol for cash settlement via 
the auction process in 2005. According to the protocol, CDS buyers and sellers must submit 
an adherence letter to the ISDA for every credit event, that is, parties had to opt in to the 
auction process. This only applies to single-name CDSs. The cash settlement auction process 
is overseen by a dealer broker such as ICE (Creditex) which conducts a dealer poll where 
dealers place orders for the debt of the reference entity to establish the inside market 
midpoint (IMM). The IMM is the market value of the bond represented as a percentage of the 
notional amount which is called the recovery rate. Protection buyers who do not own the 
reference entity are paid the notional amount minus the recovery rate (Mengle, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Cash settlement auction of a single-name CDS 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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The largest test for the cash settlement auction since its inception came with the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers. At the auction on 10 October 2008, the recovery rate was set at 8.625 
%. That meant that protection sellers had to pay out 91.375% of the nominal value of CDSs 
against debt, with Lehman Brothers as the reference entity. This was a huge win for 
speculators who had bet against Lehman Brothers. The estimated notional amount of CDSs 
bought on Lehman Brothers debt is estimated between $72 billion to $400 billion which is an 
astronomical number, but after multilateral netting, only $5.2 billion changed hands at the 
cash settlement (Stulz, 2010: 73-92). The vast difference between the notional amount 
outstanding on the CDSs and the final settlement amount is due to multilateral netting which 
is discussed in section 2.2.6.6. 
 
2.2.6.3 Hedging versus speculative use of CDSs 
Since CDSs transfer risk, they are essentially insurance contracts. However, they differ from 
insurance contracts in two important respects. Firstly, the buyer of a CDS does not need to 
own the underlying reference entity debt to take out a CDS against the default of the 
reference entity or any another kind of stipulated credit event. Secondly, the seller of the CDS 
need not be a regulated financial entity and is not required to maintain reserves to cover the 
protection sold. The first distinction gives rise to the incentive to speculate on debt using 
CDSs. Since the buyer of a CDS need not own the reference entity’s debt, many CDSs can be 
taken out against a single credit obligation. The second distinction means that the CDS seller 
might not have the necessary capital to meet its obligations, as in the case of AIG, which will 
be discussed in section 2.2.10. 
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Hedging can increase stability in the financial system because risk is held by those parties 
who are prepared to accept it. Hedging is often used by businesses for the purpose of risk 
management and through this transfer of risk to those who have an appetite for it, derivatives 
increase social welfare. CDS dealers often buy protection to hedge against protection they 
have sold, therefore balancing their risk exposure. The second reason is to speculate. A 
speculator who thinks there will be a credit event can buy a CDS against the reference entity 
without holding the reference entity, and make a profit if a credit event does happen. 
Likewise, if the speculator believes that the reference entity is creditworthy, he or she can sell 
a CDS and earn premiums as long as a credit event does not take place. In essence, 
speculators are placing bets about the probability the reference entity will default or 
experience any kind of stipulated credit event. They can take long and short positions in the 
reference entity without having to own it, essentially creating a synthetic portfolio of bonds 
and allowing them to create highly leveraged positions. When the buyer of the CDS does not 
own the underlying reference entity, it is referred to as a naked swap. Naked swaps violate 
the insurance industry principle, “requirement of insurable interest”. This principle can be 
explained as follows: one is allowed to take out home insurance on one’s own home because 
one has an interest in it, but one is not allowed to take out home insurance on one’s 
neighbour’s house (Vasudev, 2014: 56-74).  
 
Hence, to continue with the example of a single-name CDS on a corporate bond, the investor 
who buys the bond issued by Company Z can also buy a CDS against the possibility that 
Company Z’s bond suffers a credit event, thus hedging their risk. Any other party can also 
buy a CDS against a credit event on Company Z’s bond. Assume that in total, CDS sellers 
sell ten CDSs against Company Z’s bond.  If company Z does default and there is a 0% 
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recovery rate, the CDS protection sellers will be required to pay R1 000 000 to the CDS 
protection buyers. 
 
2.2.6.4 How CDSs can be used to acquire higher credit ratings on financial assets 
Many institutions are prevented from holding financial assets below a certain credit rating, 
but CDSs offer a way around this. Say, for example, Institution X would like to buy a 
corporate bond from Company Y. Company Y has a BB rating, but Institution X is restricted 
by law or by shareholders from buying assets with less than an A rating. Institution X can 
secure a CDS against Company Y’s bond from CDS writer U which has a credit rating of 
AA. Owing to the fact that the CDS provides default insurance on Company Y’s bond, 
Company Y’s credit rating is no longer important because Institution X will be paid out if 
Company Y does default. The important credit rating therefore becomes that of CDS writer 
U, which has a rating of AA. So in that way the CDS issuer gives its credit rating to the 
underlying bond superficially. In the same respect, banks used CDSs in order to reduce the 
amount of capital they had to hold. This is because under Basel I, capital requirements were 
based on risk weightings – hence the higher credit rating given by a CDS seller would give 
the asset a higher credit rating requiring less capital and allowing banks to increase their 
leverage. 
 
2.2.6.5 How CDSs can be used to create other credit derivatives 
CDOs are managed by SPVs and one can distinguish between two different types used before 
the crisis: firstly, there are balance-sheet CDOs where the loan originator has moved all the 
reference debt to the SPV, who then repackages this debt into tranches and sells this debt to 
investors. CDSs bought by the SPV against these CDOs were essentially hedging instruments 
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since the SPV owned the underlying debt, as long as the total notional amount of the CDSs 
did not exceed the total value of the underlying debt.  
 
Secondly, there are synthetic CDOs which are credit derivatives because the SPV does not 
own all the underlying debt – it simply references it. A synthetic CDO is not backed by a 
pool of assets like other CDOs, but consists instead of CDSs which simulate a portfolio of 
assets. The synthetic CDO thus relies on the default of the reference entities in order to 
generate an income. A synthetic CDO is a credit derivative, not a securitised asset.  An 
example of a synthetic CDO is J.P. Morgan’s “BISTRO”. The SPV had capital of $700 
million against the notional value of $10 billion for the reference portfolio. The SPV then 
bought CDSs against the full value of the reference portfolio. Following a default, revenue 
from CDS pay-outs would first be paid to the SPV up to $700 million and thereafter would be 
paid to the loan originator. This created a large moral hazard since both the loan originator 
and the SPV benefited from the defaults of the CDOs’ reference debt. In fact, since the SPV 
was paying for the CDSs, if the underlying reference debt had not defaulted, it would have 
made a loss. The systemic risk increases when there are multiple synthetic CDOs against a 
single reference portfolio, and when there are multiple CDSs per portfolio (Vasudev, 2014: 
56-74). According to Vasudev (2014), 85% of CDOs issued in 2006 were synthetic – that is, 
approximately $471 billion out of $550 billion. 
 
2.2.6.6 Opacity of CDS holdings and counterparty risk 
Prior to the crisis, CDSs were traded exclusively OTC, that is, they did not go through a 
formal exchange. This meant that deals were concluded between two parties which made 
them highly customisable. The size of the market is difficult to measure because to determine 
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the gross outstanding notional amount of CDSs, dealers need to provide information about 
their holdings since it was not mandatory to use a central repository. In the US, the 
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) keeps a record of the gross notional 
amount of outstanding CDSs involving large dealers, but it does not cover the whole market 
and data on CDS positions during the crisis only became available in late 2008 (Stulz, 2010: 
73-92). The gross outstanding notional amount of CDSs overstates the market for two 
reasons. Firstly, many dealers will hedge against protection sold. For example, Company A 
goes to buy a CDS from Bank 1. If Bank 1 does not want to hold the risk, then it can go to 
Bank 2 to buy a matching CDS. Bank 2 can then decide whether to hold the risk or to buy 
protection from Bank 3, and so on. Hence after multilateral netting the actual amount of risk 
in the market, it is lower than the total notional amount. The second reason is that the OTC 
market consists of a few large dealers, and aggregating their notional outstanding amounts on 
CDSs leads to double counting since they often deal with each other in the US and UK. 
 
Multilateral netting is a process whereby the transactions of more than two parties are off-set 
instead of being settled individually. For example, say that Bank A bought R100 000 worth 
of protection from Bank B who in turn bought R100 000 of protection from Bank C in order 
to balance its books. If the CDS were triggered and multilateral netting were not in place then 
Bank B would need to pay Bank A and Bank C would need to pay Bank B . However since 
Bank B has a balanced book, ie a net position of zero, then if multilateral netting were in 
place Bank C would pay Bank A directly. Even though Banks A and C did not transact with 
each other directly, in this instance they were the net protection buyers and sellers 
respectively and so money would change hands between them only. The CDS market is 
characterised by many large dealers, which explains why the final settlement after the 
Lehman Brothers default was much lower than the notional amount of the CDSs taken on 
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Lehman Brothers debt. However, even dealers who hold a net position of zero (like Bank C 
in the above example) can contribute to systemic risk through counterparty risk; this effect is 
discussed further in section 2.2.10. 
 
In practice, CDS contracts are regularly traded prior to their maturity. This secondary market 
allows the value of CDSs to fluctuate, thus reflecting the market’s view on the 
creditworthiness of the reference entity. When trading CDSs prior to the crisis, there was no 
requirement to inform the counterparty to a CDS that their counterparty had changed. This 
caused further confusion in the marketplace when large CDS counterparties like Lehman 
Brothers declared bankruptcy or defaulted. 
 
2.2.6.7 Index CDSs in practice 
In the early 2000s, it became popular to use ABSs as the reference entities for index CDSs. 
Common examples of ABSs used as reference entities for CDSs are MBSs and CDOs. 
However, index CDSs became highly complicated to keep track of owing to the high number 
of reference entities, so financial information and services companies such as Markit began 
providing an independent source of daily credit derivative pricing. Markit’s ABX indices are 
backed by RMBSs and CMBS. According to Markit, its ABX index references a basket of 20 
subprime MBSs, while its PRIMEX index references a basket of prime MBSs. When looking 
at RMBSs, one has the option of an agency index like MBX-IOS-PO or non-agency RMBS 
indices such as ABX, PRIMEX and iBoxx. Agency refers to RMBSs where the underlying 
mortgages were issued by government-sponsored entities such as Freddie Mac or Fannie 
Mae. Non-agency refers to private non-governmental issuers such as a SPV (Markit Ltd, 
2014). In 2006, the ABX indices on subprime mortgage securitisations were introduced, but 
these indices fell sharply in 2007 (Stulz, 2010: 73-92).  
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The popularity of CDSs grew prior to the crisis. According to Blanchard (2009), issuers were 
happy to accept low premiums prior to the crisis because they assumed that the probability of 
having to pay out was nearly negligible. However, that turned out to be a gross misjudgement 
of the risks. There has been a strong regulatory response to credit derivatives and OTC 
derivatives since the crisis. These responses will be examined in section 2.4. 
 
2.2.6.8 Other types of credit derivatives 
Another type of credit derivative is the total return swap (TRS). In the case of a TRS, both 
credit risk and market risk for a reference entity are shifted from the protection buyer to the 
protection seller. The protection buyer makes payments to the protection seller equivalent to 
the total return of the reference entity (coupon payments plus capital gains or losses), while 
the protection seller makes payments to the protection buyer equivalent to agreed-upon fixed 
or floating interest rate payments.  
 
CDSs and TRSs are the two basic forms which credit derivatives take, but their properties can 
create credit derivatives out of other investment products. For example, a synthetic CDO is a 
credit derivative because it references securitised assets, whereas a balance sheet CDO is not 
a credit derivative because the securitised assets are owned by the SPV.  
 
In a similar way, a CDS or TRS can be linked to an investment product such as a bond or 
stocks to create a credit-linked note (CLN). A CLN is similar to a CDS except for one 
important distinction – a CLN is always funded (hardly any CDSs are funded in practice). 
The CLN issuer is the protection buyer and the CLN investor is the protection seller. 
Investors buy securities from the CLN issuer usually through an SPV, and in exchange they 
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receive fixed or floating coupon payments for the life of the security and at maturity, and as 
long as there has not been a credit event, they receive par value. If the reference entity 
experiences a credit event, the CLN issuer will pay the investors only the recovery rate. The 
SPV enters into a CDS selling protection against the default of the reference entity. A CLN 
therefore has an embedded CDS. See figure 6 below for an illustration of a CLN where the 
reference entity is a single-name corporate bond. The reference entity could also be a basket 
or index. Thus, unlike CDSs, the protection buyer using a CLN is not exposed to counterparty 
risk, whereas the protection seller is exposed to the risk of default of the underlying reference 
entity as well as counterparty risk to the CLN issuer. Hence a CLN investor receives a 
periodic fee on the underlying reference entity (roughly equivalent to the fee protection 
sellers would receive on the embedded CDS) plus a funding premium from the SPV (Kothari, 
2009: 107-112). A CLN thus offers the issuer a hedge against credit risk without the 
associated counterparty risk of a CDS, and it offers investors a higher yield than they would 
receive on an equivalent CDS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal 
prepaid 
Periodic Coupon/ Interest payment 
At maturity, the principal amount (par value) is paid back to the 
investor if no default has occurred. In the event of a default, only the 
recovery rate is paid.  
 
CLN Issuer 
Protection buyer 
 
CLN Investor 
Protection seller 
Reference entity: 
Company Z’s corporate bond  
(Nominal value of R100 000) 
 
Figure 6: Example of a CLN on a single-name corporate bond 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
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2.2.7 Rating agencies 
Moody’s, one of the largest rating agencies, defines the role of ratings in the financial market 
as follows: “a rating simply helps investors determine the relative likelihood that they might 
lose money on a given fixed income investment. More technically, it is an opinion on the 
future ability, legal obligation and willingness of a bond issuer or other obligor to make full 
and timely payments on principal and interest due investors” (Pinto, 2006: 341-356). 
Investors have imperfect knowledge and generally have less information about the 
creditworthiness of investments than rating agencies – hence an asymmetric information 
problem exists. In addition, a moral hazard exists as rating agencies are paid by the issuers 
whose securities they rate. In fact, Moody’s profits more than doubled between 2002 and 
2006 (The Economist, 2007). Moral hazard exists when “one party to a transaction has both 
the incentive and the ability to shift the cost of its behaviour onto the other party” (Mohr, 
2015). Thus, because rating agencies are paid by the issuers and not by the users of their 
information, they have the incentive to issue higher credit ratings. The reason for this moral 
hazard is that rating agencies provide information which is non-rival and non-excludable. 
This means that it costs the same amount to provide the information for one person as it does 
for the whole market. Hence, the information does not have a market price, and  because 
access to the information cannot be restricted, it suffers from the free-rider problem. Thus, if 
rating agencies are not paid by the issuers of securities then they will not be paid at all, which 
means they will not render the service. It is worth noting that one US rating agency 
recognised by the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC), Egan-Jones rating agency 
(EJR), follows a “subscriber-pay” model. This model has received a lot of opposition from 
other rating agencies who argue that since smaller investors are unable to afford the 
information, a group of large investors could band together to create moral hazard problems. 
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In essence, the service provided by rating agencies is a public good. But would it not be 
better for rating agencies to be operated as public companies rather than private? The next 
two paragraphs look at some of the arguments for and against the nationalisation of rating 
agencies. 
 
An argument for nationalisation is centred on the key role that rating agencies play in the 
regulation of the financial industry. Some financial institutions such as pension funds and 
commercial banks are not allowed to hold sub investment grade assets. The reason is that 
these institutions must be curtailed from making risky investments since their failure would 
be disastrous for the economy and society. Pension funds render a vital service for society – 
they receive savings from people in order to make long-term investments for pay-out at 
retirement. People do not invest in pension funds in order to speculate; they invest so that 
they can retire – hence the need for pension funds to be risk-averse institutions. By contrast, 
large commercial banks have systemic risk, meaning that if they fail they could cause 
widespread panic in the financial system. Hence when rating agencies make mistakes, there 
are huge implications for the financial system. Ultimately, rating agencies do not have perfect 
information so people should not rely on them 100% when making investment decisions. 
However, the complexity inherent in these financial instruments means that most retail and 
even institutional investors simply do not have the ability to properly understand the risks 
(The Economist, 2007).  
 
The argument against the nationalisation of rating agencies is threefold. Firstly, there are 
many arguments that public institutions are less innovative than private institutions. 
Secondly, there is no guarantee that the information provided would be better because 
agencies have argued that it is not their job to measure market risk or liquidity risk and that 
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they only measure credit risk (The Economist, 2007). Credit risk refers to the chances of 
default on a debt instrument that is held to maturity; market risk refers to whether the price of 
the asset will fluctuate until it reaches maturity; and lastly, liquidity risk refers to how easy it 
is to trade the asset. The importance of market risk and liquidity risk is discussed in section 
2.2.7. Thirdly, if the information comes from a government-sponsored entity, it may be 
perceived as a public guarantee and when information proves wrong, investors might demand 
bailouts. 
 
2.2.8 Liquidity 
Liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset can be converted into cash, and since cash is 
easily tradable, liquidity also refers to the ease with which cash can be traded. The business 
model of banks is such that they generally issue long-term assets and hold short-term 
liabilities. Banks therefore usually hold more short-term liabilities then short-term assets on 
their balance sheets while having more medium- to long-term assets then medium- to long-
term liabilities. This is known as a maturity mismatch. During the normal course of business, 
liquidity will flow into a bank in the form of deposits and out of the bank when depositors 
withdraw their deposits. At the end of the day, one bank might have excess liquidity and 
another might have a shortage of liquidity. A bank with a shortage of liquidity needs to 
borrow to make sure it has enough liquidity so that it can meet its short-term obligations. 
Conversely, a bank with a liquidity surplus has more liquidity than it needs, so it would prefer 
for those extra funds to be earning interest rather than sitting idle. The interbank market 
fulfils the needs of both surplus units and deficit units in the banking sector. Money market 
instruments are considered to be highly liquid since they have a maturity of less than one 
year, and because they are easily tradable, their marketability makes them cash equivalents. 
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Most banks borrow and lend money in the interbank market for a period of less than a week 
and most of those are overnight-only transactions.  The local interbank market is a source of 
short-term finance for banks, and for longer-term finance banks could look overseas.   
 
Unlike in other industries, where the bankruptcy of a competitor may be welcome news, in 
the banking industry, a bank failure sets off tremors in the industry because banks are heavily 
connected. The primary reasons for the failure of one bank being disruptive to the whole 
financial system is twofold. The first has to do with the public’s perception of the strength of 
the banking sector because a run on a healthy bank could shut it down on account of the asset 
maturity mismatch . The second relates to with counterparty risk. Unlike during the banking 
crisis that led to the Great Depression, a run on a bank is highly unlikely to mean queues of 
depositors lining up to withdraw their deposits in the US. This is because most deposits are 
federally insured and banks can use the interbank market to obtain liquidity (not relying 
solely on depositors). South African banks do not have deposit insurance. However, in its 
financial system stability assessment of South Africa, the IMF recommended that South 
African introduce a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) to reduce systemic liquidity risk 
(International Monetary Fund, 2014). Counterparty risk stems from the interconnectedness of 
financial institutions. When two parties enter into a contract, each party is exposed to the risk 
that its counterparty will not live up to the contractual obligations. When counterparty risk 
increases, banks’ incentive to trade with one another diminishes. Even when the interbank 
interest rate increases in order to offset the increase in counterparty risk, it does not guarantee 
that surplus units will lend to deficit units because those banks that are most desperate for 
liquidity will pay the higher rate, while safer borrowers are less desperate for liquidity and 
could look elsewhere for funding. Hence during times of high uncertainty, safe borrowers 
might be pushed out of the market by high interest rates, leaving only unsafe borrowers in the 
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market. This serves as an incentive for surplus units to hang on to their additional liquidity 
and in an extreme situation the whole interbank market could seize up if surplus units are 
completely unwilling to lend to deficit units (The Economist, 2007). 
 
If banks are unable to meet their liquidity requirements by borrowing, they are forced to sell 
assets. When many institutions are suffering from liquidity shortages due to a 
macroeconomic event, such as large-scale defaults on loans, there will be fewer investors 
willing to buy assets. The high supply of assets and low demand result in a fall in the prices 
of these assets. If investors are uncertain about the fundamental value of these assets, this 
could force banks to sell assets at prices below the expected present value of the payments on 
the asset, which is known as “fire sale prices” (Blanchard, 2009). As banks sell more assets, 
the price drops and the value of similar assets on their balance sheet or on the balance sheets 
of other banks will fall when using mark-to-market accounting. This cycle continues as the 
value of assets held by banks decreases, and they might have to sell assets or reduce their 
lending to maintain their capital ratios, further feeding into the fall in asset prices. Selling 
assets to maintain liquidity and capital ratios amplifies initial losses due to the 
macroeconomic event, but in the case of the financial crisis, these two amplification 
mechanisms were extremely strong because of the opacity of complicated financial assets 
(Blanchard, 2009). The true value of these complicated assets created doubt about the 
solvency of banks and further discouraged private lending.  
 
2.2.9 Burst bubble  
Trouble began brewing in the fourth quarter of 2005 when growth in US house prices started 
to slow. By the end of 2006, US housing price indexes started declining (Blanchard, 2009). 
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According to the Case-Schiller house price index, the first quarter of 2007 showed the first 
nationwide decline in year-over-year house prices after 1991. Defaults and foreclosures on 
subprime mortgages began increasing as the equity barrier disappeared for many subprime 
lenders. In most cases, when a home owner defaults on his or her mortgage the property is 
repossessed and sold in order to pay back the loan. However, in many cases, subprime 
mortgages were underwater – in other words, the value of the loan on a mortgage was higher 
than the market price of the house owing to the large fall in property prices. These losses 
created defaults on MBSs, and by extension, on some CDOs and CDO²s. Subprime lenders 
began reporting slower growth as a result of defaults. In early 2007, several subprime lenders 
such as Ownit Mortgage Solutions Inc. and Mortgage Lenders Network USA Inc., began 
filing for bankruptcy. On April 2, New Century Financial, the USA’s largest independent 
subprime lender filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and when filing for bankruptcy, it stated that 
its lenders could demand $8.4 billion in loan repayments which it could not repay. 
Worryingly, the list of investors included major financial institutions such as Bank of 
America, Citigroup, Barclays Banks and UBS (CNN, 2007). Heavy losses through defaults 
mounted as house prices continued to fall. A vicious cycle had begun, as subprime mortgage 
lenders suffered a higher default rate by the end of 2005, less mortgage loans were being 
created, and this tightening of credit then caused a decline in the demand for houses, and 
housing prices continued to fall further. As predicted by Minsky’s model, credit has a 
procyclical nature, and during boom times, heavily indebted borrowers might increase their 
indebtedness in order to purchase assets for short-term capital gains. However, as soon as the 
market price of these assets begins to fall, these borrowers are overleveraged and are forced 
to sell assets quickly in order to meet their debt repayments (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005: 
21). By mid-August 2006, the US Home Construction Index was down over 40% year on 
year.  
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The widespread holding of MBSs on the balance sheets of financial institutions worldwide 
started to become clearer. In August 2007, it was revealed that France’s BNP Paribas and 
Bank of China had large holdings of MBSs. It was discovered that even some government-
backed regional German banks (Landesbanken) had surprisingly large exposures to US-
originated MBSs (O. Blanchard, 2009). Large US investment banks like Merrill Lynch, 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, who were heavily involved in MBSs and CDOs, began 
suffering huge losses. On 22 August 2007, Lehman Brothers closed its subprime lender, BNC 
mortgages. In November 2007, Merrill Lynch announced it would write down $8.4 billion in 
losses associated with the national housing crisis. As of October 2007, the expected loss from 
US subprime loan defaults was approximately $250 billion (Blanchard, 2009). Investors in 
SPVs that securitise MBSs were exposed to large losses, but whether it was for contractual 
reasons or reputational risk, many sponsor banks took the assets and liabilities of their SPVs 
on to their own balance sheets. The subprime loans they originated were starting to come 
back to haunt them. Citigroup and HSBC consolidated assets worth $94 billion that had been 
sitting off their balance sheets (The Economist, 2008). According to Blanchard et al., by 
October 2008, all SPVs involved with MBSs were either bankrupt or their assets and 
liabilities had already been returned to the sponsor banks’ balance sheets (Blanchard et al., 
2014).  Basel II specified that a bank is only allowed to exclude assets from its balance sheet 
(therefore reducing capital requirements) if it does not maintain any exposures in the SPV or 
make any implicit guarantees. However, very few banks had actually implemented Basel II 
prior to the crisis (Bank for International Settlements, 2009). 
 
Fears over growing subprime defaults led to a mistrust of MBSs and CDOs. Rating agencies 
responded by downgrading these securities. The market for these financial instruments seized 
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and fears over the extent to which many financial institutions held these assets worsened 
counterparty risk and interbank liquidity began to dry up. In the UK, Northern Rock, a British 
bank heavily involved in issuing mortgage loans and securitising them for sale, used short-
term funding for 65% of its mortgages, which made it highly susceptible to a liquidity 
shortage (The Economist, 2007). On 14 September 2007, Northern Rock was unable to meet 
its liquidity needs in the interbank market and was forced to approach the Bank of England 
for liquidity, which it received. However, this created panic among depositors and led to a 
traditional run on the bank because the UK did not have the same kind of deposit insurance as 
the US (The Economist, 2008). On the 22 February 2008, Northern Rock was nationalised 
after attempts at a private buy-out were unsuccessful. In March 2008, after a bailout from the 
Fed, JP Morgan Chase bought Bear Stearns with the assistance of the Fed. According to The 
Economist (2008), the reason Bear Stearns was bailed out had more to do with its central role 
in markets for CDSs and interest-rate swaps than the size of its balance sheet. 
 
The TED Spread is the difference in interest rates (price spread) between three-month 
contracts for US Treasury Bills and three-month contracts for Eurodollars (represented by the 
London Interbank Offered Rate, also known as LIBOR) having identical expiration months. 
It indicates the level of perceived counterparty risk in the banking system because Treasury 
Bills are considered risk free, while the LIBOR rate reflects the credit risk of lending to 
commercial banks (Blanchard et al., 2014). Figure 7, provides the TED Spread from 31 
December 2005 to 27 January 2015, which indicates that the rate is usually well below 1%, 
but it fluctuated significantly between late 2007 and early 2009. Figure 7 highlights this 
period of significant volatility in TED Spreads. 
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Figure 7: TED Spread: long-term view (31 December 2005–27 January 2015) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2015a) 
 
 
Figure 8: TED Spread: Lehman Brothers announces its bankruptcy on 15 September 2008 (29August 2007–28 May 2009) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2015b) 
The TED Spread ballooned in early August 2007 when news about subprime mortgage 
defaults started reaching the market. The interbank market was seizing up and central banks 
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were required to provide liquidity. The Fed was quick to act, supplying liquidity to banks, but 
the Bank of England took a strong stance that it would not help irresponsible banks. Mervyn 
King, the Bank of England’s Governor, quickly changed his stance after mounting public 
pressure. On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers announced its bankruptcy (see figure 8 – 
15 September is indicated). The closure of Lehman Brothers caused a large-scale panic in the 
financial sector because of the interconnectedness of financial institutions and the opacity of 
the new financial instruments.  Lehman Brothers had more than $600 billion in assets of 
which it was unclear how much was owed to other banks, making all banks nervous to lend to 
each other because they did not know who was insolvent (Blanchard et al., 2014). After the 
news broke, the TED Spread ballooned, reaching its highest recorded rate of 458 basis points 
on 10 October 2008 (see figure 9). After Lehman’s bankruptcy, the interbank market had all 
but frozen up and the Fed reacted by making even more liquidity available to the market. 
However, at the same time, a different problem had arisen – the market for MBSs, CDOs and 
CDO²s collapsed because no-one wished to hold these toxic assets anymore. 
 
Value at risk (VaR) is a measure of market risk developed by JP Morgan in the 1980s and 
was used by Basel II to determine capital requirements (The Economist, 2008). More 
specifically, VaR “describes the loss that can occur over a given period, at a given confidence 
level, due to exposure to market risk” (Basak & Shapiro, 2001: 371-405) . VaR uses data 
forthe previous few years to calculate the maximum possible losses a bank can expect to 
sustain and the amount of capital that must be held against these possible losses. This created 
a heavy reliance on quantitative risk analysis in the financial sector. However, using past data 
to predict losses means that during the good times VaR will predict lower possible losses, 
which is counter-intuitive since a crisis usually follows a period of expansion. A second 
problem is that during troubled times, VaR will encourage deleveraging which will create 
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further volatility. In this way, VaR is procyclical. As banks tried to move these assets off 
their balance sheets they needed to sell them at low or “fire sale” prices. In contrast, keeping 
these assets was difficult as well because of fair-value accounting, also known as mark-to-
market accounting. Fair-value accounting meant that the market value of assets was reflected 
on a bank’s balance sheet (The Economist, 2008). In addition, asset selling triggered by VaR 
measures increased procyclically. Lower market values forced banks to make write-downs, 
which increased their leveraged positions and forced many to sell assets to meet capital 
requirements. Banks can either sell assets or reduce lending to deleverage (The Economist, 
2008). As these assets became more undesirable they were sold at lower prices, which 
decreased their market value. The paradox of leverage means that a decline in the market 
value of assets on a bank’s balance sheet requires the bank to sell assets to deleverage. These 
two effects fed into one another creating a panic selling situation. The Fed reacted to the “fire 
sale” situation by starting its Quantitative Easing I (QEI) programme in November 2008 
(Blanchard et al., 2014).  
 
 
Figure 9: TED Spread: to date, highest recorded rate on 10 October 2008 (29 August 2007– 28 May 2009) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2015c) 
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Quantitative easing (QE) refers to actions taken by the central bank to increase the money 
supply when decreasing the interest rate is no longer an option. It achieves this through open-
market operations such as buying Treasury Bills or longer-term government bonds. By 
contrast, credit easing refers to actions taken by the central bank to affect the price or interest 
rate on a specific asset, for example MBSs. Under the QEI programme, the Fed bought MBSs 
in order to stop the rapid decline in the market value of these assets that was creating turmoil 
in the financial industry after fire sales and write-downs. It was thus technically a credit-
easing programme, not a quantitative-easing programme as the name suggests (Blanchard et 
al., 2014). In August 2010, the Fed launched Quantitative Easing II (QEII) in which it bought 
long-term government bonds in order to increase the money supply. Prior to the crisis, the 
Fed’s balance sheet had been approximately $700 billion, but as of early 2014 it had 
expanded to over $4 trillion. Gill Marcus, former governor of the SARB, predicts that the Fed 
will not sell these assets back to the market – it would rather will keep them to maturity, in 
other words let them run off (Turok, 2014: 11-12, 15, 16, 17, 18). 
 
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was an initiative by the US Treasury to buy 
MBSs and other assets which the market had seized in order to stop fire sales of these assets 
after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. Initially $700 billion was earmarked for this 
program, but the Dodd-Frank Act later reduced this amount to $475 billion. Capital-adequacy 
rules are designed to protect a bank from insolvency but the more immediate concern was 
liquidity risk as the large interbank market had seized up. On 9 October 2007, Mr King of the 
Bank of England stated that “regulation worldwide has paid insufficient attention to liquidity, 
focusing instead on capital” (The Economist, 2007). 
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The Fed acts as lender of last resort for commercial banks and as such they are more heavily 
regulated by the Fed than investment banks and other financial institutions. However, owinge 
to systemic risks, the Fed offered emergency funding to investment banks for the first time 
since the Great Depression (The Economist, 2008). In the wake of the crisis, the remaining 
two largest investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, changed their charters to 
become commercial banks. During the financial crisis, another source of systemic risk was 
identified, that is, credit derivatives, specifically CDSs.  
 
2.2.10 The role of AIG and CDSs in the financial crisis 
A division of AIG called AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) became heavily involved in the 
selling of CDSs in the early 2000s. AIGFP sold CDSs on MBSs as well as on senior tranches 
(AAA rated tranches) of CDOs. Since AIG did not hedge against the protection it sold, the 
buck stopped with AIG. However, even dealers who hold a net position of zero or a 
“balanced book” can cause systemic risk because the failure of one dealer will mean that its 
counterparties will need to replace their CDSs while the market may be less liquid as a result 
of the default. As of June 30 2008, AIG’s net notional amount of outstanding CDSs was $411 
billion on AAA rated CDO tranches, with $55.1 billion written on subprime collateral (Stulz, 
2010: 73-92).  
 
AIG included collateral agreements in many of its CDS contracts. The use of collateral 
reduces counterparty risk and usually the amount of collateral required changes as the value 
of the contract changes, again referring to mark-to-market. If the chance of default by a 
dealer increases or the recovery rate decreases as perceived by the market, the required 
collateral will increase (Stulz, 2010: 73-92). This practice also affected banks because as 
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stated by the Bank of America in its 2005 10-K; “Earnings volatility increases due to 
accounting asymmetry as we mark-to-market the CDS” (Minton, Stulz, & Williamson, 2009: 
1-31). 
 
Prior to March 2005, AIG had a AAA credit rating, but the departure of its longstanding CEO 
coupled with accounting irregularities resulted in a downgrade to AA+. More accounting 
irregularities combined with the credit ratings downgrades of MBSs as well as the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers resulted in further downgrades of AIG. As a result of its credit 
downgrades, AIG was forced to post larger amounts of collateral to its counterparties. At the 
same time CDSs were being triggered by credit events. In addition, AIG had borrowed to 
invest in MBSs whose value had plummeted. These factors compounded and created a huge 
liquidity shortage for AIG. Its systemic importance led to the US government bailing out AIG 
with $85 billion on 16 September 2008. In November 2008, AIG had agreed to post $39.9 
billion in collateral (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2009). In total, through 
the initial bailout, subsequent assistance and through TARP, the US government gave AIG 
more than $180 billion (Blanchard et al., 2014). 
 
2.2.11 Basel III: revised global banking regulation 
In September 2009, the G20 met at the Pittsburgh Summit, and released the following 
communiqué: 
 We meet in the midst of a critical transition from crisis to recovery to turn the page 
on an era of irresponsibility and to adopt a set of policies, regulations and reforms to 
meet the needs of the 21st century global economy (G20, 2009).  
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The G20 is a forum for a group of 20 major economies represented by their heads of 
government and central bank governors. G20 members include the US, UK, EU, Japan and 
South Africa.  
 
The Basel Committee developed Basel III to address the weaknesses in Basel II, which was 
initially published in 2004 and was largely untested because of differing degrees of 
implementation prior to the crisis. Only a few European banks had adopted the rules before 
the crisis struck (The Economist, 2007). The focus of Basel II was on credit and operational 
risk. Basel III, however, focuses on a much wider spectrum of issues: expanding on capital 
requirements from Basel I and introducing liquidity and risk management. Basel III was 
endorsed by the G20 at its November 2010 summit in Seoul, and is in the process of being 
implemented worldwide.  The first phase came into effect on 1 January 2013 and is scheduled 
to be fully implemented in all G20 countries by 2019, although there is pressure on banks to 
be fully compliant before then. The G20 also called for improvements in the classification 
and measurement requirements for financial assets to which the International Accounting 
Standards Board has responded with a new accounting standard, IFRS to replace IAS 39. 
 
Basel III makes changes in capital adequacy (The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
December 2010 ). Banks have to hold a certain minimum capital ratio, which is calculated by 
dividing the bank’s capital by its risk-weighted assets (RWA). The new capital requirements 
are more restrictive  because of two updates. Firstly, capital has a stricter definition under 
Basel III. Tier 3 capital, which was the riskiest capital a bank could hold, has been eliminated 
and there are more restrictive qualifications for tier 2 capital. The largest proportion of tier 1 
capital must be common equity tier 1 capital (CET1 capital) which is defined as common 
shares and retained earnings. Banks must hold 6% tier 1 capital of which at least 4.5% must 
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be CET1 capital, the additional tier 1 capital must be a going concern. This is up from the 
previous requirement of 4% total tier 1 capital with at least 2% CET1. Banks must also keep 
a “capital conservation buffer” of 2.5% CET1 capital. The minimum capital requirement 
remains unchanged at 8%, but the quality of capital has been significantly increased, and 
adding the capital conservation buffer means the capital requirement is 10.5%. Basel III also 
introduces a “countercyclical buffer” of between 0% and 2.5%. The idea being that during 
times of high credit growth, banks will build their countercyclical buffer so that in times of 
credit decline they have a capital buffer to counter the pro-cyclical nature of credit expansion. 
In addition, global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs), or institutions 
whose failure might lead to another financial crisis, are required to hold an additional buffer 
of between 1% and 2.5% CET1 capital depending on the banks systemic importance as 
calculated using the Basel Committee’s methodology.  
 
Secondly, the risk weights for assets have also been updated. These are as follows:  
 higher risk weights for securitised and resecuritised assets  
 higher capital requirements for derivatives that do not go through a central 
counterparty (CCP) 
 trade exposures to a qualifying CCP, which receive a 2% risk weight 
 additional margining required for illiquid derivative exposures  
 higher capital requirements for trading book positions (to avoid regulatory arbitrage 
between trading and banking books) 
 higher capital requirements for resecuritisations for both trading and banking books 
 Higher risk weights for counterparty risk stemming from dealings with other financial 
institutions 
See equation 1 for an illustration of the changes to capital treatment under Basel III.  
Required	capital	ratio ൌ ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ	ሺ݋݈݊ݕ	ݐ݅݁ݎ	1	ܽ݊݀	2ሻܴܹܣ	ሺ݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ	݅݊	ݎ݅ݏ݇	ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐݏ	݂݋ݎ	ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊	ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏሻ 
Equation 1: Capital ratio under Basel III 
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Other important elements of Basel III include the following: 
 Less reliance on external credit rating agencies due to increased internal reporting to 
avoid a repeat of the increased losses as a result of credit rating agency downgrades of 
assets and institutions during the crisis. Banks with a large exposure to a given 
portfolio of assets should develop internal ratings for that portfolio instead of relying 
on external ratings for their capital requirements. This is dependent on supervisors 
having the capacity to evaluate banks’ internal assessment processes in order to 
determine that they are a reasonable reflection of the risks undertaken. 
 Default fund exposures to a qualifying CCP are capitalised according to a risk-based 
method. 
 Two new liquidity ratios were introduced because it was illiquidity not insolvency 
that threatened the financial system during the recent crisis. 
o Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR): Addresses short-term liquidity. Banks must 
have sufficient high-quality liquid assets to withstand a 30-day stressed 
funding scenario specified by supervisors.  
o Net stable funding ratio (NSFR): Addresses longer-term liquidity. Banks are 
required to maintain a sound financing structure over a one-year stressed 
funding scenario specified by supervisors. It incentivises banks to use stable 
sources of funding. 
 A leverage ratio was introduced:  
o The leverage ratio must be ≥ 3%. That is, banks’ total assets, including off-
balance-sheet assets, cannot be more than 33 times their tier 1 capital.  
 There is a new stressed VaR requirement for banks using VaR models in the trading 
book. 
 A capital charge for potential mark-to-market losses on expected counterparty risk 
was introduced, that is, credit valuation risk (CVA). 
 An additional capital charge was introduced to cover the risk of mark-to-market losses 
on the expected counterparty risk to OTC derivatives transactions not centrally 
cleared. 
 
In South Africa, the SARB oversees the implementation of Basel III. It has already adopted 
the LCR and intends to implement the NSFR despite a limited supply of government bonds 
and an illiquid corporate debt market. In response to Basel III, the SARB has committed to 
assisting banks in meeting their liquidity needs (International Monetary Fund, 2015a). 
According to Directive 5/2013 issued by the SARB, the end of the phase-in period for capital 
changes is 1 January 2016. The SARB introduced an additional capital charge for domestic 
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systemically important banks (D-SIB) because of the small number of large banks that are 
highly connected, even though none of them qualify as globally systemically important 
financial institutions (G-SIFIs). 
 
 South African banks will need to hold 
 a minimum of 8% capital, of which 6% must be tier 1 capital and 4.5% must be CET1 
capital 
 plus, between 0% and 2.5% for predefined domestic systemically important banks (D-
SIB) 
 plus, a capital conservation buffer (CB) of between 0% and 2.5% 
 plus, a countercyclical buffer (CCB) range of between 0% and 2.5% 
 plus, a pillar 2A capital requirement at 0.5% of RWA for all banks. Pillar 2A capital 
is held for factors relating to systemic risk. Once the phase-in period for D-SIB is 
complete, pillar 2A plus the D-SIB requirement will not exceed 2% for CET1, 2.5% 
for tier 1 capital and 3.5% of total RWA. 
 plus, a bank-specific individual capital requirement (ICR), also known as pillar 2B 
The South African minima will equal 10.5% + ICR + CCB + min (3.5% or [P2A + D-SIB]), 
which gives a total capital minimum requirement of 14% (South African Reserve Bank, 
2013). South African banks are therefore subject to capital requirements that are higher than 
those specified by Basel III. 
 
The Basel Committee conducted a comprehensive quantitative impact study for Basel III, in 
which 263 banks from 23 committee member jurisdictions participated, and these banks were 
split into two groups. Group 1 consisted of 94 banks that have tier 1 capital in excess of 
€3 billion and who are internationally active; the remaining banks were placed in group 2. 
The study estimated that for group 1 banks to meet the 7% CET1 level (the 4.5% minimum 
plus the 2.5% capital conservation buffer), there would be a total shortfall of €577 billion. 
The sum of profits after tax for the year 2009 prior to distributions was €209 billion for group 
1 banks. In addition, the RWA would increase by 23% for group 1 (Bank for International 
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Settlements, 2010). The study assumed that there would be no changes in banks’ behaviour as 
a result of Basel III so the impact could be larger. Basel III could lead to significant 
reductions in credit extension which will affect global growth negatively. 
 
Basel I and II were both implemented differently across nations which led to financial 
regulatory arbitrage. At the Risk and Return conference (13 March 2014) Daniel Mminele, 
Deputy Governor of the SARB, indicated that 
concerns are being raised around issues such as inconsistency in the domestic 
implementation of the new regulatory standards and their applicability to all 
countries, and possible “unintended consequences”, which include the impact of the 
reforms which need to be balanced against the need for financial stability (Mminele, 
2014). 
 
2.2.12 Conclusion 
There are many factors that came together to cause and intensify the crisis. These include the 
low interest rate environment, subprime lending, falling property prices, complicated and 
opaque new securities, inaccurate risk ratings, credit default swap instruments, shadow 
banking, counterparty risk, an overleveraged financial system, interbank liquidity shortages 
and widespread panic selling of assets. Financial instruments such as CDSs did not cause the 
financial crisis, but their complexity and opacity accelerated and intensified the panic, which 
worsened the financial contagion effect and systemic risk to the financial system.  
 
In the wake of the financial crisis, regulators all over the world have been examining the 
failures in regulation before and during the crisis and developing regulatory responses. Basel 
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III was the Basel Committee’s response to the weaknesses identified in banking regulation 
prior to the crisis. This protocol has been adopted by the G20, of which South Africa is a 
member. Banks make up the largest OTC credit derivative market makers worldwide, and for 
this reason Basel III indirectly addresses some aspects of the OTC credit derivatives market. 
However, governments have responded with legislation to regulate local OTC derivatives 
markets that were previously largely unregulated.  
 
Regulatory responses to OTC derivatives include setting up central counterparties (CCPs), 
trade repositories (TRs), minimum capital and margining requirements. A detailed discussion 
of these regulatory responses combined with a discussion of key regulation addressing OTC 
derivatives markets is given in section 2.4. Regulations discussed are the USA’s Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the recently enacted South African Financial Markets 
Act (FMA). Financial regulation will need to continue evolving in order to keep pace with the 
innovative financial world but without stifling innovation. 
 
2.3 The South African experience 
2.3.1 Securitisation 
Since securitisation played a key role in the financial crisis, the department of bank 
supervision at the SARB instructed all banks that were involved in securitisation activities in 
either a primary or secondary role to furnish it with a report on the various risks facing those 
banks in April 2008. In November 2008, the final report was submitted to the SARB by an 
internationally based auditing firm that conducted the research. According to the report, 
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securitisation in South Africa was not as complicated as in the US and European countries 
and the assets housed in South African securitisation schemes tended to have a high level of 
transparency. The top-tier South African banks sourced only 4% on average of their total 
funding from securitisation, which was significantly less than those international banks that 
struggled during the liquidity crisis (Bank Supervision Department of the South African 
Reserve Bank, 2008). In addition, the assets securitised were subjected to the same credit 
approval processes that banks applied to their own credit exposure. This is possibly because 
of to the constraining influence of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. Hence asset 
securitisation was not a source of risk for South Africa before the crisis. 
 
Furthermore, strong exchange controls prevented South African banks from investing heavily 
in US and European securities (The OTC Derivatives Working Group, 2012). Although the 
global financial crisis did not have a direct impact on the South African financial system, it 
was the primary cause of the economic recession beginning in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 
lasting for three consecutive quarters (Financial Stability Board, 2013). Because US and 
European banks needed to deleverage, they began cutting their foreign exposure to emerging 
economies like South Africa (Blanchard, 2009). Then in the aftermath, weary investors began 
withdrawing investments from developing countries in favour of safer investments such as 
US treasury bonds. In addition to the outward flow of financial investment, lower global GDP 
reduced the demand for South African exports combined with a decline in the prices of major 
export commodities, which further harmed the domestic economy.  
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2.3.2 The total OTC derivatives market 
While derivatives were not a direct contagion for South Africa during the crisis, the country 
has had its share of derivative disasters over the years. By international standards, the South 
African OTC derivatives market is well developed and did not encounter systemic difficulties 
from the financial crisis or from other international and local crises. The total OTC market is 
large in relation to the size of the country’s economy: in June 2012 the gross notional 
outstanding value of the South African OTC derivatives market was approximately R27 
trillion which is 7.5% of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2015b). The market is also large 
compared with those of other emerging markets (see figure 10). South Africa has the only 
derivatives market in sub-Saharan Africa (Adelegan, 2009). The major market participants 
consist of “the big four” South African Banks and international banks operating domestically. 
Other market participants include corporates and financial institutions such as pension funds, 
insurance funds and asset managers. According to Price Waterhouse Coopers, in 2012, 63% 
of the total notional outstanding value of all OTC derivative transactions in South Africa was 
interbank, while 35% involved other financial institutions and only 2% involved a corporate 
counterparty. There are a small number of large banks in South Africa that are significantly 
interconnected, thereby providing a source of systemic risk. Prior to the crisis, the OTC 
derivatives market was largely unregulated. The only market participants that were subject to 
regulation were financial institutions, that is, banks and financial advisors, on account of their 
institutional nature not their activities. Derivatives were not explicitly regulated under the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (FAIS) of 2002 or the Banks Act of 1990. 
The Securities Services Act of 2004 did not provide for active regulation and monitoring of 
the OTC derivatives market. The latter Acthas been replaced by the Financial Markets Act of 
2012, which will be discussed in section 2.4.5. The JSE requires that its members report their 
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OTC derivatives positions in order to determine each member’s market risk exposure per 
instrument (National Treasury, 2014). The majority of transactions rely on bilateral execution 
and there is an uneven use of collateral for transactions (The OTC Derivatives Working 
Group, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 10: OTC derivatives averages daily Turnover in 2013, as a percentage of GDP 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2015b) 
 
The gaps in regulation meant that some OTC derivatives dealers were not subject to 
regulation or assessment of their market conduct. One such entity was Dealstream Securities 
(Pty) Ltd, which was not a licensed financial services provider. Dealstream was heavily 
involved in the OTC derivatives market mainly in “contracts for difference” which are a type 
of forward contract. In early September 2008, the FSB announced that it was investigating 
several complaints against Dealstream and that investors should be cautious of the company. 
Dealstream was accused of misappropriating its clients’ funds and by early October had filed 
for bankruptcy (National Treasury, 2014). 
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It is not only the largely unregulated OTC derivatives market that has seen derivative 
disasters. Even the highly regulated exchange-traded derivatives market has seen crises in the 
past.  A brief historical overview of exchange-traded derivatives shows that in the late 1980s, 
the South African Futures Exchange (Safex) and the South African Clearing Company 
(Safcom) were established to handle exchange-traded derivative instruments. Safex initially 
traded only futures contracts but options were introduced in 1992 and in 1995 agricultural 
commodity futures were added (Adelegan, 2009). The JSE bought Safex in 2001 and formed 
two divisions: Safex financial derivatives; and Safex agricultural derivatives (Swart, B. & 
Venter, A., 2006: 114). According to Swart and Venter (2006: 114) “… [t]hese developments 
have created an international[ly] accepted trading environment in South Africa and brought 
the country in line with global financial trends …”. 
 
In 2003, the Joint Municipal Pension Fund lost R1.9 billion on speculative maize future 
contracts. Swart and Venter (2006: 114) note that “(i)t would be unfair to blame derivatives 
as such for the disaster” and that human factors such as lack of knowledge and transparency 
as well as greed, fraud or simple error likely also played a role. They make the important 
point that “knowledge of financial processes and their modelling in particular is essential”.  
According to Allan Thomson, the head of derivatives trading at the JSE, “Lehman Brothers 
held very large single stock futures on Safex”, but when Lehman Brothers went under these 
contracts were simply transferred to another JSE member (Johannesburg Stock Exhange Ltd, 
2008). Investors did not lose their positions with the bankruptcy because the JSE was their 
counterparty, not Lehman Brothers. This is the benefit of a central counterparty in reducing 
counterparty risk. 
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2.3.3 The credit derivatives market 
The composition of market participants in the OTC credit derivatives market deviates 
significantly from that of the total OTC derivatives discussed in section 2.3.2. According to a 
South African credit derivatives trader, the local credit derivatives market is extremely one 
directional. In general, South African banks sell protection to foreign banks and in return buy 
protection from local market participants such as asset managers and insurance firms. In the 
vast majority of cases, South African banks act as dealers in the credit derivatives market, 
engaging in limited hedging activities and even less often engaging in speculative activities. 
As a result, South African banks rarely deal with each other as counterparties, simply acting 
as dealers passing risk from the international market to local market participants. The main 
market makers are Standard Bank, Absa and RMB (a division of FirstRand bank). The 
majority of CDSs in the South African market are single name with a few basket CDSs. No 
CDS indices are issued in the South African market, but South African sovereign debt and a 
few large South African corporations are referenced in foreign CDS indices. 
 
2.3.4 Regulatory response 
The aftermath of the crisis has raised questions about the suitability of financial regulation 
and supervision worldwide. In South Africa, the Financial Markets Act will directly affect the 
domestic OTC derivatives market. This Act will be discussed in detail in section 2.4.4. The 
South African regulation relating to the OTC derivatives market is compared with the US and 
European legislation in section 2.4.5. In addition, there have been significant changes in the 
roles and responsibilities of regulators of the financial sector in South Africa. These will be 
discussed in the paragraph that follows. 
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In direct reaction to the financial crisis, the Minister of Finance gave the SARB a financial 
stability mandate in 2010. The SARB responded by separating the Financial Stability 
Department from the Bank Supervision Department of the SARB (International Monetary 
Fund, 2015a). According to Gill Marcus, former Governor of the SARB, since the crisis, 
most central banks have been given a financial stability mandate. The SARB implemented 
the new structure in April 2014 whereby there are three deputy governors under the governor, 
each with a different responsibility area. These areas are risk management and compliance, 
financial conglomerates supervision and financial stability (Turok, 2014: 11-12, 15, 16, 17, 
18). However, the developments did not stop there, and the Financial Sector Regulation Bill 
has detailed large changes in the South African financial regulatory framework. Traditionally, 
the regulatory framework was in line with the institutional approach. Prior to the crisis, the 
two main regulatory authorities were the SARB, which regulates and monitors banks, and the 
Financial Services Board (FSB), which regulates and monitors non-bank financial 
institutions. The National Credit Regulator serves as a watchdog for consumer protection. 
After a joint assessment of the South African financial system conducted by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 2008, it was found that although South Africa has a 
modern and effective financial regulatory framework, it needs to strengthen both prudential 
and market conduct supervisory and regulatory powers. The South African government 
responded by issuing a proposal in 2011 to reform the financial system. The main focus of 
this reform is a shift to the twin peaks system following global moves towards this model 
after the crisis. The twin peaks approach is regarded by the National Treasury as the least 
disruptive to the financial industry while providing the optimal means of ensuring that 
transparency, market integrity and consumer protection receive sufficient priority. Regulatory 
functions are split between two regulators. In South Africa, the SARB is responsible for 
prudential regulation and supervision, while the FSB is responsible for the conduct of 
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business. The FSB has become the “market conduct authority”, while a single statutory entity 
in the SARB called the “prudential authority” supervises prudential regulation (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015a). The newly established Financial Stability Oversight Committee 
comprising the SARB, FSB and National Treasury is responsible for macro-prudential 
oversight of the financial system with a focus on the financial system’s stability. The newly 
formed Council of Financial Regulators comprising representatives from the regulators, 
market participants and other stakeholders ensures financial regulation coordination. 
(Department of National Treasury, South Africa, February 2011). 
 
2.4 Regulation relating to OTC derivatives 
2.4.1 Legal enforceability 
The history of OTC derivatives contracts has been plagued by questions of their legality. 
Traditionally, OTC derivatives were considered to be bets and could only be legally enforced 
if it was proven that at least one of the counterparties held a legitimate claim on the 
underlying reference entity. This was a common law rule used in both the US and the UK 
called the “rule against difference contracts”, and it essentially prevented OTC derivatives 
from being used for speculative purposes and restricted them to use as hedging instruments 
only. In 1936, the Commodity Exchange Act made OTC derivative contracts illegal and 
unenforceable. However, in 1986 in the UK, authorities eliminated the rule against difference 
contracts which helped to establish the UK’s OTC derivatives market which is now the 
largest centre in the world (The OTC Derivatives Working Group, 2012). In the US, the 
Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 permitted certain swaps to be traded OTC, and in 
2000, the Commodity Futures Modernisation Act gave full legal recognition to OTC 
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derivatives and allowed CDSs to be used for speculative purposes. The Act also allowed for 
self-regulation of the market. 
 
There have been a multitude of lawsuits initiated by both professional and non-professional 
end-users after suffering large losses due to OTC derivatives contracts. Complainants have 
cited market manipulation, improper conduct by the counterparty and inadequate disclosure 
of risks. A popular example is Procter and Gamble Co versus Bankers Trust Co and BT 
Securities Corporation (1996) where Procter claimed that Bankers Trust had superior 
knowledge and fiduciary obligations to Procter. The court ruled in favour of Bankers Trust 
(Schwartz & Smith, 1997). A more recent case is that of Cassa di Risparmio della 
Repubblica di San Marino v Barclays Bank Ltd (2011), where Barclays stood accused of 
misrepresentation and fraud. Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino (CRSM) 
had bought a series of CDO²s with a total value of €230 million which were structured and 
sold by Barclays. The CDO²s had a AAA rating from rating agencies but CRSM claimed that 
Barclays knew that they were more risky than the credit rating suggested because Barclays’ 
internal financial modelling indicated a higher credit risk. The court found in favour of 
Barclays. Most of these lawsuits stem from the opacity and complexity of these instruments. 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has made significant strides 
towards standardisation of contracts and its “master agreement” is the industry standard with 
its general terms and conditions which reduce the opacity of these contracts while still 
allowing customisability.  
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2.4.2 Market self-regulation in response to the crisis 
After the financial crisis, in its pursuit to further standardise CDS contracts, the ISDA 
designed the “ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees and Auction Settlement 
CDS protocol”, which is also known as the Big Bang Protocol. According to the ISDA, the 
Big Bang CDS Protocol was successfully adhered to by over 2 000 parties by 7 April 2009 
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2009).  The Big Bang Protocol and the 
subsequent Small Bang Protocol are industry self-regulatory protocols. The protocols 
established standard contract conventions. The first major change resulting from these 
protocols is that prior to 2009 there was no upfront fee payable by the protection buyer, 
which allowed speculators to take a position in a large synthetic portfolio of reference entities 
without much initial capital outlay. The Big Bang Protocol requires that the annual CDS 
premium is fixed at either 100 or 500 basis points and that an upfront fee is paid, with the 
upfront payment differing according to the perceived credit risk of the underlying bond issuer 
(collateral provided). Secondly, investors now need to opt out of the auction process (such as 
the auction held for Lehman Brothers) whereas before they needed to opt in. 
 
2.4.3 Regulatory structures during the crisis 
Prior to the crisis, the OTC derivatives market was largely unregulated with regulatory 
supervision of some market participants and not others. In the US, financial supervision was 
conducted by the Fed in conjunction with a number of other regulatory authorities such as the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as well as many other state regulators (The Economist, 
2007). In Britain, all financial supervision is conducted by the Financial Services Authority 
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(FSA), which is wholly separated from the Bank of England (BoE). In the Euro zone, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) provides liquidity to the market but supervision is carried out 
by national authorities. In South Africa, since 1971, the South African Reserve Bank has 
been responsible for the regulation and supervision of banks in the country, while the 
Financial Services Board (FSB) has been responsible for the regulation and supervision of all 
non-banking financial institutions. 
 
In the case of the US, the SEC and CFTC shared oversight and supervisory authority of 
derivative market participants. Too many regulatory authorities created a number of 
loopholes which were exploited by financial institutions (The Economist, 2007). In Europe, 
the European Commission’s (EC’s) 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) created common rules for the trading of derivatives, but contained loopholes that 
exempted qualified counterparties from some of their obligations. The Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) was created as an independent committee to improve 
coordination among European securities regulators. In South Africa, the 2002 FAIS Act 
provided standards for the conduct of professional market participants, particularly when 
dealing with retail customers. The focus is on consumers receiving fair treatment as well as 
the full disclosure of relevant information, but it does not specifically address conduct with 
respect to OTC derivatives (The OTC Derivatives Working Group, 2012). Under the South 
African Securities Act of 2004, the FSB was given some power over OTC derivatives in so 
far as it could prohibit a person from selling these instruments. It could impose conditions for 
such a business and it could prescribe conditions in terms of which specified types of unlisted 
securities could be sold. However, the FSB did not use these powers at any time because the 
largest market participants are banks that are regulated by the SARB (The OTC Derivatives 
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
86 | P a g e  
 
Working Group, 2012). This is because South Africa was largely following an institutional 
approach to regulation. 
 
The failure to supervise and regulate OTC derivatives markets has been addressed 
internationally by industry leaders such as the ISDA, and international organisations such as 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the G20, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have all weighed in on reforms to the OTC 
derivatives markets and were considered by policy makers (with varying weights) with regard 
to regulatory reform.  The focus will be on three pieces of regulation – from the US, the EU 
and South Africa, respectively. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act was signed into law by President Barack Obama on 21 July 2010. The Act 
contains specific instructions for the OTC derivatives market in the USA to increase stability. 
In the EU, the EMIR became enforceable on 16 August 2012. In South Africa, the Financial 
Markets Act of 2012 came into effect in June 2013. The UK is a member state of the 
European Union (EU) and so it is bound by the EU regulation, but it is worth noting that the 
UK is the largest centre for OTC derivatives and that the FSA would prefer more liberal 
policies in respect of central clearing and central trading (The OTC Derivatives Working 
Group, 2012). 
 
2.4.4 Comparison of Dodd-Frank and EMIR legislation 
Both Dodd-Frank and the EMIR make provision for increased regulatory and supervisory 
authority over OTC derivatives markets. In the USA, the SEC and CFTC are still the two 
main regulatory bodies in this industry but they have been given more power, and a 
“Financial Stability Oversight Council” has been created to resolve disputes between the two 
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bodies. In Europe, the CESR was replaced by the newly established European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA). Both Acts also require professional dealers to register 
themselves.  
 
Dodd-Frank refers to “swap dealers” and “major market participants” (MSPs), which are 
systemically important institutions that must be registered with the CFTC. MSPs are now 
subject to additional requirements such as record keeping and capital requirements (only 
imposed on non-bank dealers). An organisation can be an MSP for one type of derivative, but 
not necessarily for all its derivative holdings and derivatives held for hedging are not 
included. The ESMA identifies non-financial counterparties and financial counterparties. It 
gives partial exemption for non-financial counterparties from reporting and clearing 
obligations provided that their activities fall below defined thresholds. The thresholds are 
defined by the European Commission and are different for each type of derivative, taking into 
account systemic risks. It is important to note that once a non-financial counterparty exceeds 
the threshold for one type of derivative, it is subject to the same regulatory requirements as 
financial institutions for all of its derivative holdings, not only the types that are above the 
thresholds. Derivatives used for hedging are excluded from the threshold calculation. Dealers 
are market makers, while end-users use derivatives to hedge their own risk.  
A trade repository (TR) is valuable for reducing systemic risks because it aggregates and 
stores important data on transactions which can be accessed by authorities for macro-
prudential supervision as well as during a financial crisis to assess counterparty risk, thereby 
reducing the opacity of these complicated instruments. Dodd-Frank requires central reporting 
of all transactions to a TR. The onus is on the dealer to report the transaction but if neither of 
the counterparties is a dealer then they must decide which of them is responsible for reporting 
the transaction. The TR or “swap data depository” as it is referred to in the US Act, could be 
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a private institution or one operated by the CFTC. The European legislation also prescribes a 
number of standards for trade repositories; and according to the EMIR, non-financial 
counterparties are exempt from the central reporting responsibility provided that their 
activities fall below the thresholds. 
 
Central clearing reduces counterparty credit risk because the central clearing counterparty 
(CCP) acts as a counterparty to each transaction – “a buyer to every seller” – and allows for 
multi-lateral netting. Central clearing reduces systemic risk by bringing an opaque dealer 
market into the light where regulators can impose rules and also net transactions. However, 
central clearing is not always desirable for certain derivatives. The reason is twofold. Firstly, 
from the end-user’s perspective central clearing requires a level of standardisation and if a 
high level of customisability is desired, then the forced central clearing of all derivative 
contracts circumvents the use of these more exotic derivatives which is not desirable from a 
social cost perspective since many corporates use derivatives to hedge their risk. Secondly, 
the CCP itself may be unable to “risk-manage some derivatives”, and forcing it to might lead 
to systemic risk (The OTC Derivatives Working Group, 2012). For those derivatives that are 
not subject to central clearing, mandatory margin requirements or collateral have been 
imposed. According to Dodd-Frank, end-users are not exempt from margin requirements. 
Dodd-Frank requires that derivatives meeting certain criteria determined by the CFTC must 
be centrally cleared, taking into account systemic risk mitigation and the effect on 
competition among other things. The Act identifies a “derivatives clearing organisation” 
(DCO) as a systemically important entity and identifies governance and conduct of business 
rules for these institutions. According to Dodd-Frank, end-users can be exempt from central 
clearing provided they are not MSPs and/or financial institutions, and they can demonstrate 
how they meet their financial obligations associated with entering non-cleared swaps and that 
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they use swaps to hedge commercial risk. There is a grandfathering exemption, which means 
that existing contracts are not subject to these new restrictions but all new contracts will be. 
The EMIR refers to central counterparties (CCPs) to execute central clearing functions. CCPs 
reduce systemic risk because there are strict rules to deal with a default of one member. 
According to the EMIR, after the default of a member in order to settle with its 
counterparties, the CCP will use, firstly the defaulting members’ margins, then the defaulting 
members’ contribution to the default fund, then the rest of the contributions to the default 
fund, and only after that, will the CCP’s own funds be used. The European regulation 
specifies that all standardised derivatives must be cleared and it states two approaches for 
determining whether a derivative must be centrally cleared. The first approach is called the 
“bottom-up” approach where the CCPs identify which derivatives should be centrally cleared 
according to criteria determined by the ESMA. The second approach is “top down” in the 
sense that the ESMA and the European Systemic Risk Board can prescribe which derivatives 
must be centrally cleared. Dodd-Frank prevents banks from holding non-centrally cleared 
CDSs and CDSs against ABSs on their own balance sheet, but there is a grandfathering 
exemption. They are required to “push out” these derivatives on to separately capitalised 
subsidiaries from 2013. The European legislation makes no such rule.  
 
The G20 requested central trading of standardised derivatives contracts where possible. Since 
then there has been much debate about the benefits and detractors of implementing 
mandatory central trading. Proponents argue that central trading is the natural extension of 
central clearing, that it will increase pre-trade price transparency and that it will further 
bolster the safety of the market. Detractors argue that centralised trading requires a high level 
of standardisation and that greater standardisation is not desired by market participants. 
According to a study of market participants conducted by the IMF, only 17% believe that 
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current pre-trade price transparency is inadequate and that the derivative products which 
would gain the most from higher pre-trade price transparency are the more exotic derivatives 
which would not benefit from standardisation (The OTC Derivatives Working Group, 2012). 
Dodd-Frank specifies certain types of derivative contracts that must be centrally traded, 
specifically all standardised derivatives. It also introduces a new kind of trading platform 
called a “swaps execution facility”, where bid and offer spreads are posted by multiple 
dealers.  EU regulation is still in the consultation phase regarding centralised trading. 
 
Basel III’s lower risk weighting attached to derivatives which are centrally cleared provides 
an incentive for financial institutions to centrally clear derivatives that are not required to be 
centrally cleared by legislation. Standard contract conventions like the ones featured in the 
ISDA’s Big Bang and Small Bang Protocols are helpful to central clearinghouses to manage 
the impact should any large members default.  
 
Section 939(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires all federal agencies to remove the requirement 
to rely on credit ratings from their regulations and replace them with appropriate alternatives. 
Although Basel III encourages banks to use internal risk models where possible rather than 
rely solely on credit rating agencies, it does not completely eliminate reliance on these 
agencies. 
 
The major difference between the US and European regulation with respect to derivatives is 
Dodd-Franks “Volcker Rule”. The Volcker Rule prevents banks from trading in derivatives 
for themselves, that is, banking book trades. However, there are exceptions, such as risk 
mitigation. The Volcker Rule could favour the European market at the expense of the US 
derivatives market and displace profits from US banks to European banks. Regulatory 
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
91 | P a g e  
 
arbitrage could move more business to European markets at the expense of US markets. But 
the more liberal European regulation could lead to greater financial market instability in 
Europe. 
 
2.4.5 The South African FMA 
The Financial Markets Act (FMA) of 2012 repeals the Securities Services act of 2004 and its 
purpose is to align South Africa with regulations in other G20 countries to prevent regulatory 
arbitrage. The Act focuses on OTC derivatives market regulation and supervision and 
strengthening existing measures against insider trading and market abuse. South African 
regulators decided to implement the FMA’s regulation relating to the OTC derivatives market 
in three phases as opposed to adopting a Big Bang approach in an effort to avoid major 
disruptions to the market. This cautious approach is largely due to a lack of a detailed 
understanding of the functioning of the local OTC derivatives market by South African 
authorities (Financial Stability Board, 2013). Before each phase is implemented, there will be 
a period of consultation where all role players will be able to give their input on any aspect of 
the regulatory framework (National Treasury, 2014). The consultation process for the first 
phase opened on 4 July 2014 and closed on 3 September 2014. Phase 1 consists of the 
implementation of central reporting for OTC derivative transactions and a code of conduct 
for market participants and the registration of market participants. Phase 2 concerns risk 
management, specifically the margin and capital requirements for non-centrally cleared 
derivatives, where appropriate. Phase 3 concerns the standardisation of derivatives for central 
clearing and where appropriate, central trading. Authorities do not view central trading as an 
immediate concern (Financial Stability Board, 2013). 
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OTC derivatives providers will need to register with the Financial Services Board of South 
Africa (FSB). The Act refers to them as ODPs “OTC derivatives providers”, and they will be 
subject to a code of conduct established under the FMA. An ODP is defined as a 
person/entity for which OTC derivatives form a regular feature in the course of its business 
and for its own account, which originates OTC derivatives or is a market maker. There is no 
threshold because regulators wish to monitor all primary OTC market participants, essentially 
all professional market participants (Financial Stability Board, 2013). 
 
The reporting of all OTC derivative transactions to a TR will be mandatory in South Africa. 
ODPs will bear the responsibility of reporting all transactions to a TR. At this stage it is 
envisioned that end-users (say, corporates) will not bear responsibility to report their 
transactions to a TR since at this stage it is assumed that these end-users transact with ODPs. 
TRs will be subject to reporting obligations and will need to be licensed, but the Act does not 
prescribe the TR’s structure and/or ownership at this stage (National Treasury, 2014). As of 
early 2015, a South African TR had not been established, but the Act does allow for the use 
of a foreign TR.  As an example, TriOptima is a well-established Swedish TR that collects 
data from the G-14 banks regarding outstanding OTC interest rate derivatives and provides 
weekly reports that are accessible to the public (National Treasury, 2014). There are two 
issues with using a foreign TR. Firstly, it would not be under the jurisdiction of the South 
African government so South African authorities would need to sign a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) with the foreign TR to ensure that South African authorities can access 
all the data they require for supervision. Secondly, multiple (foreign and local) TRs would 
mean that the data needs to be aggregated for the local economy, which could lead to a delay 
in the accessibility of the data which could have large consequences in the event of a crisis. 
The second issue could be resolved by relying only on a foreign TR, but the MoU would have 
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to ensure that South African authorities do not face any legal or operational impediments to 
obtaining the data they need, especially under stressed circumstances (International Monetary 
Fund, 2015b). 
 
Central clearing of standardised contracts is not mandated by the Act. Authorities are initially 
going to rely on incentives to encourage ODPs to centrally clear OTC derivative transactions. 
Since the main market makers are banks, Basel III’s lower risk weighting attached to 
derivatives that clear through a CCP, as well as exemption from CVA will provide a large 
incentive. Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared OTC derivative transactions will 
follow the BCBS-IOSCO framework. It seems authorities will only commit to enforcing 
mandatory central clearing if the margining and capital requirements do not incentivise a 
large enough migration to central clearing. A South African CCP for OTC derivatives has not 
yet been licensed. The JSE’s Safcom is the CCP for exchange-traded derivatives and the JSE 
has taken steps to enable Safcom’s compliance with the principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructures (FMIs) set by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions. In September 2013, Safcom made 
an application to the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) for recognition. 
Safcom has not yet expressed an intention to apply for recognition under the Dodd-Frank 
Act. There are various criticisms against licensing Safcom as a local OTC derivatives CCP. 
Firstly, Safcom is wholly owned by the JSE, and the ESMA has suggested that the 
connectedness of an exchange and a CCP could be a source of additional risk. Secondly, 
Safcom relies heavily on four of its ten existing members for liquidity, which makes it 
extremely vulnerable should one of the big four banks fail. The Act allows for offshore CCPs 
recognised by the FSB to provide services to South African entities. South African banks 
trade extensively with foreign banks, according to Nhlanhla Nene, current Minister of 
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Finance, and around 60% of South African interbank derivatives are traded with foreign 
banks. Counterparties under the EMIR’s jurisdiction are subject to mandatory clearing of 
standardised derivatives transactions. Hence in January 2013, the first OTC derivative 
transaction involving a South African bank (Absa) and a foreign counterparty was cleared by 
LCH.Clearnet, a CCP based in the UK (Financial Stability Board, 2013). 
 
South African authorities can decide not to license a local CCP, and recognise foreign CCPs 
or not, and whether to rely only on a local CCP. Since most of the interbank derivatives 
transactions in South Africa are conducted with foreign banks, the use of foreign CCPs seems 
a natural choice, but the use of foreign CCPs would require South African entities to post 
collateral to offshore accounts. Current exchange controls limit South African entities from 
investing more than 25% of their liabilities offshore, and collateral requirements to foreign 
CCPs mean this limit may need to be reconsidered. The same supervision and access to data 
concerns that apply to a foreign TR also apply to a foreign CCP, but even more so because 
CCPs are more systemically important. It would be far harder for South African authorities to 
assist a foreign CCP in trouble than a local CCP and the failure of a foreign CCP would have 
large direct and indirect consequences for South Africa. However, a global CCP would also 
have more clearing members and therefore less reliance on the small number of large South 
African banks. Owing to economies of scale, a global CCP reduces costs for clearing 
members and allows for more netting, which is desirable. Conversely, forcing foreign banks 
to use a South African CCP would increase their costs and possibly reduce their participation 
in the market, resulting in a smaller market and less liquidity in the market.   
 
There are pros and cons to both the local only or foreign only approaches, but they are 
unsuitable for South Africa. The FMA envisioned that both local and foreign CCPs would be 
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able to operate in the market but there are also downsides to this mixed approach, such as 
reduced netting opportunities for banks that participate in multiple CCPs. Lastly, a hybrid 
model could be considered, where a local CCP becomes a clearing member of a global CCP. 
This would optimise netting while still having the benefits of having both a local and global 
CCP in the market. However, it intensifies the direct exposure if a global CCP fails.  
 
Safcom is an excellent candidate for a local CCP if authorities decide not to rely solely on a 
foreign CCP. Safcom’s “risk waterfall” is consistent with the ESMA’s framework for dealing 
with the default of a clearing member. According to the risk waterfall, if a clearing member 
defaults, the losses from the default are funded in the following order: firstly, by the 
defaulting clearing member’s initial margin; secondly, by the defaulting member’s 
contribution to the default fund; thirdly, by the JSE’s contribution to the default fund; and 
fourthly, by non-defaulting members’ contribution to the default fund. Presently, Safcom has 
ten clearing members, but it relies heavily on its four largest members for most of its 
liquidity. It has therefore been suggested that it should also have access to liquidity from the 
SARB because CCPs are systemically important institutions themselves. 
 
Central trading of derivative transactions is not seen as an immediate concern and is not 
covered by the FMA. Further regulation would be needed should authorities find that central 
trading of standardised derivative transactions is desirable. 
 
OTC derivatives are classed according to a taxonomy in the Act. The following are classified 
as credit derivatives: 
 credit default swap (single name, index, index tranche or basket) 
 credit default swaption 
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
96 | P a g e  
 
 credit default option 
 total return swap 
 
Under the new twin peaks model, the SARB and FSB will share supervisory responsibility 
for the OTC derivatives market. The FSB will be responsible for market conduct, while the 
SARB will be responsible for regulating capital and risk requirements, although the SARB’s 
power over this market has not yet been finalised. Until the twin peaks model is fully 
implemented, the FSB will have sole regulatory responsibility for the OTC derivatives 
market (Financial Stability Board, 2013) 
 
2.4.6 BCBS-IOSCO framework for margining 
The purpose of margining is to reduce systemic risk for non-centrally cleared derivatives 
while providing an incentive to use central clearing counterparties. Capital requirements 
specified in Basel III have the same objectives, that is, to reduce risk and incentivise the use 
of CCPs. However, it is worth noting that capital requirements against non-centrally cleared 
derivatives help the survivor to absorb losses in the event of a counterparty’s default whereas 
margining is kept by the survivor in the event of a default to help cushion the blow. After the 
enactments of Dodd-Frank and the EMIR legislation, the G20 identified the need for a global 
standard for margining requirements for non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage. At the November 2011 G20 conference in Cannes, the G20 leaders 
requested that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International 
Organisation for Securities Commissions (IOSCO) develop standards on margining for non-
centrally cleared OTC derivatives for consultation. In July 2012, the initial proposal was 
released for comment, and the consultation period closed on 28 September 2012. A revised 
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proposal was released in February 2013 for public comment. The BCBS and IOSCO 
conducted a quantitative impact study in order to estimate the impact of the proposed margin 
requirements, and this study informed the final framework. The study found that margining 
was being conducted on a case-by-case basis, and varied considerably between respondents 
and jurisdictions. The survey’s respondents made up approximately 75% of the global non-
centrally cleared derivatives market and between them they held margining equal to 
approximately €100 billion. That is only 0.03% of the gross notional exposure. After 
implementing the margining requirements, these respondents would need to hold €558 billion 
for the same gross notional exposure. Timelines for a phased implementation have been 
released with the objective that implementation is harmonised across countries (as with Basel 
III’s implementation) to avoid regulatory arbitrage, and over an appropriate period to 
minimise transition costs. The first phase begins in December 2015 (BCBS-IOSCO, 2015).  
The framework stipulates that all major market participants (ODPs, MSPs, financial 
institutions and systemically important non-financial institutions) will be required to 
exchange initial and variation margins as appropriate for the counterparty risk per transaction 
for non-centrally cleared derivatives. The initial margin is posted when the transaction is 
entered into, while the variation margin changes as the perceived risk changes. The variation 
margin limits the build-up of systemic risk during the life of the contract. When calculating 
the initial margin, a “standardised initial margin schedule” is used. For credit derivatives with 
a life span of zero to two years, 2% of the notional exposure is required as a margin. For two 
to five years, it is 5% and for five years plus it is 10%. This is compared to interest rate 
derivatives which have an initial margin requirement of 1% for a zero to two-year contract, 
2% for two to five years and 4% for over five years. When calculating the variation margin, 
the full amount necessary to fully collateralise the mark-to-market exposure of non-centrally 
cleared derivatives must be exchanged with sufficient frequency (say, daily). Assets used as 
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collateral for margining must be highly liquid and not be susceptible to market risk, for 
example, high quality government debt, cash, high quality corporate bonds and gold (BCBS-
IOSCO, 2015). 
 
2.4.7 Comparison of South African legislature with European and US legislature 
The implementation of the FMA has been a slow process characterised by many 
opportunities for public comment. The main reason for this is the concern that local 
authorities have about the potentially adverse side effects of the regulation that could reduce 
the market size, reduce market liquidity and stifle innovation. There is also a need to better 
understand European Union and US regulation and  the cross-border impact of these reforms. 
As such, it is not surprising that the US and EU are further along in the implementation of 
their OTC derivatives market regulation than South Africa. A summary of the progress to 
date of implementation in these three jurisdictions is provided in chapter 5. 
 
 Dodd-Frank EMIR FMA 
Market 
supervision 
 
SEC and CFTC 
with the Financial 
Stability Oversight 
Council established 
to resolve disputes. 
 
ESMA Twin peaks: SARB and FSB 
Professional 
market 
participants 
 
Act refers to 
“major market 
participants” 
(MSPs). 
 
Identified by 
market 
involvement above 
 
Act refers to 
financial 
counterparties. 
 
Non-financial 
counterparties 
receive partial 
exemption provided 
 
Act refers to “OTC 
derivatives 
providers” (ODPs). 
 
No thresholds in 
place. 
 
 All professional 
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stated thresholds. 
 
Hedging positions 
not counted 
towards threshold. 
 
Required to register 
with the CFTC and 
adhere to new 
prudential 
requirements. 
 
Possible to be an 
MSP for one class 
of derivatives but 
not another. 
 
 
 
they are below 
stated thresholds. 
 
Hedging positions 
not counted 
towards threshold. 
 
Professional market 
participants 
required to register 
and subject to new 
prudential 
requirements. 
 
Once a non-
financial 
counterparty 
exceeds one 
threshold, it is 
subject to the same 
regulatory 
requirements for all 
classes of 
derivatives. 
 
market participants 
must register as 
ODPs. Non-
professional end-
users are exempt. 
 
Must register with 
the FSB. 
 
 
 
 
Trade repository 
 
Onus is on the 
MSP to report 
transactions to a 
TR. 
 
If both parties are 
end-users, they 
must decide who is 
responsible for 
reporting the 
transaction. 
 
 
All financial 
counterparties must 
report their 
transactions to a 
TR. 
 
Non-financial 
counterparties are 
exempt from the 
reporting 
requirement 
provided they fall 
beneath all the 
thresholds. 
 
Onus is on ODPs 
to report all 
transactions. 
 
End-users are 
exempt. 
Central clearing 
 
Act refers to a 
derivatives clearing 
organisation 
(DCO). 
 
CFTC decides 
 
Act refers to a 
central clearing 
counterparty 
(CCP). 
 
All standardised 
 
Central clearing is 
not mandated at 
this stage. 
 
Authorities are 
relying on 
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which derivatives 
must be centrally 
cleared. 
 
End-users can be 
exempt from 
central clearing 
provided they are 
not MSPs and they 
use the derivatives 
for hedging 
purposes. 
 
Banks are 
prevented from 
holding non-
centrally cleared 
CDSs and CDSs 
against ABSs on 
their own balance 
sheet, and must be 
“pushed out” to 
separately 
capitalised 
subsidiaries. 
 
derivatives to be 
centrally cleared. 
“Top-down” and 
“bottom-up” 
approaches used to 
determine which 
derivatives must be 
centrally cleared. 
 
Banks not 
prevented from 
holding non-
centrally cleared 
CDSs on their 
balance sheets. 
 
 
 
 
incentives (Basel 
III) to encourage 
central clearing. 
Margin 
requirements for 
non-centrally 
cleared derivatives 
 
Non MSP end-
users not exempt 
from margin 
requirements. 
 
However, will 
follow the BCBS-
IOSCO framework. 
 
Follows the BCBS-
IOSCO framework. 
Follows the 
BCBS-IOSCO 
framework.  
Central trading 
 
Central trading of 
all standardised 
derivatives. 
 
Introduces a new 
type of trading 
platform called a 
“swaps execution 
facility” where bid 
and offer spreads 
 are posted by 
Consultations are in 
progress.  
 
Legislation has not 
been finalised 
Not required at this 
stage. New 
legislation will be 
needed if it does 
become a 
requirement. 
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dealers. 
 
 
Additional 
 
“Volcker Rule” 
prevents banks 
from trading in 
derivatives for their 
own account, that 
is, for the banking 
book.  
 
No such provision. No such provision. 
Table 1: Comparison of Dodd-Frank, EMIR and FMA 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
From the above comparison it can be see that the South African regulation was created to 
complement the European regulation. Hence the same differences between the European and 
US regulation exist between South African and US regulation. The major differences are the 
Volcker Rule, forced centralised trading of standardised derivatives, reporting obligations for 
end-users and the margin requirements for end-users. On the whole, the South African and 
European legislation is more accommodating of market participants. Interestingly, one of the 
provisions where Dodd-Frank is stricter on end-users than the European and South African is 
the margin requirements, but the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (BCBS-IOSC) issued guidelines with 
regard to margining, which are being considered by national governments. The BCBS-IOSC 
imposes margining requirements on “covered entities” which are financial institutions and the 
implementation of the guidelines would likely supersede Dodd-Frank’s initial position. 
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Chapter	3:	Methodology	
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the research methodology used in extracting data from the BA350 and 
DI430 forms for the study. In analysing the data, the study will look at market size, market 
activity, and market risk in the South African credit derivatives market. 
 
3.2 Data source 
The SARB mandates that all commercial banks complete and submit the BA350 form 
monthly. The content of the individual forms completed is confidential and not available for 
public review, but the SARB publishes the accumulated data for the South African banking 
sector, which is available to the public. According to Government notice R.1029 Banks Act 
(/1990): Regulations relating to banks (South African Reserve Bank, 2012), the purpose of 
the return is to determine the following, inter alia: 
a) The relevant notational amounts underlying all contracts in derivative instruments 
entered into during the reporting month, that is, the turnover in respect of transactions 
in derivative instruments entered into during the reporting month; 
b) The relevant notational amounts underlying all contracts in derivative instruments 
that had not yet terminated at month-end, that is, the notional amounts underlying all 
unexpired derivative contracts; 
c) The relevant fair value amounts underlying all contracts in derivative instruments 
that had not yet terminated at month-end, that is, the fair value amount underlying all 
unexpired derivative contracts. 
 
The form distinguishes between transactions entered into in respect of credit derivative 
instruments and transactions entered into in respect of derivative instruments other than credit 
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derivative instruments. Instruments other than credit derivatives include foreign exchange, 
interest rate, equity and commodity instruments.  
 
Prior to 1 January 2008, banks would complete and submit the “DI” series of forms to the 
SARB. However, with the implementation of Basel II, banks were required to complete and 
submit the “BA” series of forms to the SARB. The DI430 form is equivalent to the BA 350 
form and can be used to calculate notional amounts outstanding as well as turnover for 
exchange-traded and OTC derivative instruments prior to 1 January 2008. Gross positive fair 
value (GPFV) and gross negative fair value (GNFV) can be calculated for exchange-traded 
and OTC derivative instruments not including credit derivatives. However, it is not possible 
to calculate gross positive fair value and gross negative fair value for credit derivatives using 
the DI 430 form. It was thus not possible to collect this data for January 2005, 2006 and 
2007. An example of a BA350 form is provided in appendix B. 
 
3.3 Definitions of key terms and concepts 
3.3.1 Trading versus banking 
The BA 350 form distinguishes between derivative instruments that are used for trading 
purposes versus banking purposes. Each bank has its own written policy approved by the 
board of directors which specifies the criteria for determining which derivative instruments 
are classified as part of the bank’s trading activities and which are classified as part of the 
bank’s banking activities (South African Reserve Bank, 2012). This distinction is primarily 
based on the subjective intention of the individual bank. Assets, which the bank intends to 
keep until maturity, are listed in the banking book, while those assets the bank intends to 
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trade are listed under the trading book. Assets in the trading book are typically measured 
according to current market prices, while assets in the banking book are measured on an 
amortised cost basis with income accrued over time, having deducted any provisions for 
credit impairment. Thus, the market value of a bank’s assets may differ from the recorded 
value in the bank’s accounts. When market value is lower than the recorded value, then the 
bank’s true capital position and ability to absorb losses will be overstated (Farag, Harland, & 
Nixon, 2013: 206). Since trading book assets are supposed to be highly liquid and easy to 
trade, they have lower capital requirements than banking book assets. This, among other 
reasons, as discussed in detail in the literature review, allowed banks to overleverage 
themselves prior to and during the crisis. A Basel study based on a sample of large banks 
found substantial differences in how much capital lenders thought was needed to guard 
against possible losses on trading book assets. In order to address this deficit in regulation, 
the Basel Committee has proposed two alternative definitions for the boundary between 
banking and trading books that do not depend on the banks’ subjective intention to trade or 
putting up barriers to make switching between books more difficult (The Basel Committee, 
2013). In addition, Basel III imposes higher capital requirements for trading book positions to 
avoid regulatory arbitrage between trading and banking books. 
 
3.3.2 Turnover data 
Turnover reflects the notional gross amounts underlying all transactions entered into during 
the reporting month where the reporting bank acted as a principal (South African Reserve 
Bank, 2012).  The amounts are measured in terms of notional amounts and are reflected as 
absolute amounts. Turnover provides a measure of market activity (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2007).  
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3.3.3 Notional amounts 
Notional amounts are defined as the nominal amounts underlying the respective derivative 
contracts – in other words, the contracted base values on which payments and receivables are 
calculated (South African Reserve Bank, 2012). Notional amounts outstanding provide useful 
information on the structure of the OTC derivatives market as well as being a rough estimate 
for the potential transfer of price risk in derivatives markets. They are also comparable to 
measures of market size in related underlying cash markets and shed useful light on the 
relative size and growth of cash and derivatives markets. However, notional amounts should 
not be interpreted as a measure of the riskiness of these positions (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2007). 
 
3.3.4 Fair value 
A single comprehensive measure of risk does not exist. However, the BIS uses the concept 
“market value”, whereas the SARB uses the concept “fair value”. Market value is the cost of 
replacing all open contracts at the prevailing market prices. Conversely, fair value is regarded 
by the SARB as a broader term than market value since the market value of an instrument 
usually refers to the price obtainable in an active market. 
 
Gross negative fair value refers to the fair values of contracts where the reporting bank owes 
money to its counterparties, without taking into account netting. This represents the 
maximum losses the bank's counterparties would incur if the bank defaults and there is no 
netting of contracts, and no bank collateral was held by the counterparties. The figures for 
negative value are reported as absolute amounts. Conversely, gross positive fair value reflects 
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the values of contracts where the reporting bank is owed money by its counterparties, without 
taking into account netting (South African Reserve Bank, 2012). 
 
South African banks and the SARB follow the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) accounting standard. South Africa implemented IFRS in 2005, and since then, the JSE 
has required listed companies to use IFRS. In addition, Regulation 3 of the Financial 
Reporting Standards prescribes that all returns required to be completed by banks (i.e. the BA 
series) must be prepared in accordance with IFRS (International Monetary Fund, 2015a). 
According to the IFRS, GNFV and GPFV of derivative contracts must be published on their 
balance sheets as a liability and asset respectively (International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, 2012).  
 
3.3.5 Outstanding balances 
The outstanding balance at the beginning of the reporting month as well as outstanding 
balance at the end of the reporting month are recorded in the BA 350 form. These amounts 
reflect the remaining contractual maturity of all relevant contracts in notional gross amounts 
that had not yet terminated at the beginning or at the end of the reporting month (South 
African Reserve Bank, 2012). 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
In this study, the analysis of the data was conducted according to three indicators, namely 
market size, market activity and market risk. A detailed discussion of each will follow in 
sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.3. 
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3.4.1 Market size 
As explained earlier, notional amounts outstanding at the end of the month are comparable to 
measures of market size in related underlying cash markets and can be used as a proxy for 
relative size and growth of cash and derivatives markets (Bank for International Settlements, 
2007). 
 
In this study, the notional amounts outstanding at the end of the month for January 2005 to 
January 2015 for credit derivatives where the reporting bank is the protection buyer and for 
credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection seller were recorded, in addition to 
calculating the percentage change between periods. Notional amounts outstanding for credit 
derivative where protection was bought and sold were added (therefore not netted) to attain 
the total notional amount outstanding for the credit derivatives market for each period. This is 
the method used to calculate the total notional amount outstanding for credit derivatives used 
by the BIS, the ISDA and the OCC.  
 
The percentage change in the total notional amount outstanding at month end of credit 
derivatives was calculated. In addition, the total notional amount outstanding at month end of 
credit derivatives was compared with the total notional amount outstanding at month end of 
OTC derivative instruments other than credit derivative instruments, thereby expressing the 
size of the credit derivatives market as a percentage of the OTC derivatives market for 
instruments other than credit derivatives in South Africa for each period. 
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3.4.2 Market activity 
Turnover is a measure of market activity. The turnover of credit derivatives reflects the 
amount of protection acquired during the reporting month, in the case where the reporting 
bank is a protection buyer; and the amount of protection sold during the reporting month, in 
the case where the reporting bank is a protection seller. These two amounts were then added 
together to calculate total turnover for credit derivatives in the reporting month. Protection 
that matured during the reporting month was not included in the calculation of turnover 
because this amount does not indicate market activity during the reporting month. Instead, it 
is the result of contracts entered into in a previous month which are simply expiring in the 
reporting month. 
 
The percentage change in the total turnover of credit derivatives was calculated as well as the 
turnover of the credit derivatives market as a percentage of the turnover for OTC derivative 
instruments other than credit derivative instruments.  
 
3.4.3 Market risk 
As discussed in section 3.3.4, South African banks report the GNFV (liability) and GPFV 
(asset) of their derivative contracts on their balance sheets. However, banks under the 
authority of the US GAAP accounting standards, publish the net current credit exposure 
(NCCE) of derivative contracts on their balance sheets (either as an asset or a liability). The 
ISDA favours the use of the NCCE over the GNFV and GPFV because it believes NCCE 
provides a better reflection of an entity’s exposure to credit and liquidity risk since it takes 
into account bilateral netting agreements (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 
2012). 
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GNFV represents the maximum loss the default of the reporting bank would inflict on its 
counterparties, while GPFV represents the maximum losses a bank could incur if all its 
counterparties default. However, because NCCE takes into account bilateral netting, it is the 
net amount owed to banks if all contracts were immediately liquidated. Here, NCCE was 
calculated by subtracting netting benefits from GPFV. Therefore for a portfolio of contracts 
with a single counterparty where the bank has a legally enforceable bilateral netting 
agreement, the NCCE is equal to GPFV – GNFV. However, there are instances in which a 
bank contracts with a counterparty where the legal enforceability of bilateral netting 
agreements may be uncertain. In those instances, NCCE is not simply reflected by GPFV – 
GNFV. A primary example would be where the counterparty is based in a foreign country 
where the legal enforceability of bilateral netting contracts has either not been tested or there 
is legal precedence where after the bankruptcy of a local entity, bilateral netting contracts was 
not enforced. A second example would be where standardised documentation, such as the 
ISDA’s master agreement, is not used for whatever reason. 
 
NCCE therefore represents the sum of GPFV for counterparties without legally certain 
bilateral netting arrangements and the bilaterally netted current credit exposure for 
counterparties with legal certainty regarding the enforceability (International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, 2012). 
 
ܩܲܨܸ െ ܰ݁ݐݐ݅݊݃	ܾ݂݁݊݁݅ݐݏ ൌ ܰܥܥܧ 
Equation 2: Calculation of NCCE 
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In the USA, the OCC publishes a quarterly report on bank trading and derivatives activities 
based on information provided by all insured US commercial banks, savings associations and 
trust companies (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 2014). US banks report 
financial reports using the US GAAP accounting standards. In a 2011 report, the OCC 
confirmed that NCCE is the primary metric it uses to evaluate credit risk in bank derivative 
activities. According to the same report published by the OCC, the netting benefit as a 
percentage of GPFV was 50.6% in the first quarter of 1998, but improvements in the ISDA’s 
master agreement and other industry initiatives have contributed to the increase in this 
percentage over the years. It reported the netting benefit was 88.2% in the second quarter of 
2014 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 2014). Since NCCE does not take 
into account collateral held against contracts, according to the OCC, a more risk-sensitive 
measure of credit risk would be to consider collateral held against contracts (Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 2011). 
 
NCCE is not calculated in South Africa. A simple calculation of GPFV – GNFV would give 
a rough approximation for the NCCE in South Africa. However, without an understanding of 
netting benefits, the true NCCE could not be calculated. 
 
Therefore the GNFV and GPFV as well as the NCCE were calculated for credit derivatives 
and all other OTC derivatives.  
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3.5 Calculations 
A detailed description of the methodology for extracting data from the BA350 and DI430 
forms is provided in this section. The data were analysed on a year-on-year basis using 
January as the reference month, and the GDP deflator was used to adjust for inflation. The 
GDP deflator is defined as the ratio of the nominal estimates of GDP to the real estimates of 
GDP (Stats SA, 2012). An example of a BA350 form is attached under appendix B of this 
dissertation. 
 
3.5.1 Methodology for extracting data from the BA350 form (January 2008 onwards)1 
This methodology is as follows: 
 Total notional amount outstanding at the end of the month for credit derivatives contracts 
where the reporting bank is a protection buyer:  
Sum of columns 9 and 10 of line 112. 
 
 Total notional amount outstanding at the end of the month for credit derivatives contracts 
where the reporting bank is a protection seller:  
Sum of columns 9 and 10 of line 116. 
 
 Total notional amount outstanding at the end of the month for OTC derivative contracts 
other than credit derivative contracts: 
Sum of columns 11 and 12 of line 56. 
 
 Turnover of credit derivative contracts where the reporting bank is a protection buyer: 
Sum of columns 3 and 4 of line 112. 
  
 Turnover of credit derivative contracts where the reporting bank is a protection seller: 
Sum of columns 3 and 4 of line 116. 
 
 Turnover of OTC derivative contracts other than credit derivative contracts: 
                                                 
1 The researcher greatly appreciates the assistance of a SARB market analyst in taking the time to discuss and 
confirm the correctness of these calculations. 
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Sum of columns 11 and 12 of line 13. 
 
 Gross positive fair value (GPFV) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month end 
where the reporting bank was a protection buyer: 
Sum of columns 11 and 13 of line 112. 
 
 Gross negative fair value (GNFV) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month end 
where the reporting bank was a protection buyer: 
Sum of columns 12 and 14 of line 112. 
 
 Net current credit exposure (NCCE) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month 
end where the reporting bank was a protection buyer: 
Sum of columns 11 and 13 minus the sum of columns 12 and 14 in line 112. 
 
 Gross positive fair value (GPFV) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month end 
where the reporting bank was a protection seller: 
Sum of columns 11 and 13 of line 116. 
 
 Gross negative fair value (GNFV) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month end 
where the reporting bank was a protection seller: 
Sum of columns 12 and 14 of line 116. 
 
 Net current credit exposure (NCCE) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month 
end where the reporting bank was a protection buyer: 
Sum of columns 11 and 13 minus the sum of columns 12 and 14 in line 116. 
 
 Gross positive fair value (GPFV) of OTC derivative contracts other than credit 
derivatives outstanding at month end: 
Sum of columns 11 and 12 in line 107.2 
 
 Gross negative fair value (GNFV) of OTC derivative contracts other than credit 
derivatives outstanding at month end: 
Sum of columns 11 and 12 in line 108.2 
 
 Net current credit exposure (NCCE) of OTC derivative contracts other than credit 
derivatives outstanding at month end: 
Sum of columns 11 and 12  in line 107 minus the sum of columns 11 and 12 in line 108.2 
 
                                                 
2 GPFV and GNFV amounts recorded in both the BA 350 and DI 430 forms for OTC derivatives contracts other 
than credit derivatives also include values for exchange-traded contracts. Given the data, it is not possible to 
separate GPFV and GNFV for OTC and exchange-traded contracts.  
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3.5.2 Methodology for extracting data from the DI430 form (prior to January 2008) 
This methodology is as follows: 
 Total notional amount outstanding at the end of the month for credit derivatives contracts 
where the reporting bank is a protection buyer:  
Sum of columns 9 and 10 of line 71. 
 
 Total notional amount outstanding at the end of the month for credit derivatives contracts 
where the reporting bank is a protection seller:  
Sum of columns 9 and 10 of line 75. 
 
 Total notional amount outstanding at the end of the month for OTC derivative contracts 
other than credit derivative contracts: 
Sum of columns 13 and 14 of line 40. 
 
 Turnover of credit derivative contracts where the reporting bank is a protection buyer: 
Sum of columns 3 and 4 of line 71. 
  
 Turnover of credit derivative contracts where the reporting bank is a protection seller: 
Sum of columns 3 and 4 of line 75. 
 
 Turnover of OTC derivative contracts other than credit derivative contracts: 
Sum of columns 13 and 14 of line 20. 
 
 Gross positive fair value (GPFV) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month end 
where the reporting bank was a protection buyer: 
Not possible to calculate given the data provided.3 
 
 Gross negative fair value (GNFV) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month end 
where the reporting bank was a protection buyer: 
Not possible to calculate given the data provided. 3 
 
 Net current credit exposure (NCCE) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month 
end where the reporting bank was a protection buyer: 
Not possible to calculate given the data provided. 3 
                                                 
3For the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the DI 430 forms were used as the data source. It is not possible to 
calculate GPFV or GNFV for credit derivatives using the DI 430 forms. 
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 Gross positive fair value (GPFV) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month end 
where the reporting bank was a protection seller: 
Not possible to calculate given the data provided.3 
 
 Gross negative fair value (GNFV) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month end 
where the reporting bank was a protection seller: 
Not possible to calculate given the data provided.3 
 
 Net current credit exposure (NCCE) of credit derivative contracts outstanding at month 
end where the reporting bank was a protection buyer: 
Not possible to calculate given the data provided. 4 
 
 Gross positive fair value (GPFV) of OTC derivative contracts other than credit 
derivatives outstanding at month end:  
Sum of columns 13 and 14in line 63.5 
 
 Gross negative fair value (GNFV) of OTC derivative contracts other than credit 
derivatives outstanding at month end: 
Sum of columns 13 and 14 in line 64.5 
 
 Net current credit exposure (NCCE) of OTC derivative contracts other than credit 
derivatives outstanding at month end: 
Sum of columns 13 and 14 in line 63 minus the sum of columns 13 and 14 in line 64.4 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The data were analysed and tabulated separately according to the three research indicators, 
namely market size, market activity and market risk. The data tables are available under 
appendix C of this dissertation. The analysis of the data follows in chapter 4. 
  
                                                 
4 For the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the DI 430 forms were used as the data source. Owing to the fact that it is 
not possible to calculate GPFV or GNFV for credit derivatives using the DI 430 forms, it is not possible to 
calculate NCCE. 
5 GPFV and GNFV amounts recorded in both the BA 350 and DI 430 forms for OTC derivatives contracts other 
than credit derivatives also include values for exchange-traded contracts. Given the data, it is not possible to 
separate GPFV and GNFV for OTC and exchange-traded contracts.  
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Chapter	4:	Results	of	the	study	
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the available data on the size, activity and risk of the South African 
OTC credit derivatives market. These indicators are discussed separately in sections 4.2 to 
4.4. The data is analysed on an annual (year-on-year) basis using January as the reference 
month.  
 
The GDP deflator was used to adjust for inflation and all amounts are therefore reported in 
constant (real) prices, with 2005 as the base year6. The GDP deflator is defined as the ratio of 
the nominal estimates of GDP to the real estimates of GDP (Stats SA, 2012). As data for the 
same month (January) of each year is analysed, seasonal fluctuations are not a concern. 
 
Market size is represented by the notional amount outstanding at the end of the month and 
market risk is represented by the fair value amount at the end of the month. Hence both 
market size and risk are stock variables. However, market activity is represented by the 
notional amount outstanding of new contracts entered into during the month, and it is 
therefore a flow variable. A stock variable is a value measured at a particular point in time, in 
this case the last day of the month, while a flow variable is measured over the course of a 
period, in this case, over the course of a month.  
 
 
                                                 
6Note that the aggregate tables in appendix C are expressed in nominal prices, while the data presented in tables 
throughout the rest of the chapter is expressed in real prices. 
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4.2 Market size 
Notional amounts outstanding at the end of the month are comparable to measures of market 
size in related underlying cash markets and shed useful light on the relative size and growth 
of cash and derivatives markets (Bank for International Settlements, 2007). The sections that 
follow examine the size of the market for credit derivatives for protection bought and sold as 
well as the size of the total credit derivatives market compared to the rest of the OTC 
derivatives market. 
 
4.2.1 Notional amount outstanding credit derivatives: protection buyer versus seller 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES:  WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION BUYER  
Period Notional amount at the end of the reporting month Year-on-year change 
Y/Y % 
change 
Jan-05  R  17 879 831 000.00    
Jan-06  R  12 302 022 003.60  R -5 577 808 996.40  -31.2% 
Jan-07  R  18 566 922 889.85  R   6 264 900 886.25  50.9% 
Jan-08  R 26 996 857 308.29  R 8 429 934 418.44  45.4% 
Jan-09  R  36 375 520 728.98  R 9 378 663 420.70  34.7% 
Jan-10  R  33 896 630 065.41  R -2 478 890 663.57  -6.8% 
Jan-11  R 13 926 293 139.93  R -19 970 336 925.48  -58.9% 
Jan-12  R  24 169 419 669.29  R   10 243 126 529.36  73.6% 
Jan-13  R  40 034 846 254.40  R 15 865 426 585.11  65.6% 
Jan-14  R 44 992 995 624.00  R 4 958 149 369.59  12.4% 
Jan-15  R45 693 383 246.07  R 700 387 622.08  1.6% 
Table 2: Notional amounts outstanding for credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection buyer 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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The notional amounts outstanding presented in this analysis could be overstated for a variety 
of reasons (discussed below) but all these factors are partly, if not largely, offset. One can 
thus state that the notional amounts outstanding provided in this analysis provide a relevant 
and useful estimation of market size. 
 
The first factor is the absence of a central clearing counterparty. Without a central clearing 
counterparty, the outstanding notional amounts are overstated due to a lack of netting. 
Protection sold by the reporting bank to third parties cannot be netted against the reporting 
bank’s protection bought from third parties. In the South African market this is not a 
significant factor, because risk is generally transferred from foreign banks to local nonbank 
market participants with local banks acting as the intermediary. The effectiveness of a central 
clearing counterparty in netting contracts and thus reducing counterparty risk decreases the 
smaller the proportion of interdealer trade in the total market. In South Africa, the size of the 
interdealer market is negligible.  
 
The second factor that could lead to overstated notional amounts is agreements where 
counterparties are also reporting banks as opposed to another financial institution or non-
financial customers who are counted twice. This is known as “double-counting”. This is not a 
significant factor because in the South African credit derivative market, reporting banks 
rarely transact with each other. 
 
The third factor leading to the possible overstating of the notional amount outstanding is the 
difficultly in unwinding CDSs. Instead of cancelling or unwinding a CDS, the party would 
normally buy a corresponding CDS to offset the initial CDS. However, after the ISDA’s Big 
Bang protocol in 2009, scheduled termination dates of CDSs must always match a quarterly 
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roll date. These quarterly roll dates are always 20 March, 20 June, 20 September and 20 
December. At these dates, dealers are able to “collapse” their books, that is, netting protection 
bought and sold for each of their counterparties. This bilateral netting does not have a large 
effect on notional amounts outstanding in the South African market because risk transfer is 
largely one directional. In addition, since the crisis, technology companies have been offering 
“portfolio compression” services whereby redundant CDSs are eliminated. An example is 
triReduce from TriOptima, originally a Swedish company with offices all over the world. 
According to the company, by 2009, redundant CDSs with a notional outstanding amount of 
$60.2 trillion were eliminated (The OTC Derivatives Working Group, 2012). However, 
portfolio compression such as triReduce has not yet been applied to the credit derivatives 
market in South Africa. As is the case with bilateral netting made possible by standardised 
termination dates, the effect of portfolio compression would arguably be minimal because of 
the largely one-directional transfer of risk that characterises the South African credit 
derivatives market. 
 
According to the Financial Sector Assessment Programme conducted by the World Bank and 
the IMF, “there is no accurate information on the size of the South African OTC derivatives 
market” (National Treasury, 2014). The analysis of the size of the market is incomplete 
because only data pertaining to banks is captured in the BA350 form. However, in the credit 
derivative market, banks act as market makers so the vast majority of transactions involve a 
South African bank as a counterparty.  
 
January 2005 to January 2006 recorded a sudden drop in the notional amounts outstanding for 
credit derivatives (see figure 11). January 2006 to January 2009 saw a prolonged period of 
growth in the market. On 21 February 2007, the Minister of Finance announced exchange 
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control reforms that removed several barriers to growth in the market for derivatives in all 
asset classes (Adelegan, 2009). This is a possible factor for the growth seen between January 
2007 and January 2008. According to a South African credit derivative trader, after Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008, market activity was muted from that 
time until January 2009. Therefore the growth seen from January 2008 to January 2009 
would have mostly been from February 2008 until mid-September 2008. The market size 
then dropped from January 2009 to January 2010. This could have been the result of lower 
market confidence after the crisis. However, it is also possible that after the Big Bang 
protocol was adhered to in April 2009, dealers “collapsing” their books would have reduced 
the notional amount outstanding. Since South African banks largely transfer risk from 
international banks to local market participants, the impact of dealers collapsing their books 
would not be that high because there is limited interdealer activity. One can therefore deduce 
that the fall in notional values was largely due to the financial crisis. Market size was on an 
upward trend from January 2011 until January 2015. 
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If one examines the development of the size of CDS market where the reporting bank is a 
protection buyer represented in figure 12, the observed results can be separated into five 
distinct periods. The first period includes only January 2005, for which the notional amount 
outstanding was over R10 billion. The second period sees a drop in notional amounts 
outstanding beginning in January 2006 and continuing until January 2008, where notional 
amounts remained at around R8 billion. The third period sees a further drop in notional 
amounts outstanding, starting in January 2009 until January 2011 where they remained just 
above R5 billion. This third period could be in reaction to the global financial crisis, resulting 
in a drop in desirability of these instruments. The fourth period sees a rapid increase in the 
growth rate of notional amounts outstanding for CDSs, starting in January 2012 and 
continuing until January 2014. The market reaches an all-time high of R28.8 billion in 
January 2014. The fifth period consisting only of January 2015 sees a decline in the notional 
amount outstanding to R22.7 billion.  
 
The TRS market size has recorded insignificant amounts when compared with the whole 
credit derivatives market over the observed period, and will therefore not be discussed in 
further detail. 
 
The development of the size of “other” credit derivative instruments over the observed period 
has fluctuated greatly. The following instruments are classified as credit derivatives in terms 
of the FMA Act: CDSs (both single name, index and tranche), credit default swaptions (also 
known as credit default options) and TRSs. However, credit linked notes (CLNs) are 
sometimes classified as credit derivatives because they are used to buy protection, while 
simultaneously selling protection using an embedded CDS (see section 2.2.6.8). CLNs are 
similar to CDSs, but they differ in one crucial respect, namely they are funded. The CLN 
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issuer is the protection buyer and the CLN investor is the protection seller. According to a 
South African credit derivatives trader, there is a healthy market for CLNs in South Africa. 
South African banks issue and sell CLNs to other local market participants to offset the 
protection they have sold to foreign banks. The observed period can be separated into three 
distinct periods. The first period consists of January 2005 and January 2006, which saw a 
decline in the notional amounts outstanding of other credit derivatives. The second period 
starts in January 2007 and ends in January 2010. It is characterised by a large growth in the 
market size of other credit derivatives, reaching a high of R29.9 billion in January 2009. The 
size of the market dropped drastically between January 2010 and January 2011, falling by 
nearly 70% to R8 billion from R28.6 billion. The third period then sees another period of 
continuous growth in the market size, from January 2011 to January 2015. According to a 
credit derivative trader, reporting errors could be responsible for the vast fluctuation in 
“other” credit derivatives where some banks report CLNs as credit derivatives for protection 
bought and others do not. 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES PER INSTRUMENT:  WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION 
SELLER  
Period Credit default swaps Total return swaps Other 
Jan-05  R  12 811 627 000.00  R  179 250 000.00 R1729060000.00
Jan-06  R   8 499 605 737.46  R 57 339 854.31  R 1 552 870 606.79 
Jan-07  R  11 256 084 214.91  R  63 100 387.37  R  2 845 104 834.37 
Jan-08  R  14 245 687 242.67  R60 500 032.17  R 4 565 813 175.50 
Jan-09  R 23 202 607 540.65  R 3 560 643 500.07  R  2 226 019 753.20 
Jan-10  R 18 111 653 122.14  R 3 092 588 073.92  R  1 724 578 672.02 
Jan-11  R  43 713 343 836.87  R 2 239 383 068.90  R    610 778 064.96 
Jan-12  R 38 291 825 757.43  R 3 217 413 037.65  R  1 178 305 067.84 
Jan-13  R 45 635 364 431.83  R 1 343 260 160.40  R 1 520 167 701.06 
Jan-14  R  50 497 584 335.01  R 689 746 856.48  R 907 803 135.21 
Jan-15  R 44 660 125 130.89  R 1 303 874 345.55  R 4 851 373 821.99 
Table 5: Notional amounts outstanding for credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection seller 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
  
Figure 13
seller 
Source: C
 
The siz
bank is 
protecti
 
For CD
Howeve
these de
From J
 
 
 3
 4
 5
 6
In
 Bi
lli
on
s o
f R
an
ds
 (a
t C
on
st
an
t P
ric
es
)
The	SA	
: Notional am
ompiled by res
e of the ma
a protection
on to foreig
Ss, the ma
r, there we
clines was 
anuary 20
 ‐
10
20
0
0
0
0
Credit
Tot
OTC	cre
ounts outstand
earcher (2015) 
rket for cre
 seller com
n banks, w
rket size fo
re a few in
33% from 
06 to Jan
 derivativ
al Return Sw
dit	deri
ing for credit 
dit derivativ
pared to a 
ith CDSs b
llowed a g
stances of a
R12.8 billio
uary 2009
es where
seller:
aps
vatives
derivatives per
es for all in
protection 
y far the ins
enerally in
nnual decl
n, in Janua
, the notio
 the repo
  Per instr
Credit Defau
	marke
 instrument wh
struments 
buyer. Sout
trument of 
creasing tre
ines in mar
ry 2005, to
nal amoun
rting ban
ument
lt Instrument
t:	2005	
ere the repor
differs sign
h African b
choice (see
nd for the 
ket size ob
 R8.5 billio
ts outstan
k is a prot
s O
to	2015
124 |
ting bank is a 
ificantly w
anks prima
 figure 13)
observable
served. The
n, in Januar
ding conti
ection 
ther
	
 P a g e  
 
protection 
here the 
rily sell 
. 
 period. 
 first of 
y 2006. 
nuously 
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
125 | P a g e  
 
increased until January 2010. The increase in the notional amount outstanding in January 
2009 compared to January 2008 is likely due to activity between February 2008 and mid-
September 2008 (as observed previously). The drop from January 2009 to January 2010 is 
likely due to the influence of the crisis and to a much lesser extent, the Big Bang protocol as 
discussed in section 4.2.1. January 2011 saw a huge increase of 141% in notional amounts 
outstanding compared to January 2010. There was a small decline in January 2012 compared 
to January 2011, followed by another period of sustained growth cumulating in an all-time 
high of R50 billion in January 2014. From January 2014 to January 2015 there was a drop to 
R44.7 billion.  
 
As with credit derivatives where the reporting bank was a protection buyer, the notional 
amounts outstanding of TRSs where the reporting bank was a protection seller is exceedingly 
small compared to the total credit derivatives market. It saw a period of large growth between 
January 2009 and January 2012, but has since declined and in comparison to CDSs and other 
credit derivatives, it remains relatively small. 
 
In sharp contrast to the notional amounts outstanding of other credit derivatives where the 
reporting bank is a protection buyer, the size of the market for other credit derivatives where 
the reporting bank is a protection seller is exceedingly small. According to a South African 
credit derivative trader, the reason for this is that South African banks sell protection to 
foreign banks primarily through CDSs and buy protection from local market participants 
either in the form of CDSs or CLNs. CLNs are sometimes classified as “other” credit 
derivatives. The notional amount outstanding in January 2005 was R1.7 billion, spiking to 
R4.6 billion in January 2008. This was followed by a period of decline lasting from January 
2008 to January 2011, where it experienced overall growth until reaching a high of R4.9 
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billion in January 2015. Unlike the market size of other credit derivatives, where the 
reporting bank is a protection buyer, the market for other credit derivatives where the 
reporting bank is a protection seller has been dwarfed by the CDS market where the reporting 
bank is a protection seller since January 2008. 
 
4.2.3 Notional amounts outstanding total credit derivatives versus all other OTC 
derivatives 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
TOTAL OF ALL OTHER OTC DERIVATIVES 
Period Notional amount at the end of the reporting month Year-on-year change 
Y/Y % 
change 
Jan-05  R                   7 236 998 542 000.00    
Jan-06  R                   7 128 385 785 896.67  R       -108 612 756 103.34  -2% 
Jan-07  R                   7 657 805 948 720.62  R        529 420 162 823.96  7% 
Jan-08  R                 12 530 150 927 206.60  R     4 872 344 978 486.02  64% 
Jan-09  R                 19 147 193 296 379.60  R     6 617 042 369 172.93  53% 
Jan-10  R                 15 702 614 892 091.80  R    -3 444 578 404 287.78  -18% 
Jan-11  R                 19 414 087 734 295.10  R     3 711 472 842 203.36  24% 
Jan-12  R                 19 268 864 416 023.10  R       -145 223 318 272.01  -1% 
Jan-13  R                 15 463 538 170 244.80  R    -3 805 326 245 778.29  -20% 
Jan-14  R                 19 293 811 575 915.40  R     3 830 273 405 670.52  25% 
Jan-15  R                 18 720 248 723 036.60  R       -573 562 852 878.71  -3% 
Table 6: Notional amounts outstanding for total credit derivatives (protection bought and sold) versus all other OTC 
derivatives 
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Figure 14: Size of the total credit derivatives market compared to the rest of the OTC derivatives market 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
The size of the credit derivatives market as a percentage of the size of the rest of the OTC 
derivatives market in South Africa remained between 0.3% and 0.4% from January 2006 to 
January 2012, with only January 2005 and January 2007 breaching the 0.4% mark. However, 
from January 2013 to January 2015, the size of the credit derivatives market was over 0.5% 
of the rest of the OTC market. The credit derivatives market did grow by 30% from January 
2012 to January 2013, which partly explains this jump. Another possible contributor could be 
the use of portfolio compression for interest rate swaps. On 6 October 2014, TriOptima 
announced that after its first triReduce compression cycle for cleared South African rand, 
interest rate swaps had been completed and that $284.3 billion in notional amounts 
outstanding had been eliminated for LCH.Clearnet’s SwapClear members. This decline in 
notional amounts outstanding for interest rate swaps could artificially raise the size of the 
credit derivatives market as a percentage of the size of the rest of the OTC derivative market. 
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4.3 Market activity 
Turnover is a measure of market activity. The sections below will look at the protection 
acquired and sold during the reporting month as well as turnover of total credit derivatives 
compared to turnover for all other OTC derivatives during the reporting month. 
 
4.3.1 Protection acquired during the reporting month versus protection sold during 
the reporting month 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES:  WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION BUYER 
Period Protection acquired during the reporting month Year–on-year change 
Y/Y % 
change 
Jan-05  R       2 497 223 000.00     
Jan-06  R          368 095 711.93  R    -2 129 127 288.07  -578.4% 
Jan-07  R       644 793 892.33  R        276 698 180.41  42.9% 
Jan-08  R       2 356 356 954.45  R     1 711 563 062.12  72.6% 
Jan-09  R       1 582 316 362.80  R       -774 040 591.65  -48.9% 
Jan-10 R       1 776 188 506.79  R     193 872 143.99  10.9% 
Jan-11  R       1 167 578 564.96  R      -608 609 941.83  -52.1% 
Jan-12  R       2 387 626 135.14  R    1 220 047 570.17  51.1% 
Jan-13  R       2 930 705 545.68  R    543 079 410.54  18.5% 
Jan-14  R       1 312 036 780.59  R    -1 618 668 765.09  -123.4% 
Jan-15  R          167 048 167.54  R    -1 144 988 613.05  -685.4% 
Table 7: Protection acquired by the reporting bank during the month 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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There are large fluctuations in both the amount of protection acquired and the amount of 
protection sold during the reporting month. There was a huge amount of activity for both 
protection acquired and sold in January 2005. Activity then dropped steeply for both for 
January 2006 and January 2007. Over R2 billion’s worth of protection was acquired in 
January 2008 and remained above R1 billion during January 2009, 2010 and 2011. While 
protection sold dropped in January 2009 compared to January 2008, it reached a low in 
January 2009 of R0.3 billion. Protection sold then rose in January 2011 and 2012 until it 
reached a peak of R4.1 billion in January 2013. In January 2012 protection acquired 
amounted to over R2 billion and in January 2013 it peeked at R2.9 billion. It then declined 
drastically to R0.17 billion in January 2015. Protection sold also dropped off drastically in 
January 2015 compared to January 2014. 
 
Without information on all the months in the year, it is difficult to draw conclusions about a 
month in isolation when looking at market activity. 
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4.3.2 Turnover of total credit derivatives versus all other OTC derivatives 
TOTAL OF ALL OTHER OTC DERIVATIVES 
Period Turnover Year-on-year Change Y/Y % change 
Jan-05  R        1 876 480 952 000.00     
Jan-06  R        2 102 243 676 779.81  R        225 762 724 779.81  10.7% 
Jan-07  R        2 536 244 234 544.10  R        434 000 557 764.28  17.1% 
Jan-08  R        4 314 261 887 223.37  R     1 778 017 652 679.27  41.2% 
Jan-09  R        3 844 920 084 889.77  R       -469 341 802 333.60  -12.2% 
Jan-10  R        3 173 893 153 980.30  R       -671 026 930 909.47  -21.1% 
Jan-11  R        5 563 662 233 478.08  R     2 389 769 079 497.78  43.0% 
Jan-12  R        4 367 859 598 112.73  R   -1 195 802 635 365.36  -27.4% 
Jan-13  R        3 816 376 851 601.05  R       -551 482 746 511.68  -14.5% 
Jan-14  R        6 132 199 715 836.70  R     2 315 822 864 235.65  37.8% 
Jan-15  R        5 545 877 556 544.50  R       -586 322 159 292.20  -10.6% 
Table 9: Turnover of all other OTC derivatives 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
 
Figure 16: Turnover of total credit derivatives expressed as a percentage of the rest of the OTC derivatives market 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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In January 2005, market activity for credit derivatives reached a high of 0.29% of market 
activity for all other OTC derivatives. Market activity as a percentage of market activity for 
all other OTC derivative contracts then remained fairly constant at around the 0.05% mark. It 
spiked in January 2013 to just under 0.2%, and then reached a low of 0.14% in January 2015. 
Without information on all the months in the year, it is difficult to draw a conclusion about a 
month in isolation when looking at market activity. 
 
4.4 Market risk 
Even though there is no single complete measure of market risk, the concept of fair value is 
used by the SARB to identify potential losses. “The measurement of fair values maximises 
the use of relevant and reliable inputs and [is] consistently applied for risk management and 
reporting purposes” (International Monetary Fund, 2015a). In the subsections that follow, 
GPFV and GNFV for protection bought and sold are compared against each other and 
expressed as a percentage of the rest of the OTC derivatives market plus exchange-traded 
derivatives because they could not be separated. It is unfortunate that the GPFV and GNFV 
for OTC derivatives excluding credit derivatives could not be separated from the GPFV and 
GNFV of exchange-traded derivatives. However, the notional amounts outstanding of 
exchange-traded derivatives are a fraction of the notionals for OTC derivatives. In June 2010, 
the notional amount outstanding of exchange-traded derivatives was R800 billion, while for 
the same period, the notionals for OTC derivatives were R25 000 billion. Hence, the 
inclusion of GPFV and GNFV of exchange-traded derivatives in the GPFV and GNFV of 
OTC derivatives excluding credit derivatives is negligible.  The analysis then compares the 
NCCE for protection bought and protection sold and is also expressed as a percentage of the 
rest of the OTC derivatives market plus exchange-traded derivatives.  
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4.4.1 Gross positive fair value and gross negative fair value 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION BUYER 
  GROSS POSITIVE FAIR VALUE 
Period Amount Year-on-year change Y/Y  
% change
Jan-05 N/A N/A N/A 
Jan-06 N/A N/A N/A 
Jan-07 N/A N/A N/A 
Jan-08  R   3 750 194 608.85     
Jan-09  R  8 768 541 068.39  R   5 018 346 459.54  57.2% 
Jan-10  R   8 368 003 198.30  R     -400 537 870.09  -4.8% 
Jan-11  R   5 154 600 615.89  R  -3 213 402 582.41  -62.3% 
Jan-12  R   3 905 113 965.71  R  -1 249 486 650.18  -32.0% 
Jan-13  R   4 292 704 886.18  R   387 590 920.47  9.0% 
Jan-14  R 1 205 238 464.52  R  -3 087 466 421.66  -256.2% 
Jan-15  R  2 628 153 926.70  R 1 422 915 462.18  54.1% 
Table 10: GPFV of credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection buyer 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION BUYER  
GROSS NEGATIVE FAIR VALUE 
Period Amount Year-on-year change Y/Y% change
Jan-05 N/A N/A N/A 
Jan-06 N/A N/A N/A 
Jan-07 N/A N/A N/A 
Jan-08  R 413 256 722.85     
Jan-09  R  4 181 284 922.42  R    3 768 028 199.57  90.1% 
Jan-10  R  3 307 438 119.07  R      -873 846 803.35  -26.4% 
Jan-11  R    804 820 994.93  R   -2 502 617 124.14  -311.0% 
Jan-12  R    707 955 473.28  R        -96 865 521.65  -13.7% 
Jan-13  R  2 701 741 193.93  R    1 993 785 720.64  73.8% 
Jan-14  R  7 158 740 375.56  R    4 456 999 181.63  62.3% 
Jan-15  R  8 292 847 643.98  R   1 134 107 268.42  13.7% 
Table 11: GNFV of credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection buyer 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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CREDIT DERIVATIVES WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION SELLER 
  GROSS POSITIVE FAIR VALUE 
Period Amount Year-on-year Change Y/Y  
% change
05-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
06-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
07-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
08-Jan R 1 910 022 355.89     
09-Jan R 2 067 574 185.79 R 157 551 829.90 7.62% 
10-Jan R 1 161 009 670.73 R -906 564 515.07 -78.08% 
11-Jan R 1 963 744 555.63 R 802 734 884.90 40.88% 
12-Jan R 1 783 672 706.19 R -180 071 849.43 -10.10% 
13-Jan R 3 666 711 222.07 R 1 883 038 515.88 51.35% 
14-Jan R 2 337 531 158.26 R -1 329 180 063.82 -56.86% 
15-Jan R 2 407 234 554.97 R 69 703 396.72 2.90% 
Table 12: GPFV of credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection seller 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION SELLER 
GROSS NEGATIVE FAIR VALUE 
Period Amount Year-on-year change Y/Y  
% change
05-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
06-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
07-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
08-Jan R 344 989 224.14     
09-Jan R 2 812 657 034.94 R 2 467 667 810.80 87.73% 
10-Jan R 1 585 667 610.99 R -1 226 989 423.95 -77.38% 
11-Jan R 2 060 075 260.91 R 474 407 649.91 23.03% 
12-Jan R 2 951 184 532.82 R 891 109 271.92 30.19% 
13-Jan R 2 012 649 417.64 R-938 535 115.19 -46.63% 
14-Jan R 2 016 103 694.68 R 3 454 277.04 0.17% 
15-Jan R 4 277 791 099.48 R2 261 687 404.80 52.87% 
Table 13: GNFV of credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection seller 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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The data from tables 10 to 13 are then aggregated to obtain GPFV for protection bought and 
sold (table 14) as well as GNFV for protection bought and sold (table 15). 
 
TOTAL CREDIT DERIVATIVES GROSS POSITIVE FAIR VALUE 
Period Amount Year–on-year change 
Y/Y  
% change 
05-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
06-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
07-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
08-Jan  R  5 660 216 964.75     
09-Jan R 10 836 115 254.19  R  5 175 898 289.44  47.77% 
10-Jan  R  9 529 012 869.03  R -1 307 102 385.16  -13.72% 
11-Jan  R  7 118 345 171.52  R -2 410 667 697.51  -33.87% 
12-Jan  R  5 688 786 671.90  R -1 429 558 499.62  -25.13% 
13-Jan  R  7 959 416 108.25  R  2 270 629 436.35  28.53% 
14-Jan  R  3 542 769 622.78  R -4 416 646 485.47  -124.67% 
15-Jan  R  5 035 388 481.68  R  1 492 618 858.90  29.64% 
Table 14: GPFV for total credit derivatives 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
TOTAL CREDIT DERIVATIVES GROSS NEGATIVE FAIR VALUE 
Period Amount Year–on-year Change 
Y/Y  
% change 
05-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
06-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
07-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
08-Jan  R  758 245 946.99     
09-Jan  R   6 993 941 957.36  R  6 235 696 010.37  89.16% 
10-Jan  R   4 893 105 730.06  R -2 100 836 227.30  -42.93% 
11-Jan  R   2 864 896 255.84  R -2 028 209 474.23  -70.80% 
12-Jan  R   3 659 140 006.11  R     794 243 750.27  21.71% 
13-Jan  R  4 714 390 611.57  R  1 055 250 605.46  22.38% 
14-Jan  R   9 174 844 070.24  R  4 460 453 458.67  48.62% 
15-Jan  R 12 570 638 743.46  R  3 395 794 673.22  27.01% 
Table 15: GNFV for total credit derivatives 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
136 | P a g e  
 
TOTAL OF ALL OTHER DERIVATIVES (OTC AND EXCHANGE TRADED)  
GROSS POSITIVE FAIR VALUE 
Period Amount Year-on-year Y/Y % change
Jan-05  R     199 375 210 000.00     
Jan-06  R     160 435 579 378.19  R      -38 939 630 621.81  -24.3% 
Jan-07  R     118 120 098 320.22  R     -42 315 481 057.97  -35.8% 
Jan-08  R     155 121 026 601.90  R     -18 046 942 894.51  -11.6% 
Jan-09  R     354 626 312 860.36  R     199 505 286 258.45  56.3% 
Jan-10  R     187 595 061 932.63  R   -167 031 250 927.73  -89.0% 
Jan-11  R     142 140 998 964.84  R     -45 454 062 967.79  -32.0% 
Jan-12  R     178 674 703 165.61  R       36 533 704 200.77  20.4% 
Jan-13  R     151 297 003 992.32  R     -27 377 699 173.29  -18.1% 
Jan-14  R     184 242 088 849.50  R       32 945 084 857.18  17.9% 
Jan-15  R     187 201 693 717.28  R         2 959 604 867.78  1.6% 
Table 16: GPFV for total of all other derivatives (OTC and exchange traded) 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
TOTAL OF ALL OTHER DERIVATIVES (OTC AND EXCHANGE TRADED)  
GROSS NEGATIVE FAIR VALUE 
Period Amount Year-on--year Y/Y % change
05-Jan R 203 114 616 000.00     
06-Jan R 157 697 346 237.61 R -45 417 269 762.39 -28.80% 
07-Jan R 121 484 756 891.97 R -36 212 589 345.64 -29.81% 
08-Jan R 146 834 706 317.55 R -29 581 136 092.16 -20.15% 
09-Jan R 344 283 485 823.26 R 197 448 779 505.71 57.35% 
10-Jan R 180 915 213 989.81 R -163 368 271 833.45 -90.30% 
11-Jan R 134 815 639 424.74 R -46 099 574 565.08 -34.19% 
12-Jan R 160 598 296 591.31 R 25 782 657 166.58 16.05% 
13-Jan R 126 265 088 973.42 R -34 333 207 617.89 -27.19% 
14-Jan R 160 229 468 232.43 R 33 964 379 259.01 21.20% 
15-Jan R 169 465 704 712.04 R 9 236 236 479.62 5.45% 
Table 17: GNFV for all other derivatives (OTC and exchange traded) 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
 
  
4.4.1.1 
Figure 17
Source: C
 
Overall
exceede
only ex
billion f
 
As at Ja
protecti
derivati
was due
local m
 
1
1
In
 Bi
lli
on
s o
f S
ou
th
 Af
ric
an
 Ra
nd
s (C
on
st
an
t 
Pr
ic
es
)
The	SA	
Credit der
: GPFV of prot
ompiled by res
, the GPFV
d GPFV o
ception wa
or protectio
nuary 2009
on sold. It 
ves where t
 to an incre
arket partic
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
08‐Jan
3.8
1.9
OTC	cre
ivatives: G
ection bought v
earcher (2015) 
 of credit 
f credit der
s January 2
n bought. 
 and Janua
is during th
he reportin
ase in CLN
ipants such
09‐Jan
8.8
2.1
Credit deriva
Credit deriva
dit	deri
PFV – pro
ersus protectio
derivatives
ivatives wh
014 where 
ry 2010, th
is same pe
g bank is a
s issued by
 as asset ma
10‐Jan
8.4
1.2
tives where t
tives where t
vatives
tection buy
n sold 
 where the
ere the rep
GPFV was 
e GPFV of
riod that th
protection 
 South Afr
nagers and
11‐Jan 1
5.2
2.0
he reporting 
he reporting 
	marke
er versus
 reporting 
orting bank
R2.3 billio
 protection 
ere was a m
buyer. It w
ican banks 
 insurance 
2‐Jan 13
3.9
1.8
bank is a prot
bank is a prot
t:	2005	
protection 
bank was 
 was a pro
n for protec
bought, dw
assive spik
as postulate
and bought
firms. 
‐Jan 14‐J
4.3
1
3.7
2
ection seller
ection buyer
to	2015
137 |
seller 
a protectio
tection sel
tion sold a
arfed the G
e in “other
d that this 
 by local n
an 15‐Jan
.2
2.6
.3
2.4
	
 P a g e  
 
n buyer 
ler. The 
nd R1.2 
PFV of 
” credit 
increase 
on-bank 
  
4.4.1.2 
Figure 18
Source: C
 
Regardi
where 
extreme
tenfold 
January
January
 
The ye
reportin
for ban
1
1
1
In
 Bi
lli
on
s o
f S
ou
th
 Af
ric
an
 Ra
nd
s (C
on
st
an
t 
Pr
ic
es
)
The	SA	
Credit der
: GNFV of cred
ompiled by res
ng figure 
the reporti
ly low in 
to R7 billio
 2011. Fro
 2015 of R
ars ending 
g bank was
kruptcy, th
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
08‐Jan
0.40.3
OTC	cre
ivatives: G
it derivatives: p
earcher (2015) 
18, there w
ng bank w
January 20
n by Janua
m January
12.6 billion
January 20
 a protectio
e counterp
09‐Jan
4.2
2.8
Credit d
Credit d
dit	deri
NFV – pro
rotection buye
as a large 
as a prote
08 for bot
ry 2009. GN
 2011, GN
. 
14 and Ja
n buyer. Th
arty risk to
10‐Jan
3.3
1.6
erivatives wh
erivatives wh
vatives
tection buy
r and protectio
variation b
ction buye
h protectio
FV then d
FV increa
nuary 2015
is means th
 local non
11‐Jan 1
0.8
2.1
ere the repor
ere the repor
	marke
er versus
n seller 
etween the
r and a p
n bought a
eclined unt
sed steadil
 both saw
at if the re
-bank mark
2‐Jan 13
0.7
3.0
ting bank is a
ting bank is a
t:	2005	
protection
 GNFV of
rotection s
nd sold. It
il January 
y until it 
 enormous
porting ban
et particip
‐Jan 14‐Ja
2.7
72.0
2
 protection se
 protection b
to	2015
138 |
 seller 
 credit der
eller. GNF
 then rose 
2010 and fu
reached a 
 GNFV wh
k defaulted
ants such 
n 15‐Jan
.2
8.3
.0
4.3
ller
uyer
	
 P a g e  
 
ivatives 
V was 
sharply 
rther in 
peak in 
ere the 
 or filed 
as asset 
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
139 | P a g e  
 
managers and insurance firms (excluding bilateral netting and collateral) has increased 
significantly in the preceding two years. 
 
4.4.1.3 GPFV of credit derivatives as a percentage of the sum of GPFV for all other 
derivatives (OTC and exchange traded) 
 
Figure 19: GPFV of credit derivatives expressed as a percentage of GPFV for all other derivatives (OTC and exchange  
traded) 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
The GPFV/GNFV for all other OTC derivatives could not be separated from the GPFV/ 
GNFV for exchange-traded derivatives. The above therefore reflects the GPFV of credit 
derivatives as a percentage of the GPFV for all other OTC derivatives plus the GPFV of 
exchange-traded derivatives. 
 
Regarding figure 19, the GPFV of credit derivatives as a percentage of GPFV for all other 
OTC derivatives plus the GPFV of exchange-traded derivatives was extremely erratic over 
the observed period, fluctuating between 3% and 5% between January 2008 and January 
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2013. In January 2014, it reached a low of less than 2% and increased to just under 3% in 
January 2015. 
 
4.4.1.4 GNFV of credit derivatives as a percentage of the sum of GNFV for all other 
derivatives (OTC and exchange traded) 
 
Figure 20: GNFV of credit derivatives expressed as a percentage of GNFV for all other derivatives (OTC and exchange 
traded) 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
The above thus reflects the GNFV of credit derivatives as a percentage of the GNFV for all 
other OTC derivatives plus the GNFV of exchange-traded derivatives. With reference to 
figure 20, the GNFV of credit derivatives as a percentage of GNFV for all other OTC 
derivatives plus the GNFV of exchange-traded derivatives saw strong growth over the 
observed period, from a low of below 1% in January 2005 to a high of over 7% in January 
2015. This is in sharp contrast to the erratic movements observed in figure 19. 
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4.4.2 Net current credit exposure 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION BUYER 
NET CURRENT CREDIT EXPOSURE 
Period Amount Year–on-year change Y/Y 
% change
05-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
06-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
07-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
08-Jan  R      3 336 937 886.00     
09-Jan  R      4 587 256 145.97  R     1 250 318 259.97  27.26% 
10-Jan  R      5 060 565 079.23  R       473 308 933.26  9.35% 
11-Jan  R     4 349 779 620.96  R       -710 785 458.27  -16.34% 
12-Jan  R      3 197 158 492.42  R    -1 152 621 128.54  -36.05% 
13-Jan  R      1 590 963 692.25  R    -1 606 194 800.17  -100.96% 
14-Jan  R     -5 953 501 911.04  R    -7 544 465 603.29  126.72% 
15-Jan  R  -5 664 693 717.28  R        288 808 193.76  -5.10% 
Table 18: NCCE for credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection buyer 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
4.4.2.1 NCCE where the reporting bank is a protection buyer 
 
Figure 21: NCCE where the reporting bank is a protection buyer 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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With reference to figure 21, the GPFV of credit derivatives where the reporting bank was a 
protection buyer exceeded the GNFV of credit derivatives where the reporting bank was a 
protection seller from January 2008 until January 2013– hence the positive NCCE value. 
During January 2014 and 2015, however, there was a sharp increase in the GNFV and a 
decline in the GPFV for credit derivatives where the reporting bank was a protection buyer. 
For these two periods, the GNFV exceeded the GPFV leading to a negative NCCE.  
 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES WHERE THE REPORTING BANK IS A PROTECTION SELLER 
NET CURRENT CREDIT EXPOSURE 
Period Amount Year-on-year change Y/Y  
% change
05-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
06-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
07-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
08-Jan R 2 255 011 580.03     
09-Jan R 4 880 231 220.74 R 2 625 219 640.70 53.79% 
10-Jan R -424 657 940.27 R -5 304 889 161.00 1249.21% 
11-Jan R -96 330 705.28 R 328 327 234.99 -340.83% 
12-Jan R -1 167 511 826.63 R -1 071 181 121.35 91.75% 
13-Jan R 1 654 061 804.44 R 2 821 573 631.07 170.58% 
14-Jan R 321 427 463.58 R -1 332 634 340.86 -414.60% 
15-Jan R -1 870 556 544.50 R -2 191 984 008.08 117.18% 
Table 19: NCCE for credit derivatives where the reporting bank is a protection seller 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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4.4.2.2 NCCE where the reporting bank is a protection seller 
 
 
Figure 22: NCCE where the reporting bank is a protection seller 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
 
NCCE where the reporting bank is a protection seller was far more erratic (see figure 22). 
January 2008 and 2009 reflected a large positive NCCE, which dropped to a negative value 
for January 2010, 2011 and 2012, then back to a positive value for January 2013 and 2014 
until diving to a negative value in January 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(R3)
(R2)
(R1)
R0
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
08‐Jan 09‐Jan 10‐Jan 11‐Jan 12‐Jan 13‐Jan 14‐Jan 15‐Jan
In
 Bi
lli
on
s o
f S
ou
th
 Af
ric
an
 Ra
nd
s (C
on
st
an
t P
ric
es
)
NCCE where the reporting bank is a protection 
seller
NCCE where the reporting bank is a protection seller
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
144 | P a g e  
 
TOTAL CREDIT DERIVATIVES: NET CURRENT CREDIT EXPOSURE 
Period Amount Year-on-year Change 
Y/Y  
% change 
05-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
06-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
07-Jan N/A N/A N/A 
08-Jan R 5 591 949 466.03     
09-Jan R 9 467 487 366.71 R 3 875 537 900.68 40.94% 
10-Jan R 4 635 907 138.97 R -4 831 580 227.74 -104.22% 
11-Jan R 4 253 448 915.68 R -382 458 223.28 -8.99% 
12-Jan R 2 029 646 665.79 R -2 223 802 249.89 -109.57% 
13-Jan R 3 245 025 496.68 R 1 215 378 830.89 37.45% 
14-Jan R -5 632 074 447.46 R -8 877 099 944.15 157.62% 
15-Jan R -7 535 250 261.78 R -1 903 175 814.32 25.26% 
Table 20: NCCE for total credit derivatives 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
4.4.2.3 NCCE for all credit derivatives 
 
Figure 23: NCCE for all credit derivatives 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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From January 2008 to January 2013, the positive NCCE for credit derivatives where the 
reporting bank was a protection buyer overwhelmed the negative NCCE values of January 
2010, 2011 and 2012, where the reporting bank was a protection seller. This resulted in a 
positive NCCE for all credit derivatives from January 2008 to January 2013 until the large 
increase in GNFV for credit derivatives, where the reporting bank was a protection buyer, 
resulting in a negative NCCE for all credit derivatives during January 2014 and January 
2015. 
 
 
ALL OTHER DERIVATIVES (OTC AND EXCHANGE TRADED)  
NET CURRENT CREDIT EXPOSURE 
Period Amount Year-on-year Change 
Y/Y  
% change 
05-Jan  R   -3 739 406 000.00     
06-Jan  R    2 738 233 140.58  R    6 477 639 140.58  236.6% 
07-Jan  R   -3 364 658 571.75  R   -6 102 891 712.33  181.4% 
08-Jan R 8 286 320 284.35  R  11 534 193 197.66  139.2% 
09-Jan R 10 342 827 037.09  R    2 056 506 752.74  19.9% 
10-Jan R 6 679 847 942.82  R   -3 662 979 094.28  -54.8% 
11-Jan R 7 325 359 540.10  R    645 511 597.28  8.8% 
12-Jan R 18 076 406 574.30  R  10 751 047 034.20  59.5% 
13-Jan R 25 031 915 018.90  R    6 955 508 444.60  27.8% 
14-Jan R 24 012 620 617.07  R  -1 019 294 401.83  -4.2% 
15-Jan R 17 735 989 005.24  R -6 276 631 611.84  -35.4% 
Table 21: NCCE for all other derivatives (OTC and exchange traded) 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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4.4.2.3 NCCE of credit derivatives expressed as a percentage of the sum of NCCE for all 
other OTC derivatives plus exchange-traded derivatives 
 
 
Figure 24: NCCE of credit derivatives as a percentage of the sum of NCCE for all other derivatives (OTC and exchange 
traded) 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
The NCCE of credit derivatives expressed as a percentage of the sum of NCCE for all other 
OTC derivatives plus exchange-traded derivatives is incredibly high. In January 2008 it was 
67% and in January 2009 it reached a height of 91%. 
 
From January 2008 to January 2015, the NCCE for all other OTC derivatives and exchange-
traded derivatives was positive. The NCCE for credit derivatives was positive from January 
2008 to January 2013, at which point it became negative. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
4.5.1 Market size 
The decline in the size of the market for credit derivatives, where the reporting bank was a 
protection buyer and a protection seller from January 2009 to January 2010, was primarily 
attributed to the impact of the global financial crisis which began in September 2008.  
 
A large variation in the size of the market for “other” credit derivatives, where the reporting 
bank was a protection buyer, was identified. It was argued that this could have been the result 
of inconsistencies in reporting. It was reasoned that CLNs could be classified as credit 
derivatives that acquire protection for the CLN issuers which, in South Africa, are primarily 
banks. CLNs include an embedded CDS which, from the perspective of the reporting bank, 
would be recorded as protection sold. However, the CLN issuer could report the notional 
amounts outstanding for CLNs as protection bought under “other” credit derivatives 
balancing the CDS reported as protection sold.  
 
During the observed period, protection sold by banks generally balanced protection bought 
by banks, the exceptions being January 2011 and January 2012 where protection sold 
dwarfed protection bought. During this same period, the size of other credit derivatives 
reported for protection bought plummeted, falling by nearly 70% from R28.6 billion in 
January 2010 to R8 billion in January 2011. January 2012 remained low at R9.4 billion 
before notional amounts outstanding started picking up again in January 2013. It is therefore 
possible that reporting errors (where CLNs were not fully reported during the period) were to 
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blame for this anomaly and that the credit derivatives books of South African banks were 
more balanced than the notional amounts outstanding for January 2011 and 2012 indicate. 
 
4.5.2 Market activity 
Market activity is measured over a period, in this case, January of each year. Without 
information on all the months in the year, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
movements in one month in isolation. 
 
4.5.3 Market risk 
The GNFV of credit derivatives was on an upward trend from January 2011 to January 2015, 
while the GPFV witnessed an overall decline. As a result, NCCE for total credit derivatives 
became negative in January 2014 and 2015. A negative NCCE indicates that the derivative 
holdings are a net liability to the reporting banks. According to the OCC, NCCE is not a true 
measure of market risk because it reflects the net present value of expected cash inflows and 
outflows of contracts that are traded under an enforceable netting agreement, and market 
volatility could change these amounts (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
2014). 
 
Policy recommendations for OTC derivatives regulation in South Africa, with specific 
reference to credit derivatives, will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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Chapter	5:	Conclusion,	progress	in	the	implementation	
of	OTC	derivatives	regulation	and	policy	
recommendations	
5.1 Introduction 
OTC derivatives markets were largely unregulated prior to the crisis, but the regulatory 
environment has changed drastically in response to the crisis, directly affecting not only the 
OTC derivatives markets, but also the worldwide financial system at large. The rest of the 
chapter is set out as follows: Section 5.2 summarises the research findings discussed in 
chapter 4 (sub-problem 1). The progress in the implementation of OTC derivatives regulation 
is discussed in section 5.3 (sub-problem 2). Section 5.4 deals with policy recommendations 
for South Africa in implementing OTC derivatives regulation and for the broader financial 
system (sub-problem 3). Section 5.5 looks at the possible impact of OTC derivatives 
regulations on the economy, while in section 5.6, the future of the South African credit 
derivatives market is discussed. Section 5.7 makes recommendations for further study. 
 
5.2 Summary of research findings 
5.2.1 Market size 
The decline in the size of the South African market for credit derivatives where the reporting 
bank was a protection buyer and a protection seller from January 2009 to January 2010 was 
primarily attributed to the impact of the global financial crisis, which began in September 
2008.  
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A large variation in the size of the market for “other” credit derivatives, where the reporting 
bank was a protection buyer, was identified. It was argued that this could have been the result 
of inconsistencies in reporting. It was argued that CLNs could be classified as credit 
derivatives that acquire protection for the CLN issuer, which in South Africa, are primarily 
banks. CLNs include an embedded CDS, which from the perspective of the reporting bank, 
would be recorded as protection sold. However, the CLN issuer could report the notional 
amounts outstanding for CLNs as protection bought under “other” credit derivatives 
balancing the CDS reported as protection sold.  
 
During the observed period, protection sold by banks generally balanced protection bought 
by banks, the exceptions being January 2011 and January 2012, where protection sold 
dwarfed protection bought. During this same period, the size of other credit derivatives 
reported for protection bought plummeted, falling by nearly 70% from R28.6 billion in 
January 2010 to R8 billion in January 2011. January 2012 remained low at R9.4 billion 
before notional amounts outstanding started picking up again in January 2013. It is therefore 
possible that reporting errors (where CLNs were not fully reported during the period) were to 
blame for this anomaly and that the credit derivatives books of South African banks were 
more balanced than the notional amounts outstanding for January 2011 and 2012 indicate. 
 
5.2.2 Market activity 
Market activity is measured over a period, in this case January of each year. Without 
information on all the months in the year, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
movements in one month in isolation. 
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5.2.3 Market risk 
The GNFV of credit derivatives was on an upward trend from January 2011 to January 2015, 
while the GPFV witnessed an overall decline. As a result, NCCE for total credit derivatives 
became negative in January 2014 and 2015. A negative NCCE indicates that the derivative 
holdings are a net liability to the reporting banks. According to the OCC, NCCE is not a true 
measure of market risk because it reflects the net present value of expected cash inflows and 
outflows of contracts that are traded under an enforceable netting agreement and market 
volatility could change these amounts (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
2014). 
 
5.3 Progress in the implementation of OTC derivatives regulation 
The progress to date in the implementation of regulation in reforming OTC derivatives 
markets in South Africa, the USA and the EU are summarised in table 22 below. 
 
 South Africa USA EU 
Trade reporting 
The FMA makes 
provision for a trade 
repository. No entity 
has been authorised to 
operate as a trade 
repository to date. 
Enforced. Over 90% 
of transactions are 
being reported. 
Enforced. Over 90% 
of transactions are 
being reported. 
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Central clearing 
The FMA has 
proposed criteria for 
determining which 
products should be 
centrally cleared. 
Public review will 
soon begin. 
Enforced. Products 
which must be 
centrally cleared have 
been identified. Over 
90% of these products 
are being centrally 
cleared. 
Enforced. Products 
which must be 
centrally cleared have 
been identified. Most 
of these products are 
being centrally 
cleared. 
Capital 
requirements for 
non-centrally 
cleared 
derivatives 
Basel III’s standards 
for banks’ 
counterparty credit 
risk-related capital 
treatment of non-
centrally cleared 
derivatives exposures 
have been accepted. 
Enforcement is 
expected in 2017. 
Basel III’s standards 
for banks’ 
counterparty credit 
risk-related capital 
treatment of non-
centrally cleared 
derivatives exposures 
are being reviewed.  
Basel III’s standards 
for banks’ 
counterparty credit 
risk-related capital 
treatment of non-
centrally cleared 
derivatives exposures 
have been accepted. 
Enforcement is 
expected in 2017. 
Margin 
requirements for 
non-centrally 
cleared 
derivatives 
BCBS-IOSCO 
standards for initial 
margining and 
variation margining 
to be applied to non-
centrally cleared 
derivatives have been 
released for 
consultation and will 
most likely be 
accepted. 
Enforcement was set 
to begin in December 
2015 but has since 
been delayed to 
September 2016. 
BCBS-IOSCO 
standards for initial 
margining and 
variation margining 
to be applied to non-
centrally cleared 
derivatives are under 
consideration. 
BCBS-IOSCO 
standards for initial 
margining and 
variation margining to 
be applied to non-
centrally cleared 
derivatives have been 
accepted. 
Enforcement was set 
to begin in December 
2015 but has since 
been delayed to 
September 2016. 
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Central trading 
The FMA makes 
provision for the 
central trading of 
standardised 
derivatives. 
Authorities have not 
yet decided whether 
to enforce central 
trading. 
Enforced. Products 
which must be 
centrally traded have 
been identified.  
Enforced. Products 
which must be 
centrally traded have 
been identified. This 
includes interest rate 
and credit asset 
classes – enforcement 
to begin in January 
2017. 
 
Table 22: OTC derivative regulatory reform 
Source: Financial Stability Board (2015)  
 
The Dodd-Frank’s Volcker rule only applies to the USA. It restricts banks’ proprietary 
derivatives trading activities, that is, banking book trades. Only “bona fide hedging and 
traditional bank activities” will be permitted under the Volcker rule. The restrictions on 
proprietary trading are a strong signal of intent from US regulators that they do not want 
banks to speculate using derivatives in future. According to an article by the Wall Street 
Journal, the Volcker rule is “perhaps the most significant new restriction on [banks’] 
activities since after the Great Depression”. Despite this fact, most banks were compliant 
when the Volcker rule was implemented on 22 July 2015 after many legal attempts to stop 
the rule’s implementation were unsuccessful (Tracy & Rudegeair, 2015: 4 September 2015). 
At this stage it is uncertain whether this return to fundamentals will enhance financial 
stability or if banks will find more systemically risky activities in their search for yield. 
 
A second major difference in regulation between the USA, EU and South Africa is the 
accounting treatment of derivatives, as discussed in section 3.4.3. The USA follows US 
GAAP, while the EU and South Africa follow the IFRS. Under US GAAP, banks report 
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derivatives as a net value (i.e. NCCE) either as an asset or a liability in their balance sheets. 
In contrast, under IFRS, banks report derivatives as gross amounts (i.e. the GPFV is recorded 
as an asset and the GNFV is recorded as a liability). These differences in reporting structures 
have large impacts on banks’ balance sheets. If banks currently operating under US GAAP 
were forced to record derivatives as gross amounts on their balance sheets, they would need 
to either deleverage or increase their capital holdings to comply with Basel III’s leverage 
ratio and capital adequacy requirements. However, if banks reporting under IFRS were 
allowed to report derivatives as a net position, they would have the capacity to increase their 
lending (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2012). 
 
In 2010, the G20 and the Financial Stability Board requested that the boards responsible for 
US GAAP and IFRS discuss ways to converge the two sets of accounting standards to reduce 
the differences in the recording of derivative positions. However, the project was not 
successful (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2012). It is important that 
efforts to consolidate US GAAP and IFRS continue as the differences between the two are a 
source of regulatory arbitrage. According to the OCC, NCCE after collateral has been taken 
into account is a far better indication of an entity’s ability to generate future cash flows than 
gross values. It is for this reason that it recommends that US GAAP standards continue to 
require the reporting of derivative holdings as a net amount (Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), 2014) 
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5.4 Policy recommendations for South Africa 
5.4.1 South African trade repository 
After a TR has been established, mandatory reporting will be phased in over a 12-month 
period following the commencement of the mandatory reporting requirement. Like the EU, 
South African authorities have exempted end-users from the responsibility to report 
transactions to a TR. However, once end-users cross over the threshold, they automatically 
become systemically important institutions and need to report their transactions to a TR (the 
FMA does not prescribe a threshold). 
 
One local licensed TR (if a local repository is considered) is recommended to avoid 
duplication of data and avoid operational complexities even though the FMA allows for 
multiple TRs to be established (International Monetary Fund, 2015b). Strate, the central 
securities depository (CSD) for the JSE has applied for a licence to operate a local TR. If a 
foreign TR is licensed, then it is critical that South African authorities establish a MoU with 
the foreign TR to ensure they have access to all the data they need to monitor the local 
market. It is anticipated that reporting will be phased in during 2016 and completed by the 
first half of 2017 (Financial Stability Board, 2015).  
 
Currently, the local data suffers from a number of defects, especially with respect to the type 
of data submitted and aggregated (The OTC Derivatives Working Group, 2012). A TR could 
therefore assist South African authorities in assessing the build-up of systemic risks in the 
OTC derivatives market. However, the usefulness of this data will depend on the type of 
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information collected and also ensure that those individuals responsible for reporting are 
properly trained to do so.  
 
5.4.2 South African central clearing counterparty 
As of early 2015, there was no licensed local CCP and no foreign CCP had yet been 
recognised in the South African OTC derivatives market. The debate between the benefits 
and drawbacks of using only a local CCP, only a foreign CCP, both or a hybrid approach still 
continues internationally. Brazil mandates that transactions are cleared by the local CCP, 
BM&FBOVESPA. Canada requires market participants to make use of a global CCP, while 
Singapore and Australia allow market participants the choice between using either a local or 
foreign CCP. There has been no practical application of the hybrid model to date 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015b). The FMA does allow for the use of both local and 
global CCPs, but there will still be a public consultation phase where revisions could be 
made. If authorities do settle on the mixed approach they should be cognisant of the timing of 
the licensing or recognition of the first CCP. Recognising a foreign CCP before licensing a 
local CCP could severely hamper a future local CCP’s competitiveness in the market. 
 
Safcom is a potential candidate for a local CCP but it is owned by the JSE which is the 
country’s only exchange. The ESMA has identified that the connectedness of a CCP and an 
exchange poses additional systemic risks. In addition, South African authorities have begun 
investigating the effectiveness of the JSE as a self-regulatory organisation. Another risk is 
that Safcom has ten clearing members of which the big four are primarily responsible for its 
liquidity. The failure of one of these big four would place a huge burden on the surviving 
members. This is a challenge that would face any South Africa CCP because the country only 
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has five big banks that are highly interconnected.  The failure of one of the CCP’s large 
clearing members could result in the failure of the CCP itself because it is vulnerable to 
wrong-way risk. The failure of a local CCP would have catastrophic consequences for the 
local financial system. It is for this reason that it is recommended that any local South 
African CCP have access to liquidity from the SARB. Already the National Bank of Belgium 
and other central banks in Europe have committed to provide liquidity to their local CCPs 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015b). 
 
It is important to consider the effect of the credit downgrade of a South African clearing 
member of a global CCP, or a credit downgrade of South Africa as a country. If a South 
African bank or the country receives a credit downgrade it could trigger margin calls by the 
global CCP since that CCP is concerned with the stability of the country in which it is based. 
Increased margin calls will increase the amount of collateral the South African bank has to 
post. This, in turn, will negatively affect the South African bank’s liquidity which may 
require it to deleverage. This, in turn, could result in higher margin calls setting off a 
procyclical downward spiral. South African banks that post collateral in South African rands 
are less exposed to exchange rate fluctuations, but the use of South African rands could result 
in higher margin calls imposed by a global CCP. 
 
South African banks have been using LCH.Clearnet Ltd, a foreign CCP based in London, 
since early 2013. Currently, there is no agreement between South African authorities and UK 
authorities regarding South African banks’ use of LCH.Clearnet Ltd, although the Financial 
Services Board does intend to initiate coordination. South African banks are presently 
indirect clearing members, but could become direct clearing members in the future 
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(International Monetary Fund, 2015b). South African banks have not yet registered as market 
participants under Dodd-Frank because the volumes have so far been under the threshold. 
 
5.4.3 Capital requirements 
Basel III applies a lower risk weight of 2% to derivative transactions cleared through a CCP, 
as long as the CCP meets certain requirements. However non-centrally cleared derivatives are 
subject to an additional capital charge for potential mark-to-market losses on the expected 
counterparty risk, and this additional capital charge is known as credit value adjustment 
(CVA). CVA accounts for counterparty risk – the higher the perceived counterparty risk, the 
higher the capital charge. OTC derivative transactions that are cleared through a CCP will not 
be subject to CVA. These requirements came into effect at the beginning of 2013, but owing 
to the lack of a local licensed CCP or a recognised foreign CCP, the SARB temporarily 
exempted banks from the CVA requirement for transactions denominated and transacted 
solely in South African rand, as well as for those OTC derivatives entered into bilaterally 
between local counterparties until the end of 2014 (International Monetary Fund, 2015a). 
 
In addition to higher capital charges for banks when not transacting through a CCP, the FMA 
has made provision for margining requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives to be 
imposed. The South African authorities have allowed for a temporary exemption from 
margining requirements until 2015. A simple way to speed up this process would be for 
authorities to recognise a foreign CCP, and then phase in the capital and margin requirements 
for non-centrally cleared derivatives. However, this might impede the competitiveness of a 
local CCP once licensed (International Monetary Fund, 2015b).  
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5.4.4 Margin requirements 
BCBS-IOSCO bilateral margin requirements call for an initial margin and variable margin to 
be placed. The requirements state that the initial margin be posted against “potential future 
bilateral derivatives exposures”. In discussions with market participants, the Macroeconomic 
Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD) found that derivatives dealers have serious 
objections to initial margin being posted against potential future exposures. These concerns 
were published in the BIS’s ”Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives 
regulatory reforms” of 2013. Their argument is fourfold. Firstly, dealers contend that they do 
not hold enough high quality collateral to cover initial margin requirements. Secondly, they 
maintain that the increased demand for high quality collateral would result in higher prices 
for these assets. Thirdly, initial margins are procyclical because when market volatility 
increases, collateral requirements will increase, and vice versa when market volatility 
decreases. Fourthly, an initial margin has a higher opportunity cost of interest than a variable 
margin. Margining is also required by end-users such as asset managers and hedge funds. 
Hedge funds generally have two-way positions so they would be posting and receiving 
margins at the same time. However, asset managers generally have one-directional positions, 
which means that initial margin requirements would be high (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2013). 
 
These concerns are certainly relevant in the South African market which does not have a 
large supply of liquid assets that qualify as collateral. This point was mentioned earlier in 
section 2.2.11, where it was noted that the SARB was needed to provide liquidity to the 
market to assist banks in their compliance with the LCR. Margin requirements will only 
increase these strains on liquidity and raise the price of assets which qualify to be used as 
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collateral. The procyclical nature of margining is perhaps the most disturbing as this is in 
direct conflict with the G20’s goal of increased stability in financial markets. 
 
5.4.5 Centralised trading of OTC derivatives 
The draft FMA does not mandate the centralised trading of standardised derivative 
transactions. It is recommended that authorities focus on the implementation of mandatory 
reporting to a TR, mandatory central clearing through a CCP, margining and capital 
requirements as well as the implementation of the twin peaks framework before mandating 
trading of standardised derivatives. Authorities may decide that mandatory trading is not 
required in South Africa (International Monetary Fund, 2015b).  
 
5.4.6 International regulatory arbitrage 
The FMA was specifically designed to complement the EMIR since most local banks transact 
heavily with European banks. South African authorities must be aware of the inconsistencies 
with the US regulation and work to close these gaps to prevent regulatory arbitrage, while 
still balancing the unique needs of the local market. A one-size-fits-all approach is not 
suitable, especially in the infant phase of OTC derivatives regulation. At the same time, the 
simultaneous implementation of twin peaks and OTC derivatives market reform poses a 
significant challenge for regulators who will need to plan the implementation carefully to 
avoid market disruptions. 
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5.4.7 Crisis management planning 
In November 2011, the G20 encouraged the development of recovery plans and resolution 
plans for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). A recovery plan outlines 
credible recovery options that can be implemented quickly under a range of market-wide 
stress scenarios. Resolution plans are also called living wills because they provide authorities 
with a guide to achieving an orderly resolution of the institution should the recovery plan be 
unsuccessful (KPMG, 2011: 1-2). Recovery planning for D-SIBs in South Africa has already 
begun, but it cannot start until authorities clarify legislation requirements for bank resolution. 
It is recommended that this is done as soon as possible. Three of the big five South African 
banks, namely ABSA, Nedbank and Investec, have strong ownership ties to institutions in the 
UK. It is therefore recommended that the recovery and resolution plans for these D-SIBs are 
developed in consultation with UK authorities (International Monetary Fund, 2015a).  
 
The G20 hopes that recovery and resolution planning will curb the moral hazard problems 
associated with SIFIs such as “too big to fail”. Another source of moral hazard in South 
Africa stems from the inability of the SARB to fine individuals such as senior bank 
management or board members, and it is recommended that this position should be revisited  
(International Monetary Fund, 2015a). 
 
In March 2014, the Financial Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF) conducted a simulation 
exercise including the SARB, Financial Services Board, National Treasury, JSE and other 
FMIs to test the coordination between authorities during a crisis scenario. The results of the 
simulation are being used to further improve cooperation and coordination in the event of a 
crisis (International Monetary Fund, 2015b).  
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5.5 Impact of regulation and challenges for the market 
In February 2013, the OTC Derivatives Coordination Group commissioned a quantitative 
study of the macroeconomic impact of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms to be undertaken 
by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD). The MAGD was chaired 
by Stephen G. Cecchetti of the Bank of International Settlements, which published its report 
in August 2013. The MAGD identified the direct costs of reforms as higher capital 
requirements, an improvement in the quality of capital held, additional margin requirements, 
and clearing fees when clearing through a CCP. It assumed that banks would pass on the 
increased costs of reforms to their customers in the form of higher prices and lending spreads. 
It concluded, therefore that the main cost would be a reduction in economic activity (GDP) 
resulting from higher prices. The group focused on the consequences of reforms after they 
have been fully implemented, and therefore the direct costs of implementation such as the 
one-time costs, for example, technological upgrades and legal consultation, were ignored. 
The MAGD assumed that the benefit of reforms would be a lower probability of financial 
crisis. The group estimated that the annual probability of a financial crisis propagated by 
OTC derivatives would be 0.26%, and that following the implementation of reforms, the 
probability would be negligible. Assuming that a typical crisis costs 60% of GDP, then the 
benefit of OTC derivatives reforms would be 0.26 x 60% = 0.16% of annual GDP (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2013). 
 
Three estimates of the cost of reforms were identified as high cost, low cost and central 
scenarios. The main differentiation between the three cost scenarios is the assumed amount of 
netting capabilities, and higher netting would result in lower costs of reform. The group 
calculated the various costs for each scenario and came to the following percentages of 
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annual GDP lost per scenario: low cost 0.03%, central 0.04% and high cost 0.07%. Hence, 
given the benefits of 0.16% of annual GDP, in the central cost scenario the net benefits of 
reform are 0.12% of annual GDP. The MAGD thus found that the benefits from reform 
outweigh the costs, especially in the low cost and central scenario. The group recommends 
that OTC derivatives that can be safely cleared by a CCP should be centrally cleared, as a 
reduction in counterparty risk is central to the assumed benefits (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2013).  
 
The study conducted by the MAGD ignored possible macroeconomic costs resulting from 
changes in behaviour of market participants (as these are incredibly difficult to model). One 
of the most concerning of these behavioural changes relates to small relatively illiquid 
markets, such as the South African market. Owing to increased costs, dealer banks may alter 
their business models and reduce their involvement in market making, resulting in lower 
market liquidity which could threaten the existence of the market. 
 
A potential benefit of reforms is a reduction in price model risk. This is because currently 
counterparty risk is priced into derivative contracts, but because it is difficult to measure, it is 
often requires subjective judgement. In a post-reform environment, counterparty risk will be 
reduced and thus derivatives will be easier to price, making these instruments less opaque. 
 
Since the benefits of netting decline as the number of CCPs increase, it would be beneficial 
for CCPs to operate together. This, however, increases systemic risk. In addition it is 
imperative that only derivatives which can be centrally cleared in a safe manner are forced to 
do so because clearing illiquid derivatives could lead to a build-up of risks in a CCP. The 
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failure of a CCP would have catastrophic counterparty credit risk effects and could itself lead 
to a financial crisis. 
 
5.6 The future of the South African credit derivatives market 
The development of the South African credit derivatives market, as indicated in section 2.3, 
can be split into the following four distinct phases: infancy, pre-crisis growth, crisis 
aftershock and post-crisis growth. The infancy stage saw the birth of the credit derivatives 
market in South Africa in 2003 (the first time the researcher could find credit derivatives 
reported on the DI430 form was January 2003) until the exchange control reforms announced 
by the Minister of Finance in his 2007 budget speech. Up to that point, exchange controls had 
been a significant barrier to growth in the market for all derivative asset classes (Adelegan, 
2009). The pre-crisis growth period was characterised by an increase in the number of market 
participants and greater product innovation. For instance, in 2008, Absa introduced new 
products such as enhanced return credit-linked notes and inflation credit-linked notes, and 
this period also saw an increase in the number of market participants (Risk Magazine, 2008). 
The third period, beginning in late September 2008 and lasting for several months, was 
characterised by uncertainty and sluggishness in the market in the aftermath of the crisis. The 
fourth period has seen continued growth post-crisis, but the future of the South African credit 
derivatives market is extremely uncertain. The South African credit derivatives market is 
currently too small to allow for a liquid interdealer CDS market. Hence South African banks 
act as dealers passing risk from international counterparties to local market participants and 
they rarely trade with one another. This lack of liquidity will continue to restrict the range of 
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local structured credit products on offer. This one-directional risk transfer would also 
severely limit the benefits of netting if central clearing were mandated. 
 
In the USA, mandatory central clearing of certain standardised credit derivatives has already 
been enforced. These are selected North American CDX and European iTraxx indices; 
already 79% of new index credit derivatives transactions in the USA are centrally cleared. In 
the EU, selected iTraxx credit derivatives indices have been identified and it is anticipated 
that mandatory central clearing will be enforced for these products by the first half of 2016 
(Financial Stability Board, 2015). Credit derivative indices are the most standardised 
products in the credit derivatives asset class, which makes them more suitable for central 
clearing. In South Africa, the vast majority of CDSs are single name, with only a few basket 
CDSs being used. There are no South African issued CDS indices, which could present an 
obstacle to speedy central clearing. In addition, the depth and liquidity of the South African 
credit derivatives market are most likely not high enough to warrant central clearing. The 
costs associated with operating an authorised CCP for the credit derivatives asset class could 
outweigh the revenue that may be generated from offering services in South Africa. 
 
South African authorities must recognise the need to establish a CCP for improving the safety 
of the market and aligning with international regulation, particularly in respect of interest rate 
derivatives, which make up the majority of the OTC market. The costs and benefits of central 
clearing for other derivative asset classes such as credit derivatives should also be carefully 
considered. Careful planning of regulation and supervisory powers is essential given the 
systemic importance of CCPs. Higher capital charges will force banks to reduce their 
leverage, resulting in tighter credit extension in the economy, which will be a constraint on 
future growth. 
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5.7 Recommendations for further study 
The international financial sector is in the midst of regulatory changes unlike anything ever 
experienced in any other period in history. This creates scope for research into the 
implementation of regulations and their effect on the economy, also relating to South Africa 
specifically. The following are some suggested avenues for further research: 
 
 the effect of regulation on the liquidity and structure of OTC credit derivatives market 
as well as the OTC derivatives market at large. 
 how extensively banks use credit derivatives to hedge their own risk and how 
regulation has affected this. 
 the effect of the implementation of Basel III on bank behaviour and lending spreads 
 the challenges of implementing twin peaks in South Africa. 
 conducting a cost/benefit analysis of post-crisis regulation on world GDP. 
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Appendix	A:	GDP	deflator	
 
Date GDP deflator index 
2005/12/31 100 
2006/12/31 106.528 
2007/12/31 115.134
2008/12/31 124.352
2009/12/31 134.763
2010/12/31 145.077 
2011/12/31 153.599 
2012/12/31 160.443 
2013/12/31 169.826 
2014/12/31 180.53 
2015/12/31 191 
 
Table 23: GDP deflator for South Africa 
Source: Quantec (2015) 
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Appendix	B:	Example	of	a	completed	BA350	form	published	by	the	SARB	
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Figure 25: BA350 form (January 2014): values are in thousands of rand 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2014) 
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Table 24: Notional amounts outstanding in current (nominal) prices 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
Appendix	C:	Data	tables	
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Table 25: Turnover in current (nominal) prices 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
The	SA	OTC	credit	derivatives	market:	2005	to	2015	
 
183 | P a g e  
 
 Table 27: Fair value in current (nominal) prices 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
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Table 28: Fair value in current prices (continued) 
Source: Compiled by researcher (2015) 
 
